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ABSTRACT
Institutionalizing Environmental Justice:
Race, Place, and the National Environmental Policy Act
by
Keith K. Miyake

Advisor: Ruth Wilson Gilmore

In this dissertation, I examine ways that the US National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) and its primary enforcement mechanism, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
process, have reshaped the state as a site for racial and environmental conflict by institutionalizing
a particular form of environmental justice within governmental decision making processes.
Combining archival methods and legal analysis, I develop three case studies involving community
struggles over the social production of space that each engage the EIA process to different effect.
The case studies were selected based on what they reveal about the ways that the environmental
justice framework intersects with and gets institutionalized within the EIA process. The first case
study follows the conflict over a public housing project in New York City where race and class
figured as environmental categories deployed in relation to desegregation efforts and fair housing
policy. The second case study looks at a campaign to stop the construction of a prison in Delano,
California, where the EIA process provided a legal platform for bridging environmental justice
and prison abolition struggles. The final case study looks at an ongoing campaign against live-fire
military training on land used for Native Hawaiian cultural and subsistence practices on the island
of Oʻahu in Hawaiʻi, where ecological concerns embedded within Native Hawaiian land use
epistemologies provide a critical framework for resisting ongoing US militarization.
I develop the concept of the racial environmental state in order to explain how the EIA
iv

process functions to simultaneously and interdependently maintain both racial capitalism and
uneven productions of nature, while also providing institutionalized pathways for challenging and
reshaping the state as a site of racial and environmental conflict. My case studies highlight the
capacities and limitations of this particular state formation for social and environmental justice
organizing. I detail ways that the NEPA legislation and the EIA process have institutionalized a
specific type of environmental justice that renders racialized space and difference legible and
governable within the purview of the contemporary capitalist state vis-à-vis environmental
knowledge. My analyses reveal complex ways in which people rework racial and environmental
meanings through their engagement with environmental policy, and in so doing, counterpose race
and environment as articulated modes of resistance to the racist capitalist state.
Each of my case studies tells the story of a geographically specific conflict over the
production of racialized space that is waged through a combination of legal actions and mass
mobilizations around the EIA process. The concepts of race and environment operate in different
ways within each case study, but in all three, the legal battle over the EIA process is tied up in
struggles that deploy race and environment to articulate differing visions of place, as well as in
conflicts over the state’s understandings of race and difference. While the specific stakes of each
case differ in their spatial, scalar, temporal, and political particularities, they share a common
struggle over placemaking waged through and against the state’s use of race and environment as
linked concepts informing land use and infrastructure decisions. I conclude that through these
struggles, the EIA process has institutionalized a particular form of environmental justice logics
that maintain the legitimacy the racial environmental state through the incorporation of liberal
forms of official antiracism, distributive justice, and neoliberal capitalist environmental relations.
Ultimately, my research reveals that the development and institutionalization of the EIA process
in the US provides institutional, legal, and political structures for governing racialized space and
populations, and as a result, opens new possibilities and limitations for social and environmental
justice activism and community organizing.
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Introduction

In 1969, US Senator Henry Jackson introduced a piece of legislation, a National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), which he promoted as a necessary step in addressing what he termed the
“growing environmental problems and crises the nation faces” (Jackson qtd. in Caldwell 1998, 1,
emphasis added). The NEPA legislation was approved by Congress and signed into law on
January 1, 1970 by President Richard Nixon. It was passed amid financial crises, widespread civil
unrest, and general uncertainty about the future of US capitalism. The mainstream popularity of
Rachel Carson’s bestselling book, Silent Spring, published in 1962, helped to fuel a growing
mainstream environmentalism movement into a powerful political force whose
precautionary—and at times alarmist—messages challenged the stability of industrial capitalism
in the US. At the same time, the US was facing massive Vietnam War debt and a skyrocketing
balance of payments, which eventually contributed to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
and the elimination of the gold standard. Along with the ongoing sociopolitical pressure from the
Civil Rights and Anti-War Movements, the US government was in need of major political reforms
to mediate civil unrest and ensure the future of Cold War Capitalism. In this context, NEPA
emerged as an addendum to the series of social, economic, infrastructural, and environmental
policies legislated under the banner of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society program.
Importantly, this series of government reforms help set into motion the slow and
contradiction-ridden decline of Keynesianism and the interventionist welfare state headlined by
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, and set the stage for the rise of the neoliberal state, and
as I describe further below, the racial environmental state. Ultimately, the institutional
1
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arrangements that emerged from this state restructuring resulted in dramatic shifts in the
mechanisms and rationalities of governance, with new dependencies on the logics of bio- and
techno-scientific rationality, the liberalization of global finance regimes, and new forms of liberal
antiracism and its cousin, covert racism (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Ong 2006).
The NEPA legislation fundamentally changed the administrative process for implementing
government funded projects and programs that affected the physical environment (Caldwell 1998;
Bartlett and Kurian 1999). It brought together roughly a century’s worth of fragmented and often
conflicting environmental legislation in the US under an umbrella environmental policy that
affects every federal government agency. The legislation consists of three primary parts. The first
is a broad and vague statement that the government should “encourage a productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment” (42 USC §4321 Sec. 2) by placing a subjective
value—without obligation—on activities and policies aimed at preserving healthy environmental
conditions. The second part establishes a central environmental agency within the executive
branch, the Committee on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to oversee and report on the country’s
environmental quality. The third part is a statutory, or legal requirement for all federal agencies to
evaluate the environmental impacts of “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment” (42 USC §4321, Sec. 102(c)). In practice, the first provision of the
NEPA legislation has had little or no substantive impact on government operations (Lindstrom
2000). The CEQ established by the second provision has at times been effective in establishing
environmental guidelines and policy, but is positioned in such a way that it has little enforcement
power or oversight capacity (Taylor 1984). The third provision is by far the most important and
enduring aspect of the NEPA legislation because it is the “action-forcing provision” (Caldwell
1998, 29) that substantiates and gives visibility to the environmental goals of the first part of the
Act. This third provision establishes a requirement that all federally funded projects and actions
undergo a systematic assessment of potential environmental consequences as part of the
administrative evaluation and decision making process, known as the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process. Given the significance of the EIA process because of its widespread
2
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impact on government agencies and actions, what are the implications of this aspect of the NEPA
legislation to the role of environment in government generally? And more specifically, how might
we understand the increased role of environment within government functions as a matter of
environmental justice?
Since its initial deployment as a requirement of the NEPA legislation, the EIA process has
been further incorporated into a broad class of public policies and state-centered environmental
practices with two primary functions.1 The first is to introduce procedural requirements for state
administrators and bureaucrats, planners, developers, and policymakers to systematically account
for and assess broadly conceived environmental impacts into the decision making processes for
large-scale development projects and programs. The second objective, arrived at through early
political struggles in the US, is to allow for a modicum of transparency and public participation
within that decision making process. This EIA process framework, as it has been adopted across
the range of government functions and scales of governance, formalizes the precautionary
principle of systematically assessing and weighing the potential benefits of a project or program
against its potential risks or harms as a key component of liberal democratic governance, and
aims to displace paternalistic and fragmented forms of governance.
As has become a normalized condition under neoliberal governance models in the latter
part of the 20th century, the EIA process emphasizes scientific and liberal economic rationality,
public participation, and deliberative decision making that render both space and the populations
that inhabit them as legible and manageable under the purview of the liberal capitalist state (Ong
2006; Foucault 2007; Goldman 2001; Luke 1995). Viewing the EIA process in this way, as a
mechanism of neoliberal governance and what some scholars have variously termed
“environmental governmentality” (Luke 1995; Darier 1996), demands an understanding of how
1

In addition to its use in environmental policy, similarly structured “impact assessment” type
policies have been developed to consider the potential impacts from other aspects of public
administration, such as economic impact assessments, health impact assessments, social and
cultural impact assessments, policy impact assessments, etc. See Taylor (1984).
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the process came to be institutionalized as such. Furthermore, given the geographically specific
ways that the state has historically used various forms of environmental controls to racially
differentiate populations and dominate racially differentiated populations, what are the
implications of the EIA process for the racial state? In turn, how does the EIA process’s
pervasiveness within state institutions implicate environment and race as interconnected systems
of knowledge and control? This dissertation aims to address these questions through case studies
of conflicts involving the EIA process, with a particular focus on the implications of the EIA
process on the environmental justice framework and the particular state form I see as most
directly impacted by the EIA process, the racial environmental state.
This project is a legal and geographical history that examines some of the ways that the
NEPA legislation and the EIA process have institutionalized a specific type of environmental
justice that renders racialized space and difference legible and governable within the purview of
the contemporary capitalist state. This history, told through three case studies, reveals that the
development and institutionalization of the EIA process in the US provides new institutional,
legal, and political structures for governing racialized space and populations, and as a result,
opens new possibilities and limitations for social and environmental justice activism and
community organizing. Each of the case studies tells the story of a geographically specific
conflict over the production of racialized space that is waged through a combination of legal
action and mass mobilization around the EIA process. While the specific stakes of each case
differ in their spatial, temporal, and political particularities, they share a common struggle over
placemaking waged through and against the state’s use of race and environment as linked
concepts informing land use and infrastructure decisions.
Through the case studies, I address a number of questions that derive from my overarching
questions about the EIA process. How do locally situated or culturally specific environmental
epistemes articulate with social justice objectives across geopolitical scales? One of the novelties
of the EIA process is that it requires that state agencies develop knowledge about a place and
4
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populations through a range of social and physical sciences (Caldwell 1982). Through the public
feedback mechanisms institutionalized within the EIA process, different forms of environmental
knowledge and knowledge systems can be made legible to the state when concerned citizens
incorporate them into their feedback regarding the potential impacts of a proposed project or
action. These different ways of knowing and relating to the environment can expose new
possibilities for alternate geographical conceptions of space and scale that exceed locally confined
Cartesian understandings of environment. For example, the commonly understood concept of
ecosystems can potentially unsettle a fetish for localized geographies because of the mobility and
interconnectedness of ecological and biological entities and systems. Holding constant this
process-based approach to interconnected systems of environment, the ecological model can be
extended to social and economic systems to understand social-environmental systems in terms of
the linkages between physical changes to the environment in one place whose impacts propagate
unevenly across racially and economically differentiated communities and spaces (Katz 2001).
Building on the question of multiple ways of understanding the environment, how does
the EIA process accommodate or foreclose competing environmental uses and values, and in turn,
what does this mean for community organizers and activists aiming to use the EIA process as a
point of intervention in state actions? The EIA process forces state agencies to weigh alternative
possibilities for achieving a policy or infrastructure objective, and through this deliberative
process, address the ways that each possibility, along with the preferred alternative, address a
broad and continually growing set of statutory and institutional objectives, ranging from the
protection of endangered species to minimizing the release of toxins to ensuring that
lower-income communities and communities with larger non-white populations are not
disproportionately impacted by harmful environmental conditions. Understanding the process
through which agencies weigh their institutional objectives against these often competing
obligations can reveal contradictions and fractures within the state that can present as
opportunities for social justice organizers to intervene or act to shift the state’s priorities.

5
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Through the case studies, I address these and other questions about the form and function
of the EIA process. I conclude that the EIA framework fundamentally changes the method of
racial and environmental statecraft, providing a mechanism and capacity for non-state actors to
engage and alter the state capacities for placemaking. I argue that the development and
institutionalization of the EIA process in the US fundamentally altered the ways in which space is
governed in relation to racially and economically differentiated populations, resulting in new
possibilities and limitations for social and environmental justice struggles through their
engagement with and opposition to the capitalist racial environmental state. I demonstrate some
of the ways that the development of EIA has resulted in an institutional scaffolding that provides a
platform for political maneuvering through and against the capitalist racial state, and upon which
a multiplicity of social justice struggles have gained purchase through an environmental justice
framing. I contend that through these struggles, the EIA process has institutionalized a particular
form of environmental justice logics that maintain the legitimacy the racial environmental state
through the incorporation of liberal forms of official antiracism, distributive justice, and
neoliberal capitalist environmental relations. The sections that follow expand on these concepts in
general and as they are applied throughout this dissertation.

A Primer on Environmental Impact Assessment

In practice, the EIA process is an administrative procedure to determine and publicly disseminate
the potential environmental outcomes of a proposed project or program (see Figure 1.1). The
government agency in charge of the proposal, the lead agency, is responsible for overseeing and
conducting the series of environmental reviews that comprise the EIA process, and ultimately,
using the findings of those reviews to aid in their decision to proceed with the proposal or not. All
federal agencies fall under the NEPA umbrella, meaning that the lead agency can be any
organization from the Department of Justice to the Bureau of Land Management to the US Postal
Service. In addition to the requirements for EIA under the NEPA legislation, similar legislation
6
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exists at different scales of government and internationally. Most of the US states have
“mini-NEPA” legislation that holds similar requirements for EIA for agencies within the state
government as those under NEPA; in some cases, even municipalities have EIA requirements for
publicly funded local projects. Internationally, most countries have their own EIA provisions at
the national and/or local level, as does the European Union, and even the World Bank requires an
EIA process for projects it funds. What follows is a brief description and theoretical analysis of
the general EIA process as required by the NEPA legislation; it is similar in form and function to
most other EIA requirements being as it was the original template that was later copied elsewhere.
The first step of the EIA process is an initial determination on the applicability or need for
impact assessment. If the lead agency is unsure of the extent of potential environmental impacts,
they will first conduct a preliminary Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine whether the
impacts are likely to be significant or extensive. If the EA finds no significant impacts, the EIA
process is essentially concluded. If the lead agency initially suspects that significant
environmental impacts are likely, or the EA concludes similarly, then the lead agency is
responsible for preparing a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), sometimes called an
Environmental Impact Report (EIR). The EIS/EIR details the specific impacts of the proposed
action on various aspects of the environment, using a combination of economical, biological,
geological, ecological, anthropological, and sociological data and scientific analyses of those data.
It is also supposed to describe remediation or mitigation steps that will be implemented, and
compare the proposed action with possible alternative actions that might achieve similar
objectives, including the “no action” alternative.
Upon completion of all the different studies to determine the environmental impacts of the
proposed project or action, the lead agency publishes a “draft” version of the EIS/EIR, which is
then distributed to other agencies that might have a stake in the findings. At the same time, the
lead agency is responsible for publishing a notification of availability in the Federal Register,
local and national news outlets, and other places where affected populations and the general
7
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public might see it. The notice of availability marks the start of a public comment period that lasts
a minimum of 45 days, during which time people can submit written feedback to the lead agency.
At least one public hearing will also take place during the public comment period. The public
hearing provides a space where people can give oral testimony that will be recorded as part of the
public record (see below). At the conclusion of the public comment period, the lead agency is
required to respond to and address every comment in a revised draft or final EIS/EIR. Once this
revision is published, public notification is again given, triggering a 30-day waiting period before
the agency can take any actions to finalize the EIA process and make their decision about how to
proceed with their proposed action or project. The process concludes when the lead agency
publishes a Record of Decision (ROD) stating their decision and providing a justification and
rationalization for that decision.
After the lead agency issues its ROD, they have fulfilled their obligations under the NEPA
legislation and they can proceed with the implementation phase of their proposal. However, in
some cases the finalization of the EIA process is the point at which individuals or organizations
mount legal challenges to the lead agency’s findings.2 At the very least, such lawsuits can result
in implementation delays, injunctions, and in rare cases, project abandonment. In the period
between 2008-2012, approximately 21% of the 498 cases that were litigated resulted in
court-imposed injunctions prohibiting the agency from proceeding with their proposal until they
produced a revised EIS (see Table 1.1).

2

For the period of 1970-1977, Serge Taylor (1984) estimated approximately 9% of proposed
projects that required an EIS were subjected to lawsuits, with roughly 10,000 EISs being
prepared versus 20,000-40,000 proposals not requiring a full EIS; of the 10,000 EISs, roughly
half were drafts and the other half final EISs. Using a similar methodology to that employed by
Taylor, a report issued by the US Government Accounting Office (2014) between 2008-2012,
just over 40% of projects requiring an EIS were subject to lawsuits, however a much smaller
percentage of projects during this period required full EISs, on the order of about 2% of all
projects. Of the roughly 2,300 EISs published—again with a roughly even split between draft
and final EISs—approximately 500 were subject to litigation according to the annual NEPA
litigation surveys published by the Council on Environmental Quality (2016).
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Table 1.1. Total EIAs Litigated and Injunctions Issued, 2008-20123
Year

Cases Filed

Injunction-Remands

Percentage

2008

132

35

27%

2009

97

23

24%

2010

87

16

18%

2011

94

21

22%

2012

88

10

11%

Total

498

105

21%

The initial legislative aim for the EIA process was to aid in the internal decision making
process for proposed large-scale projects and legislative actions, from things such as building a
highway or a power plant to funding particular branches of scientific research (Caldwell 1998).
The outcome of the EIA process is not a binding recommendation or decision about the proposed
project or action, only an evaluation and decision about the proposal based on the pertinent
information obtained through the process. The decision is intended to incorporate public feedback
as well as input from technical experts and other government agencies. It further serves as a
mechanism for the relative merits of a project to be weighed against its potential costs in terms of
overall impact to the human environment, and in relation to other statutory or programmatic
obligations of the lead agency. In this regard, the process theoretically fits within a sort of
deliberative democracy framework that lends legitimacy to the state’s decision making process
(Mouffe 1999; Wiklund 2005; Morgan 2012). In practice, however, the lead agency is often much
more deliberate than deliberative, and the process serves more as a rubber stamp than as a
platform for informed decision making, though the transparency and participatory aspects still
function to provide legitimacy to the state.
3

U.S. Council on Environmental Quality. 2016. “NEPA Litigation.” NEPA.GOV.
https://ceq.doe.gov/legal_corner/litigation.html.
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As a mechanism of governance, the EIA process operates through the interconnected
elements of administrative proceduralism and jurisprudence. Information gathering, scientific
analyses, disclosure and public feedback, and administrative review all fall under the category of
administrative proceduralism. They require planners, policy makers, and other state administrator
to follow established sets of procedures in proposing and implementing new actions. The theory
of governance behind this proceduralism is that informational inputs from a breadth of disciplines
and plurality of sources lead to better administration of programs and more sound decisions.
Jurisprudence provides a system of legal checks and balances to the proceduralism. Judicial
review, as well as the threats of costly legal fees, lengthy delays, and establishing undesirable
legal precedents, encourages thoroughness and prudence within the administrative process. The
combined effect of these governance mechanisms is a structured yet flexible framework for
enabling and democratically legitimizing state-led environmental change and productions of
space. Understanding how the procedural and juridical elements of the EIA process operate in
relation to conflicts over the production of racialized space thus becomes an important aspect of
uncovering changes that the NEPA legislation brought to the racial environmental state, and how
it functions as a platform for social and environmental justice.

Public Disclosure and Public Feedback

One aspect of the EIA process that intends to serve a deliberative governmental function is the
public feedback process, yet this was not initially the case. The legislative intention behind the
EIA requirement within the NEPA legislation was for it to be used as an internal decision making
tool, however the actual implementation of EIA in the US resulted in the environmental review
process becoming a major political opening for external pressure on, and scrutiny of, the
governmental decision making process (Caldwell 1998). The NEPA legislation does not explicitly
call for public feedback or notification, but CEQ guidelines and President Richard Nixon’s
Executive Order 11514, signed on March 5, 1970, called on Federal agencies as well as State and
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local agencies to publicly disclose the findings of the EIA process and to solicit public feedback.
Nixon’s Order directs Federal agencies to:
Develop procedures to ensure the fullest practicable provision of timely public
information and understanding of Federal plans and programs with environmental
impact in order to obtain the views of interested parties. These procedures shall
include, whenever appropriate, provision for public hearings, and shall provide the
public with relevant information, including information on alternative courses of
action. Federal agencies shall also encourage State and local agencies to adopt
similar procedures for informing the public concerning their activities affecting the
quality of the environment. (Nixon 1970)
Most forms of EIA implemented throughout the world have similar disclosure and feedback
requirements, making these aspects of the EIA process one of the most widely recognized
components of environmental policy in the world (Wood 1995). Public disclosure and feedback is
not unique to the EIA process; it has long been used in urban planning, for example, in the US the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1926 called for public notice and hearings.4 What is
4

See Advisory Committee on Zoning Appointed by Secretary Hoover (1926). Regarding the
method of enacting zoning regulations within a municipality, the Act reads: “no such regulation,
restriction, or boundary shall become effective until after a public hearing in relation thereto, at
which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. At least 15 days
notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be published in an official paper, or a paper of
general circulation, in such municipality” (7). In a footnote, the Act further expands upon the
justification for public hearings as such: “It is thought wise to require by statute that there must
be a public hearing before a zoning ordinance becomes effective. There should be, as a matter of
policy, many such hearings” (7, note 27). As a more direct link to the EIA process where there is
a lead agency that oversees the process, the Act calls for the local legislative body to appoint a
zoning commission that “shall make a preliminary report and hold public hearings thereon before
submitting its final report, and such legislative body shall not hold its public hearings or take
action until it has received the final report of such commission” (9). Another footnote strikes at
the heart of the EIA process: “This is a proper safeguard against hasty or ill-considered action. It
should be carefully noted that this is in no sense a delegation of its powers by the local legislative
body to the zoning commission. The legislative body may still reverse the recommendations of
the zoning commission” (9, note 40). Finally, as a measure to circumvent constitutional equal
protection conflicts, another footnote makes explicit: “This permits any person to be heard, and
not merely property owners whose property interests may be adversely affected by the proposed
ordinance. It is right that every citizen should be able to make his voice heard and protect against
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significant about the NEPA legislation and its specific instantiation of the EIA process is the
coverage the Act carries across the breadth of Federal activities and the flexibility of the concept
of the “human environment” that allows it to encompass such a diversity of spatial, social,
ecological, economic, and political arenas that might not have been originally considered by the
lead agency. In this way, agencies can be compelled through the public feedback process and
juridical enforcement to consider culturally, racially, and geographically specific environmental
impacts otherwise fall outside of the state’s purview and beyond the original legislative intent
behind NEPA.
As part of the public disclosure process, and to minimize the likelihood of a lawsuit, the
lead agency is required to elicit public feedback at each major step within the EIA process in
which new findings or decisions are reached (see Figure 1.1). Over the course of the EIA process,
the lead agency will arrange a series of public informational, scoping, and feedback hearings
where they present the proposed project, describe potential areas of environmental impact and
mitigation measures, discuss their findings, and then record comments from those in attendance.
Comments can be in support or opposition to the proposed action, and can be simultaneously
submitted as written comments. Members of the public can additionally submit written comments
with greater detail and supporting documentation directly to the lead agency. Comments and
feedback can range from simple letters of support or opposition, to requests for consideration of
additional environmental factors or data, to lengthy point-by-point critiques that interrogate the
lead agency’s assumptions or findings. All comments submitted in either written or oral form are
documented by the lead agency and included in the formal record, usually meaning they will be
published in an appendix of the final impact statement, along with the lead agency’s written
response to each point within each comment. This is due to early court decisions brought under
the NEPA legislation that clarified the lead agency’s obligation not only to make public
notification and seek public comment, but to take these comments into consideration when
any ordinance that might be detrimental to the best interest of the city” (p. 7, note 28)
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drafting final impact statements (Anderson 1973).
A lead agency’s responsibility to respond to comments does not imply an obligation to
remedy the underlying aspects of environmental impact; their only obligation is to address the
issues raised in the comments through impact analysis. In other words, a comment that opposes
the project because the EIS failed to address one particular impact can be addressed by the lead
agency in the final EIS by simply adding an analysis of that impact and stating how their analysis
and decision making process considers that area of impact. The agency’s failure to address all of
the comments thoroughly makes them liable for a lawsuit on the basis of the inadequacy of the
EIS. Therefore, it is often the case that in response to the comments received during public
feedback periods, the lead agency will make substantial additions or modifications to their
environmental analyses or project proposal, and in some cases, propose additional mitigation
measures as a counter to negative environmental impacts. Thus, the public feedback mechanisms
of the EIA process can sometimes shape both the decision making process, and ultimately,
environmental outcomes.
On the one hand, this public intervention into the EIA process has enabled communities
and public interest groups to delay or stop thousands of proposed projects from being
implemented, largely due to procedural missteps or the inadequacy of EIA findings (Taylor 1984).
But on the other hand, this aspect of EIA has resulted in the further institutionalization of diverse
environmental knowledges within the review process, as has been the case with the logics of
environmental justice, which potentially diminishes the radical or at least disruptive capacities of
those knowledges. Once the state has institutionalized a particular way of knowing or relating to
the environment within the EIA process or EIA guidelines, agencies make it a point to factor those
considerations into their investigation and analysis. Because the EIA process has been rendered
through case law as a merely procedural requirement, the state has no further mandate to factor
those analyses into its decision making process other than to state that they have been considered
as such. Furthermore, as the scope and scale of the EIA process has grown to accommodate an
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ever increasing diversity of environmental knowledges and potential impact categories, the
reports have likewise grown in length, complexity, and the degree of techno-scientific expertise
required to interpret and evaluate them. This in turn precludes many people from participating in
the public feedback process because of the incomprehensibility of the reports to lay persons.
Although the public feedback mechanisms within the EIA process can sometimes help
reshape proposed projects or programs, they are less effective as a means for redirecting or
reshaping the underlying policy-based functional objectives of the proposed actions. Put another
way, public feedback might encourage the lead agency to take measures to minimize the air, water,
soil, and energy impacts of an infrastructure project, or even to select a different alternative to that
originally proposed, but it is unlikely that public feedback in the EIA process will have any
impact on the lead agency’s underlying goal to implement a project that satisfies the same
programmatic goal as their original proposal. Written and oral comments submitted to the lead
agency are typically treated in a pro forma manner, with the lead agency respectfully noting the
comment in the record, then responding by saying the comment is unlikely to alter their ultimate
decision. Although final decisions about funding and implementing a proposed action are made
after an affirmative outcome from the EIA process, the proposal is likely to have sufficient
political will behind it to see it through long before the EIA process formally commences.

Litigation under NEPA

The two main ways that people and organizations have used NEPA and the EIA process to
intervene in proposed projects and programs are through its public feedback mechanisms and
through the use of judicial review (see Figure 1.1). In addition to the public disclosure and
feedback aspects of the EIA process described above, the legal basis for judicial intervention lies
in the US Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (APA), which provides judicially reviewable
guidelines for public transparency throughout the decision making process. This means that the
lead agency is responsible for researching, documenting, and publicly reporting the decision
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making process (see Fogleman 1990). Individual citizens and organizations can challenge the
lead agency’s adherence to the NEPA requirements under the APA if they believe the lead agency
failed in its responsibilities, or made decisions that appear “arbitrary or capricious” (Fogleman
1990).
Like with public feedback, the NEPA legislation does not contain an explicit provision for
judicial review of the EIA process. Early NEPA cases established a legal precedent that allows
courts to review the EIA process either under the APA or under the NEPA legislation directly
(Anderson 1973; Fogleman 1990). The APA provides a legal basis for challenging the lead
agency’s actions through judicial review of the documentation, process, and decision making
procedures followed by the lead agency. If, after filing comments through the EIA process,
individuals or organizations believe their concerns have not been adequately addressed in
subsequent steps along the EIA process, or if they feel that a lack of immediate judicial
intervention would in some way cause them direct injury, those individuals or organizations have
the right to file a lawsuit against the lead agency in civil court. Such lawsuits typically occur at
one of two major points in the EIA process: either after the lead agency approves an EA that
declares the proposed project will have little or no adverse environmental impacts, resulting in the
issuance of a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI); or after the issuance of one of the EIA
reports, from the notice of intent and scoping documents, through draft EISs, and up to the final
EIS or the Record of Decision. In the former circumstances, a lawsuit will typically request that
the court require the lead agency to prepare a full EIS. In the latter circumstances, the lawsuit will
request the court require a revision or amendment to the EIS that addresses the claimed
deficiencies. In either case, the parties initiating the litigation will typically ask the court to issue
an injunction, or court order prohibiting the lead agency from taking further steps in
implementing the project, until the requirements of the NEPA legislation are sufficiently met.
Numerous legal issues enter into consideration within NEPA cases, such as whether or not
those bringing the lawsuit have a right or protected interest that allows them to sue the lead
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agency, whether a particular case is reviewable or within the jurisdiction of the court, and the
types of relief that can be requested of the court (Fogleman 1990; Czarnezki 2006). Each of these
topics come under consideration within my case studies and are discussed in greater detail in the
context of those cases. Because most NEPA litigation involves a request for the court to compel
the lead agency to consider environmental impacts not adequately addressed in their analyses, it is
not uncommon for cases to come before the same court numerous times as the lead agency
iteratively addresses concerns in its EIS revisions (Fogleman 1990). Ultimately, so long as the
lead agency adheres to its procedural obligations, and barring a situation in which an irreparable
harm might ensue, the lead agency typically has the upper hand in NEPA litigation because the
requirements for the EIA process are merely procedural. So even if an injunction is issued that
prohibits the lead agency from proceeding with the implementation of its proposed action, in most
cases, the lead agency can get the injunction lifted once it satisfactorily fulfills its NEPA
obligations, which in most cases means additional environmental impact studies or analyses.
Reviews of NEPA cases in the courts reveal that the judiciary has been particularly
accommodating of the state in NEPA cases; indeed, the Federal government has a perfect record
in winning Supreme Court rulings dealing with NEPA (MacMillan 2005; Lazarus 2012). This
statistic, however, does not account for the numerous injunctions granted en-route to decisions in
the government’s favor, the cases in which settlements were reached outside of court rulings
where the parties reached a compromise, or cases where the suit was dropped either because the
government decided to abandon the proposal or because the proposal was amended in such a way
that it negated the need for judicial intervention.
The nearly half-century of case law under the NEPA legislation has dramatically changed
the scope, scale, applicability, and process of the EIA requirement. For example, numerous cases
where courts ruled in the government’s favor contributed to the narrowing in scope of NEPA
applicability and the defanging of NEPA’s substantive goals (see Lindstrom 2000). The narrowing
of NEPA’s applicability means that courts ruled that some types of environmental impacts, such as
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hypothetical impacts or psychological impacts, were beyond the requisite scope of the EIA
process (Fogleman 1990). As discussed in Chapter 2, NEPA was defanged through cases in which
the court ruled that the substantive goals of the NEPA legislation—the protection of the human
environment—were effectively unenforceable, and so long as the lead agency adequately
identified and weighed the environmental impacts of their proposed actions, then any
well-reasoned decision regarding that proposal was beyond the juridical reach of the courts.
These and other changes to the EIA process that have resulted from case law precedents point to
the power of litigation in shaping the administrative procedures of state action, revealing the
potential malleability as well as resilience of state institutions to conflict and external pressures.
This adaptability of the state vis-à-vis law precisely pinpoints how the EIA process, and its ability
to institutionalize and diffuse potential points of racial and environmental crisis within the state,
operates as such an effective mechanism for governance within contemporary racial capitalism.
Nikos Poulantzas (2014) explains it as follows:
It is precisely through a system of general, abstract and formal rules that law
regulates the exercise of power by the state apparatuses, as well as access to these
apparatuses themselves. Within a specific form of domination, this legal system
controls the process whereby power is apportioned to the various classes and,
above all, the distinct fractions of the bourgeoisie that make up a power-bloc. By
thus giving order to their mutual relations within the State, it allows a changed
balance of forces in the ruling alliance to find expression at state level without
provoking upheavals. Capitalist law, as it were, damps down and channels
political crises, in such a way that they do not lead to crises of the State itself.
More generally, capitalist law appears as the necessary form of a State that has to
maintain relative autonomy of the fractions of a power-bloc in order to organize
their unity under the hegemony of a given class or fraction. This compulsion is
further bound up with the State’s relative separation from the relations of
production - that is to say, with the fact that agents of the economically dominant
class (the bourgeoisie) do not directly coincide with the occupiers and agents of
the State. (91)
The NEPA legislation provides new mechanisms, both legal and procedural, for asserting and
18

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
assigning power over the utilization of natural resources and the production of the built
environment. It does this in a manner that maintains the hegemony of capitalist environmental
relations through the legitimacy and consent garnered through its institutionalization of liberal
forms of transparency and public participation. Yet the legal contours of both the racial
environmental state and the NEPA process are themselves malleable and evolve over time
through the accretion of legal precedents, the addition and modification of official guidance
regulations, and intersections with other areas of public policy. This malleability allows the racial
environmental state to adapt to and mediate conflicts within and against the state, and thus diffuse
crises of the state’s legitimacy to effectively govern space and the built environment.

Environmental Epistemologies and Institutionalizing Environmental Justice

Through the EIA process, the NEPA legislation establishes a malleable framework for state
sanctioned understandings of the environment. It calls for the interdisciplinary and integrative use
of both the physical and social sciences, with the key recognition that the content of those
sciences would change over time, resulting in uncertainty and change in the bases of
environmental planning and decision-making (Caldwell 1998, 56). But the legitimacy of the EIA
process, and hence that of the state, is heavily dependent on the comprehensiveness and
robustness of the scientific inquiry used to evaluate the environmental impacts of proposed
projects or actions. Therefore, it is in the interest of state actors to utilize a robust set of scientific
approaches to qualify their findings and to reveal selective biases toward different aspects of the
environment. However, the environmental knowledges that substantiate these scientific
approaches to impact assessment are prone to ontological and epistemological ruptures. This is
especially the case because of the public feedback mechanisms institutionalized within the EIA
process that allow for environmental claims to be made against the state from outside the
institutional boundaries of dominant scientific communities such as those within universities,
private consultancies, and other state funded institutions.
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By requiring bureaucrats to think through the environmental consequences of their actions,
EIA produces a number of political ruptures horizontally across the branches of federal
government, and vertically through scaled hierarchies of government (Taylor 1984). One of the
novelties of the EIA process lies in its requirements for the incorporation of a range of specific
types of knowledge and information into administrative procedures. Lynton Caldwell provides an
insightful analysis of the policy role served by the incorporation of diverse knowledges within the
EIA process:
EIA and the integrated interdisciplinary approach to policy that NEPA requires
implies syncretic thinking that does not comport well with predetermined political
objectives which characteristically have been based on single-track perceptions of
reality…Syncretic thinking, which often leads to synergistic conclusions, is an
unusual quality; it is rarely encouraged or encountered anywhere. It seeks a whole
that may be significantly different and more revealing than a mere summation of
the parts. (Caldwell 1989, 11)
The EIA process forces public administrators to think beyond the confines of their agency
or departmental roles, and thus adds new impediments, or procedural checks, to the
implementation of new programs and projects. This process gives rise to tensions between
different government agencies with different agendas and which operate at different scales of
government, such as state or local priorities that conflict with federal policies. It also opens the
door to conflicts over the definition of “the environment,” what constitutes environmental
impacts, and perhaps most importantly, the value assigned to those impacts, where the concept of
value represents a diverse set of epistemological conceptions of outcomes, uses, or impacts. In
practice, these ruptures within the workings of government have also resulted in opportunities for
non-government entities to intervene into the political processes relating to a range of policy and
infrastructure undertakings with justifications that I argue far exceed the environmentalist
intentions of NEPA’s architects (Caldwell 1998). But the same political openings produced
through the EIA process that have allowed for public intervention into government processes
have also been subject to juridical and legislative reworking in ways that foreclose some its more
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radical possibilities. So just as important as understanding the possibilities EIA produces is the
need to work through the contradictions within EIA and the state institutions responsible for
employing it in order to better understand it as a site for engaging structural social change.
The process of developing impact statements and the public feedback mechanisms are
institutionalized moments when different forms of racialized environmental epistemologies enter
the political purview of the state through struggles over land and the environment. By this I am
referring to the geographically and culturally specific ways of understanding, knowing, and
relating to the environment as a complex system of social processes and institutional structures
that contribute to both sustaining life and prematurely ending it through the racially differentiated
production of environmental harms and benefits (Cole and Foster 2001; Forsyth 2003). In some
regards these ways of understanding the environment exceed the environmentalist intentions of
NEPA’s architects, whose focus was primarily on the human impacts on ecosystems, yet part of
the novelty of the EIA process is that its structure seems to encourage these types of
epistemological ruptures within the mechanisms of state centered decision-making (Caldwell
1998). Environmental epistemologies are often place specific and grounded in the particular
material conditions of racially and culturally differentiated space. Because the EIA process has,
both through design and through conflicts over its form and function (see Chapter 2), come to
incorporate a range of environmental epistemologies, it functions as a mechanism through which
the state employs and deploys environmental-geographical knowledge as a means of control and
domination within racially and culturally differentiated space (Said 1979; Dalby and Ó Tuathail
1996). As I explore throughout this dissertation, resistance to this state power, and alternatively,
working to reclaim or redirect particular instantiations of this power, occurs at both the local level
and a more macro-policy/legal level (Routledge 1996). Understanding the geographical workings
of the former provides insights into the how and why of the latter.
The reason for focusing on NEPA and the EIA process is that their institutionalization has
resulted in a complex state apparatus consisting of infrastructure, discourses, and practices that
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combine racial and environmental knowledges to govern space in ways that contribute to uneven
productions of space and nature (Smith 1984). They provided a scaffolding and testbed for the
institutionalization of sanitized environmental justice ideas that potentially disrupt the radical
possibilities of the environmental justice movement. Yet for these same reasons, the NEPA
legislation and the EIA process are riddled with contradictions that provide openings for
resistance to hegemonic orderings of the environment under racist and capitalist regimes of
accumulation and domination. Opening the door to alternate environmental epistemologies means
that the EIA process functions as a site of contestation over racial and environmental knowledges
and the production of space. At times, EIA is a fruitful site of resistance to capitalist forms of
development because it enables the articulation of non- and anti-capitalistic environmental use
values through its framework of environmental knowledge. At the same time, the EIA apparatus
is able to synthesize these oppositional forces and rearticulate them as state sanctioned forms of
“antiracist” knowledge that work to legitimize the capitalist racial state. But in so doing, racial
and environmental meanings are transformed and metabolized differently within the state’s
apparatuses, constantly revealing new possibilities for resistance and social change across
geographical space and scales.

Theorizing EIA

Despite considerable scholarship on the relevance, effectiveness, practice, implementation, and
legal ramifications of EIA, only a small fraction of the literature theorizes EIA as an object of
study (Lawrence 1997; Bartlett and Kurian 1999). Being that the institutionalization of EIA
opened up a huge demand for environmental professionals and the production of environmental
knowledge to meet the requirements of EIA procedures, this tendency in EIA scholarship should
not come as a surprise. But what is somewhat surprising is that among the small but growing
body of scholarship that builds theory around EIA, relatively little attention has been paid to the
political implications of EIA beyond its role in environmental protection or the political processes
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leading to that same end, with most attention being paid, understandably, to
environmental-as-ecological outcomes.
First worth noting is the considerable scholarship theorizing both the NEPA legislation
and the EIA process by Lynton K. Caldwell. Regarding the former, Caldwell holds that despite
the ways that courts have interpreted the Act as lacking enforceable substance, the vision and
values embedded within it, and the EIA process intended to enforce them, should be viewed as
forward-looking, value-driven legislation whose potential has yet to be fully realized (1998). Of
course, Caldwell’s vision should be read with the understanding that he was one of the policy
consultants brought in by the US Senate Interior Committee to assist in formulating and drafting
the legislation (Caldwell 1998). He thus he has a personal stake in recuperating the vision for the
NEPA legislation and EIA process from those who would dismiss its substantive values. While
Caldwell stridently argued for understanding EIA in light of its historical context and
development under the NEPA legislation, he also contributed scholarship about the process more
generally as a mechanism of administrative reform, particularly with regard to its important role
in promoting the incorporation of environmental sciences and rational planning principles within
government administration (Caldwell 1982; Caldwell 1989; Caldwell 1990).
Robert V. Bartlett, one of Caldwell’s former students, has also written extensively on the
theory of the EIA process. Bartlett, like Caldwell, theorized EIA from a political science and
public policy administration perspective. In a summative review of policy analyses of the EIA
process, Bartlett and Priya Kurian (1999) put forth a six-part model for understanding the policy
and governance mechanisms of EIA: information processing (a mechanism for gathering and
processing information); symbolic politics (a rubber stamp formality with more symbolic than
substantive political value); political economic (a mechanism for evaluating risk and externalities
affecting market relations); organizational politics (a mechanism that restructures organizational
hierarchies and institutional power structures); pluralist politics (a path for non-state actors to
influence discrete institutional decisions as well as broader organizational changes);
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institutionalist model (a mechanism that transforms the processes and constraints of institutions,
and thus political activity). Both Caldwell and Bartlett worked across these six areas of analysis,
while focusing their attention most closely on the effectiveness and ramifications of the EIA
process on institutional change (Bartlett and Kurian 1999; Bartlett and Baber 1989).
One of the most detailed and widely cited theoretical explorations of the EIA process was
developed by Serge Taylor (1984), in which he combines institutional, organizational, and
pluralistic models described by Taylor to analyze the overall role of the EIA process in
government function and political action. Taylor uses the scientific model of knowledge
production as an analogy for understanding the different mechanisms and processes of EIA,
including exploratory work, data collection and analysis, iteration and validation, oppositional
peer-review, complications around expertise and uncertainty, and established norms for practice.
He focuses in particular on the ways that opposition between internal and external functions as a
political force shaping institutional and organizational change, leading to shifts in the normative
qualities of EIA in much the way that theoretical paradigm shifts occur in scientific communities
(see also Popper 2002 [1963]). Building on Taylor’s and Caldwell’s work, a number of additional
scholars have developed analyses of the EIA process that eschew a value-free view of the
scientific process, and instead look at the confrontational, deliberative, and value-laden mediation
between science and policy (Owens, Rayner, and Bina 2004; Cashmore 2004; Cashmore, Bond,
and Cobb 2008; Cashmore et al. 2004).
In addition to the literature dealing with the political mechanisms of the EIA process, a
growing number of scholars have begun examining the historical and structural entanglements of
the EIA process with neoliberal forms of governance. In general, these scholars are concerned
with the development of new political subjects/subjectivities and their attendant articulations of
embedded “local” (counter-hegemonic) knowledge and what has been termed
“eco-governmentality” or “environmentality” in reference to the apparatuses, processes, and
organizations of power that have resulted in the governmentalization of the environment, ecology,
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and biosystems more generally (Espeland 1994; Rutherford 1999; Rutherford 2007; Robbins
2000; Luke 1995; Goldman 2001; Agrawal et al. 2005; Cashmore et al. 2010).5 Within this
literature, Rutherford (1999) provides a short but highly relevant analysis of EIA as a new form of
biopower that operates simultaneously through juridical and self-regulating forms of
governmental rationalities. Additionally, Agrawal et al. (2005) uses the idea of biopolitics to
explore the specific technologies of government that produce both human and non-human
environmental subjects as the focus of government that operate at and between scales from the
individual to the state.
Interestingly, the same Lynton Caldwell who helped draft the NEPA legislation used the
same term “biopolitics” in a similar yet different way than its use famously popularized by Michel
Foucault in his Collège de France lectures in 1976, and Caldwell’s use of the term sheds light on
the formative ideas about science and politics that he would later contribute to the NEPA
legislation. Indeed, twelve years before Foucault began exploring the concept of “a ‘biopolitics’
of the human race” (2003, 243), Caldwell (1973) deployed the term in a paper published by The
Yale Review in 1964, used as a reference to the wielding of the continuously growing body of bioand techno-scientific knowledge systems deployed within political and ethical frameworks to
address the impacts of such knowledge and technologies on society. Caldwell used the term to
describe a framework and proposed course of political action to “reconcile biological facts and
popular values—notably ethical values—in the formulation of public policies” (1973, 24).
It is interesting to think about Foucault in conversation with Caldwell because their
different approaches to a common political theme reveals continuities and ruptures in each of their
logics. There are a number of very close parallels between the two scholars’ theories of
biopolitics and its impacts on government and populations. Also indicative of a similar materialist
context to their writings is the use of identical biological science examples of a necessity for
biopolitical intervention in areas such as nuclear weapons, the post-War population explosion, and
5

See also Foucault (2007).
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anthropogenic environmental changes (Caldwell 1973, 26–27; Foucault 2003, 244–45). These
similarities are also indicative of common sociocultural and political economic tropes, at least in
the U.S. and Western Europe, that help to situate the scholarship and delineate the contours of the
state from which EIA and other political projects emerged. More to the point of theorizing the
EIA process, Foucault provides a precise set of methods and framing questions for thinking about
the operation of governmentalized biopolitics in practice, as Agrawal, Rutherford, and others
have demonstrated in applying Foucault’s theories of governmentality and biopolitics to the EIA
process. While I do not explicitly engage Foucault’s or Caldwell’s theories of biopolitics in my
case studies, I am certainly influenced by Caldwell’s proposition of critically reflecting on the
role of bio- and techno-scientific knowledge in shaping the contours of racial and environmental
logics within the operation of the state, as well as the implications of this incorporation of
knowledge in shaping the function of government and the relationship between government,
space, and geographically and racially differentiated populations.

Environmental Justice and Urban Political Ecology

My analysis of the EIA process is situated at the nexus of environmental policy, environmental
justice, and social justice more broadly. As an object of study, the EIA process provides me with a
point of entry into thinking more expansively about the political capacities of the racial
environmental state as a set of policies, laws, institutions, and practices that shape and respond to
geographical struggles over place (see below). The project draws inspiration from and builds
upon the environmental justice framework for engaged scholarship and activism. The
environmental justice framework provides a particularly powerful lens through which to consider
the EIA process because the framework is rooted in political struggles that articulate across, or
bring together, multiple forms of domination and resistance through the analytics of race, class,
gender, and ecological destruction (Hall 1980; Bullard 1990; Pulido 1996b; Pulido and Peña
1998; Cole and Foster 2001; Gilmore 2008). This framework is complemented by the urban
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political ecology (UPE) literature, which has developed a robust set of theoretical and empirical
tools for analyzing human-environment relationships through the lens of critical urban political
economy (Keil 2003; Heynen, Kaika, and Swyngedouw 2006).
One of the most significant epistemological ruptures within the state’s purview of
environmental knowledge resulted from political mobilizations for environmental justice based
on the ontological claim of state sanctioned environmental racism. Environmental racism is the
term developed in the 1980s to describe the uneven spatial distribution of environmental harms
and benefits with regard to racially and ethnically differentiated populations (Bullard 1990;
Mohai and Bryant 1992; Cole and Foster 2001). Environmental justice activism brought to the
fore the ontological position that environmental conditions are geographically inextricable from
the production of racially differentiated space through processes of uneven capitalist development
(Bullard (1994); Pulido (2000)]. These claims worked within a US-centered context to shift the
focus of both the practice and official state discourses about the racialized dimensions of
environmental issues and state practices more broadly.
The environmental justice framework emerged in the 1980s out of a social justice
movement to uncover and remedy human negative health and quality of life impacts that
disproportionately affected politically, racially, and economically marginalized communities due
to the uneven distribution of environmental harms and benefits—the material effects of structural
environmental racisms (Cole and Foster 2001). The environmental justice movement traces its
lineage to the Civil Rights Movement organizing that took place throughout the US from the
1950s through the 1970s, and to the environmentalism and anti-toxics movements that started in
the 1950s and continued into the late 1970s (Cole and Foster 2001). Civil Rights Movement
leaders combined their experience in direct-action and mainstream political organizing with
critiques of the social and economic structures underpinning racial segregation and oppression to
effectively mobilize communities of color in struggles against the environmental problems
affecting their neighborhoods (Bullard 1993; Taylor 2000; Cole and Foster 2001; Keil 2003).
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The communities that turned to an environmental justice framework to articulate their
struggles for social justice framed their arguments against environmental racism through
discourses of structural racism and patriarchy, emphasizing uneven impacts to communities that
were largely ignored by the mainstream, white middle-class environmentalism movement that
was premised primarily on preservation and conservation (Pulido 1998; Buckingham and Kulcur
2009). Joining in this struggle were some of the more radical organizers and scholars from the
anti-toxics branch of the mainstream environmentalism movement. Their analyses contributed the
identification of corporate power and the structuring of the global political economy through the
production of surplus value, as the driving forces behind the uneven production of toxics (Cole
and Foster 2001). The convergence of these two camps in the 1980s led to the establishment of a
coherent environmental justice framework that claimed uneven environmental conditions were a
product of environmental racism structured through the capitalist political economy. What
eventually emerged was an environmental justice framework that takes seriously the objective of
social justice requires thinking about environmental justice in terms of scholarship and praxis that
counter-articulates various modes of social justice struggle in opposition to the historically and
geographically specific modes of dominance that structure society, such as racism, sexism, and
capitalism (Hall 1980; Gilmore 2002; Pellow and Brulle 2005; Kurtz 2009; Pellow 2009).
In contrast with the dominant ecological understandings of the environment, the
environmental justice framework presents a radically different way of understanding the
environment through the lens of structural racism and the political economy that proved to be just
as contentious as it was politically powerful. In the first half of the 1990s, a number of scholars
began interrogating environmental justice claims and challenged its basis of environmental
racism. They employed a variety of quantitative methodologies to empirically “prove” that claims
of environmental racism were merely the spatialized outcomes of market forces, civic
participation, and static notions of class difference, and not a result of racist practices (Been 1992;
Been 1994; Anderton et al. 1994; Cutter 1995; cf. Pulido 1996c). As a radical intervention
intended to recuperate the concept of environmental racism from the throes of liberal
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environmental justice scholarship predominating in the 1990s, Laura Pulido (2000), building on
the work of one of the most influential environmental justice scholars, Robert Bullard, introduced
a conceptual framework and model for environmental justice scholarship that defines social
justice as its objective rather than as a purportedly value-free question, and asserts environmental
racism as a de facto result of centuries of geographically driven structural racism (see also Bullard
1990; Bullard 2001; Pulido and Peña 1998).
Countering scholars who held environmental justice as a question driven by intentionality
and personal choice, Pulido and others pointed out the embedded racism in studying
environmental racism purely based on distributive measures of uneven environmental landscapes
by pointing out the fetishism and essentialism of viewing race as a static concept and racism as
discretely embodied acts of malevolence. Drawing on critical race theory and critical whiteness
studies, Pulido and others instead argued for the importance of understanding racism in terms of
the shifting forms of domination produced by and supportive of spatial practices rooted in forms
of difference that are fundamental to the maintenance of the capitalist racial state (see also Harris
1993; Omi and Winant 1994; Lipsitz 1995 Goldberg (2002); Kurtz 2009). Furthermore, Pulido
argues that the lack of critical understandings of racism within geographic and environmental
justice research reflect and reinforce broader systems of white supremacy within the discipline,
and which serve to alienate environmental justice scholarship from environmental justice praxis,
or engaged political struggles (Pulido 2002; Cole and Foster 2001; Kurtz 2009). Therefore,
environmental justice scholarship that takes seriously the objective of social justice requires
thinking about environmental justice in terms of scholarship and praxis that articulates various
modes of social justice struggle in opposition to the historically and geographically specific
modes of dominance that structure society, such as racism, sexism, and capitalism (Hall 1980;
Gilmore 2002; Pellow and Brulle 2005; Kurtz 2009; Pellow 2009).
Throughout these debates over the theoretical basis of environmental justice scholarship,
environmental justice activists were successfully employing these theoretical positions in locally,
29

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
regionally, and nationally organized struggles for environmental justice over issues such as
healthy working, living, and learning environments; access to clean air and water; housing access;
indigenous land rights; clean and accessible public transportation and public spaces; prison
conditions and policing practices; and other forms of spatially situated social and economic justice
(e.g., Bullard 1993; Pulido 1996a; Burgos and Pulido 1998; Taylor 2000; Sze 2007; Gilmore
2008). Through grassroots organizing and juridical challenges to siting decisions, which often
came through the EIA process, environmental justice activists were able to gain state recognition
of epistemologies that saw the environment not just in terms of its ecological functions, but also
in terms of the myriad ways that environments enable or inhibit the racialized and gendered
terrains of social reproduction (Pulido and Peña 1998; Braz and Gilmore 2006). Thus, the
structural mechanisms and infrastructures of EIA provided an institutional capacity and site of
convergence for mobilizing resistance to environmentally racist practices and then incorporating
environmentally anti-racist knowledges into the state logics of environmental decision-making.
Complementing the environmental justice framework guiding my research are the
theoretical tools and methods developed in urban political ecology (UPE) scholarship. There is a
great deal of overlap between the two literatures in their critical engagements with the uneven
production of social natures (Smith 1984; Castree and Braun 1998). Where the environmental
justice framework guides my thinking, Marxist UPE provides the theoretical and methodological
nuts and bolts that bring together my arguments about the material and discursive geographies of
EIA in relation to the structural production of socio-environmental change (Swyngedouw and
Heynen 2003). UPE employs historical materialist approaches to the spatial and scalar politics, as
well as the specific urban political economic conditions, of uneven urban development vis-à-vis
capitalist productions and metabolisms of nature (Smith 1984; Castree and Braun 1998; Keil 2003;
Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003; Peet and Watts 2004; Heynen, Kaika, and Swyngedouw 2006).
Some UPE scholars have criticized the environmental justice literature and its
geographically and historically specific forms of political praxis for taking a “liberal and, hence,
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distributional perspective on justice” (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003, 910). However, I contend
that the environmental justice framework offered by Pulido and others, as described above,
preempts this critique and provides the lens through which to dialectically approach the
contradictions within the environmentally racist capitalist state. That is, uneven racial
geographies and uneven development are inseparable spatial practices that are fundamental to the
maintenance of the capitalist racial state. As I describe below, this position is further evidenced by
documented environmental justice struggles that demonstrate the expansive analytical and
political possibilities offered by this framework for radical analyses that far exceed the limitations
of racial liberalism and distributional justice (Schlosberg 2007; Melamed 2011).
My analysis of EIA stems in part from the epistemological and ontological expansion of
knowledge produced through EIA with regard to conceptions of the environment, particularly
those that venture beyond nature and ecology. Both the UPE and environmental justice literatures
provide insights into the processes and practices that have supported these discursive shifts in
environmental knowledges. For example, Gezon and Paulson (2005) provide examples of
epistemological ruptures that shift the terms of debate when interrogating ecological processes in
terms of the actors and subjects of environmental knowledge. More closely related to the political
processes shaping my research, the environmental justice movement has been particularly
effective in shifting environmental discourses to frame all spaces where social reproduction
occurs—spaces for living, working, learning, and playing—as functionally inseparable from the
ecological aspects of the environment (Pulido and Peña 1998). Finally, there are those instances
where safe environments—in the sense that they don’t produce “group-differentiated
vulnerabilities to premature death” (Gilmore 2007, 28)—are articulated as safe from state
institutions of racial domination and violence such as policing practices and the prison industrial
complex (Braz and Gilmore 2006; Gilmore 2008).
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The Racial Environmental State

Race and environment have a long history as overlapping and mutually constituting structures of
domination within state formations. For example, between the end of Reconstruction and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Jim Crow laws, as well as other state-sanctioned mechanisms such as
mortgage discrimination and redlining, resulted in uneven development characterized by deeply
seated racial segregation, in terms of populations, resources, and productive capacity. Throughout
this this history, which is certainly not unique to the US, the contemporary racial environmental
state, understood as an assemblage of institutional and ideological capacities, functions through
and is shaped by conflicts over the ways that race and environment are defined, maintained, and
incorporated into hegemonic social relations, specifically, capitalist social relations. Building on
David Theo Goldberg’s (Goldberg 2002) historical analysis of the racial state’s role in shaping
and mediating racial categories and meaning through its various powers, I refer to the
aforementioned convergence of institutional capacities as the racial environmental state.
The racial environmental state should not be confused with government, which is the
object, the “thinginess,” that instantiates the state through policies and actions. Rather, the racial
environmental state operates through the management of race and environment as both ideological
concepts and material practices. It is at times racist and environmentally destructive, but it also
variously employs anti-racism or environmental protections as functional components of state
building and ensuring the reproduction of capital. The racial environmental state functions
through policy, law, police powers, and other mechanisms of political will and power, and is
shaped through countless forms of conflict, deliberation, and force. Just as the contemporary
racial state functions to maintain racial capitalism, or the saturation of racial logics through the
organization and reproduction of capitalist social relations, including the political, economic,
cultural, and ideological structures articulated with race that are in turn “structured in dominance”
(Robinson 1983; Hall 1980), so too does the racial environmental state function to simultaneously
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and interdependently maintain both racial capitalism and uneven productions of nature.
One way to get at the racial environmental state is through the concept of racial projects
developed by Omi and Winant (1994) to explain the process of racial formation. In their
formulation, historically (and geographically) situated racial projects “connect what race means in
a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday
experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning” (56). The racial environmental state
can be understood in terms of the state’s capacities for shaping understandings of race and
environment as interconnected systems of knowledge and representation that provide structure for
each other as modes of domination and dialectically thus, resistance. While race and environment
are certainly not inseparable, understanding them through their points of connection and mutual
dependencies facilitates an inherently syncretic geographical analysis of the capitalist state. Like
the racial state that has evolved through conflicts over racial meanings and domination, so too has
the environmental state been shaped through changing understandings of the geographies of
human habitation, for example, by shifting understandings of territory, property, natural resources,
ecology, biomes, climate, and natural disasters. Conceiving of the racial environmental state
provides a framework for understanding how racial meanings are produced through the ways that
the state operates through environmental functions, and vice versa. For example, the
“green-washing” of prisons by employing renewable energy, reclaimed water, and on-site gardens
to help legitimize the state’s continued use of cages to warehouse populations rendered surplus
within contemporary racial capitalism demonstrates the way that an environmental project—the
green-washing of prisons—functions to maintain the hegemony of the prison industrial complex
as a racist geographical structure of state power and racial domination.
In this dissertation, I utilize the concept of the racial environmental state in order to
understand how the EIA process functions as a mechanism of the state and renders the state as a
site of racial and environmental conflict. In turn, my research highlights the capacities and
limitations of this particular state formation for social and environmental justice organizing.
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Through my case studies, I argue that the EIA process institutionalizes environmental justice
principles prior to their official codification under President Bill Clinton’s Executive Order 12898
in 1994, which made environmental justice a priority for all government agencies. This move
represented a significant victory for environmental justice activists, but it also cemented a
particular set of racial and environmental logics and neoliberal rationality within the state. This
signals the ways in which racial capitalism was reorienting itself around projects of what Jodi
Melamed (2011) calls “neoliberal multiculturalism” to describe the phase of racial capitalism in
which official state anti-racisms became linked to the maintenance of state legitimacy in light of
shifting racial regimes, the solidification of neoliberal mechanisms of free-market economism and
technocratic rationalities, and the growth of “differentiated” or “neoliberal sovereignty” under
global capitalism (Ong 2006; Chalfin 2010; Melamed 2011).
Indeed, the EIA process has become an inextricable component of global capitalism
through its adoption both as a government function in almost every country, but more importantly,
as a prerequisite for transnational lending institutions such as the World Bank. In this role, it
provides a normative, technocratic framework for the incorporation of rational scientific,
economistic, and risk-based metrics for global development and policy implementation. EIA
provides a method for the implementation of biopolitical, and as I argue, racial knowledges and
modes of governance that secures and legitimizes the hegemony of neoliberal forms of
governance that aim to unify the underlying contradictions of the political economic, social,
cultural, and environmental crises within contemporary racial capitalism (see Melamed 2011).
Furthermore, through its biopolitical mechanisms for producing knowledge about the human
environment and its racially and economically differentiated populations, the EIA process
functions in service of what Ong (2006) terms “differentiated citizenship,” which Jodi Melamed
(2011) describes as “a differentiated experience of citizenship that ensures governments protect
those who are valuable to capital, whether formally citizens or not, and devalue and render
vulnerable those who are not valuable within circuits of capital, whether formally citizens or not”
(39-40). Differentiated citizenship encapsulates the structural conditions addressed by radical
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approaches to environmental justice, and describes one of the primary functions that the
contemporary racial environmental state mediates through its various modes of environmental
governance.

Methodology

The purpose of this dissertation is to develop understanding about the form and function of the
EIA process. To accomplish this task, I looked at case studies in which the EIA process was
interrupted by lawsuits brought by individuals and groups looking to challenge the state’s actions.
While challenges to the EIA process can take different forms, the most visible and potentially
disruptive means for using the EIA process or the statutory and procedural requirements of the
NEPA legislation to challenge agency actions is by filing a civil lawsuit against the agency
responsible for the EIA process. It follows, then, that the case studies I examined for the purposes
of this dissertation involve judicial intervention. With this in mind, appropriate case studies were
identified through a combination of word-of-mouth from individuals who had familiarity with
cases they thought might be interesting, and through preliminary research into cases with
enduring significance to NEPA case law. I encountered numerous cases that could have been
included in my research, and can say with confidence that most of them could have surfaced
interesting aspects of the EIA process and its impacts to the racial environmental state and
community organizing.
In the end, I settled on the three particular cases included in this dissertation due to the
particular ways that each of the cases reveal different aspects of the ways that the environmental
justice framework intersects with and gets institutionalized within the EIA process, whether that is
explicitly or implicitly. These three case studies were not selected because they are representative
of any sort of totality, though I attempted to select cases that provided diversity across a range of
categories to highlight the effects of the EIA process across a similarly diverse set of conditions.
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One might think of these as geographically contingent contextual variables within my data. The
three cases I selected for this dissertation span the US—one is in urban New York City, another is
in rural Central California, and the last involves an unpopulated valley wedged between rural and
urban parts of the Hawaiian Island of O‘ahu. Two involved federal actions based on the NEPA
legislation, while one involved a state-level “mini-NEPA” with similar EIA requirements. One of
the cases eventually ended up being heard at the Supreme Court, one is still active in a federal
district court, and the one at the state level ended in the California State Appeals Court. In two of
the cases, the courts decided in favor of the state agencies that were defending their actions within
the EIA process, while the last case remains unresolved, but appears to be headed in a direction
that is ultimately favorable to the community organizations challenging the state’s actions. Two of
the cases feature social and environmental justice community organizing in opposition to the
state’s proposed actions, while in the third, social justice advocates side with the state in
opposition to racist and classist community organizers who fought to stop the state from
implementing a public housing project. Finally, all three cases take up the concept of racialized
environments in very different ways, but in each case, the legal battle over the EIA process is tied
up in both struggles over differing racialized visions of place, as well as in conflicts over the
state’s engagement with different understandings of race and difference.
Since each of my case studies involves legal proceedings, and because the EIA process
itself is primarily procedural and enforced by the judiciary, I decided early in the research process
that my data for this project should focus on the legal and procedural aspects of each case. This
approach allowed me to pay close attention to the workings of the state and to the ways in which
activists and other non-state actors operated in relation to the state (Hooks 1991). Thus, in order
to narrate the stories of each case study, I used a combination of court rulings, documents filed by
lawyers and witnesses during court trials, and primary source documents published as part of the
EIA process. To provide context, fill gaps in the narrative, and better understand the various
actors in each case study, I also incorporated a variety of secondary sources including published
interviews, newspaper articles, press releases, and other scholarly works that discuss the cases.
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The bulk of these data were collected using news and scholarly databases, and documents made
available by public agencies, while other data had to be specially accessed through court record
databases such as the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system, and public
records requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
This combination of data sources allowed me to analyze the ways that both the state and
non-state actors engaged the EIA process, in terms of both administrative procedure and
environmental law. Though my particular choice of data sources limited the extent of the
inferences I could make about the intentionality behind various actors’ actions, my sources still
provided me with plenty of data about how the legal strategy based on the EIA process fit within a
broader context of social change. In addition to the archival sources that I used for this project, I
could have potentially employed oral history, ethnography, or more in-depth archival research
involving historical records kept by parties involved in each of the campaigns. However, I felt
that the data were sufficient to the scope of the project and the types of questions I aimed to
address regarding the legal and political implications of the EIA process. Data sources between
the different case studies were also inconsistent, and for some of the cases, it was difficult to track
down additional reliable sources of information, so I decided that limiting the overall scope of
data and analysis to the legal and institutional processes was the most prudent course for this
dissertation.
As I sifted through the data for each of the case studies, I used legal and historical
analyses to make sense of and draw conclusions about the operation of the EIA process. Each
case provides unique insights into the functional operation of the EIA process vis-à-vis the
judiciary since the precedents established in case law directly affect the ways in which statutes
and guidelines are interpreted and applied by state agencies. The full effect, indeed the practical
meaning, of any legislation, NEPA notwithstanding, requires legal challenges to define the
contours of both state action and responsibility, and thus, analysis of the legal process yields both
the shape and texture of the inner-workings and tensions within the state. The EIA process is
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dynamic; it’s been gradually transformed through practice and policy, mediated by the law (see
Merry 2000). Therefore, a history of the EIA process is inextricable from legal analysis of the
cases and practices that forced its transformation. Limiting this dissertation to three case studies
means that my analysis not representative of the breadth of case law that has shaped the EIA
process in general; nor is this dissertation meant to provide a complete history of the ways that the
EIA process has institutionalized aspects of environmental justice practice. Rather, my analysis
provides insights into the historical development of the EIA process by glimpsing specific cases
in moderate detail to see how the legal and institutional apparatuses of the racial environmental
state operate in relation to geographically specific struggles over place.
At the same time, each of my case studies is situated within a particular historical and
geographical context that provide the conditions of possibility for the state and various
communities to engage in their conflicts. Historical materialist analysis of these conditions allows
me to consider the state as a geographically contingent set of relationships and institutions,
including the EIA process, as embedded in a dialectical relationship with the environment. That
is, my analysis of the environment views it as a social relation between society and “nature” that
can only be understood through the ways that people make sense of it; the environment, in its
physicality, sociocultural meaning, and political economic functions, exists as such because the
state and society have shaped it through their mutual dependence upon it. Therefore, a legal and
geographical history of the EIA process requires that I attend to an environmental history of each
case study in order to understand the social and cultural changes in the context of a historical
materialist perspective (see Harvey 1996).

Organization

This dissertation is organized into three case study chapters that address different aspects of the
ways that NEPA and the EIA process get taken up in community struggles that engage the racial
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environmental state and demonstrate the ways in which environmental justice principles get
variously institutionalized within the EIA process. In Chapter 2, I ask how different ideas and
approaches to the concept of environment come to be embedded within the EIA framework. As
legislated, NEPA specifies that the EIA process should include analysis of impacts to the human
environment, but in practice, “human environment” is a concept whose meaning is worked out
through conflicts within the purview of the racial environmental state. This chapter asks what the
role of the judiciary is in mediating this process and what implications this bears for the racial
environmental state. Chapter 3 addresses questions regarding the use of the EIA process as a
strategy for social movement building. What are the implications of engaging the racial
environmental state as a site of conflict within a broader social movement for justice? How does
this engagement change the stakes of struggle for community organizers, potential collaborators,
and state institutions and organizations? What opportunities and constraints come with a legal
strategy based around the EIA process? In Chapter 4, I look beyond NEPA to ask how the
intersection of other land use policies with the EIA process can consolidate efforts to build a
social movement around culturally specific, counter-hegemonic land uses. In turn, how does this
engagement with the racial environmental state shift the ways that racial identities get deployed
within the movement and synthesized by the state? Furthermore, in considering the ways that the
political economic climate has changed dramatically over the nearly half-century since NEPA was
enacted, how has the malleability of the EIA process allowed it to adapt to shifting racial and
environmental discourses and national priorities? The concluding chapter synthesizes my findings
regarding the ways that NEPA and the EIA process have transformed the racial environmental
state. It also asks how the environmental justice principles institutionalized through changes
within the EIA process relate to the official requirements for environmental justice considerations
within Federal agencies under President Bill Clinton’s Executive Order 12898.
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White Flight and Pocket Ghettos as Environmental Impacts in New
York’s Upper West Side

In January 1980, after a protracted legal and bureaucratic battle lasting nearly a decade, the US
Supreme Court issued a ruling in Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen (Strycker’s Bay,
444 US 223 (1980)) that allowed the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
to provide funding for the construction of a public housing project in New York’s Upper West
Side (UWS). The plaintiffs in this case were a coalition of property owners and real estate
developers that claimed the federal government could not fund the housing development because
HUD failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). They argued that HUD did not adequately consider that the development would
create what they claimed was “an impermissible ‘pocket ghetto’ of a nonintegrated nature,” thus
deteriorating the local environment by “tipping” the neighborhood demographics toward
low-income, and presumably non-white residents, with the implication being an increase of crime,
“white flight,” and deteriorated property values.1 In addition to the racist and classist impunity of
the plaintiffs in this case, and the vigor with which local community housing advocates, in league
with the local, state, and federal government pushed back in support of public housing, this case is
significant for establishing a legal precedent used by courts in adjudicating the conflicting
priorities between substantive mandates of federal agencies and procedural requirements of
1

Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974); Otero v. New York
Housing Authority, 484 F. 2d 1122 (1973).
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NEPA, among other things.2 But what is perhaps most interesting about this case is the bigger
issue that it didn’t resolve, but which was emphasized throughout: that the environmental impact
assessment requirement under NEPA potentially undermined the substantive mandates of
anti-segregation civil rights legislation such as the Fair Housing Act.
The Strycker’s Bay case is one within a series of conflicts surrounding public housing in
the US following passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. At stake in these battles was the
development of large-scale public housing designed to alleviate the steady demand growth for
housing in urban areas following World War II. The need was greatest amongst the working poor
and unemployed populations, especially in communities of color as a result of decades of racist
housing and lending practices. But the same racist attitudes that fueled the de jure discriminatory
housing practices prior to the Fair Housing Act gave rise to diverse conflicts to prevent, delay,
relocate, restructure, and defund, as both a matter of fact and jurisprudence, the racially
progressive social welfare housing developments the Act intended to produce. Environmental
policy figures prominently within these conflicts, even if not always at the center. Public and
affordable housing in the US slowly eroded into private and affordable-for-some housing in the
1990s and 2000s. The legal precedents and political challenges enabling that transition are rooted
in, as this case study demonstrates, the racialized struggle over space, as much as the class-based
conflict over the state’s role in social welfare provision.
2

In legal terms, the difference between procedural requirements and substantive mandates is that
the former is a requirement that specific procedures be followed, usually in accordance with the
Administrative Procedures Act. The latter is a more subjective objective such as decreasing
segregation or enhancing the environment; in accordance with the APA, it’s left to the discretion
of the agency charged with the mandate as to whether or not their actions satisfy the substantive
goals of the mandate, so long as their actions are neither arbitrary nor capricious, and do not
represent an abuse of discretion (“5 U.S. Code § 706” 1966). The importance of this distinction
was made clear in one of the first NEPA cases granted cert by the Supreme Court, Calvert Cliffs’
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F. 2d 1109 (1971), in which
the Court’s majority opinion described the substantive goals of NEPA as “flexible,” in contrast
with its “not highly flexible” procedural requirements.
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This court case, and the broader conflict over low-income housing in New York City’s
West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA) from the 1950s through 1970s, form the heart of this
chapter. Through an examination of the legal decisions and policy implications of this case, I
showcase important shifts in the form and function of the racial environmental state under the
NEPA, in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, and alongside the slow decline of the
Keynesian welfare state throughout the latter half of the 20th century. Environmental policy plays
a central role in this story; indeed, I argue that environmental policy helped facilitate the
transition from the Keynesian welfare state to a particular form of neoliberal state characterized
by what Ruthie Gilmore describes as post-Keynesian militarism (Gilmore 1998; Gilmore 2007). I
show how contradictions within housing policy, civil rights legislation, and environmental policy
provided fertile grounds for racialized conflicts over the production of space, and how these
conflicts reshaped the racial environmental state. The racial environmental state facilitates the
capitalist organization and production of space vis-à-vis the management of racially differentiated
populations. I focus on the interactions between state agencies and the judiciary in resolving
issues borne out of public policy in the wake of social and economic crises beginning in the 1960s.
What emerges is a geographical understanding of the ways in which race and environment become
reinstitutionalized as mutually constituting frameworks in the post-civil rights era racial state.

Housing Conflict within The Upper West Side Renewal Area

Throughout the mid-20th century, New York City’s Upper West Side entertained massive
redevelopment efforts aimed at reinvigorating capital investment and maintaining property values
throughout the area. The most notorious effort was Robert Moses’ massive Lincoln Center
Renewal Project in the 1950s and 1960s, which razed entire city blocks and displaced hundreds of
households in the name of development and progress. Following on the heels of that controversial
project, Mayor Robert Wagner established a special Urban Renewal Board in 1959, as an offshoot
of the City Planning Commission, to plan the next round of redevelopment in what came to be
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known as the West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA), just a short distance north of the
Lincoln Center. Seeking a departure from what Martin Anderson (1964) calls the “Federal
Bulldozer” approach to redevelopment, Wagner’s plan for the WSURA called for a partnership
with the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to leverage federal funds
and financing to preserve the existing community through the expansion of decent affordable
housing, while still “arresting the spread of blight” (New York City Planning Commission 1958).
The plan called for a mix of demolition, rehabilitation, and new construction of housing and
community service facilities within a 20-block area bounded by 87th and 97th Streets, Central Park
West, and Amsterdam Avenue (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).
According to the Planning Commission’s (1958) study of the WSURA, one of the primary
objectives of the redevelopment plan would be to address the loss of investor confidence in the
WSURA, as it “suffered a deterioration in investment quality and…assumed many of the
characteristics of a declining area” (26), despite the fact that the same study showed that real
estate prices and housing demand indicated otherwise. The Planning Commission viewed high
population turnover within the WSURA as a clear indication of the “under confidence of capital”
(28). This finding is confounding because on the one hand, high population turnover coupled with
high housing demand can promote steady rent increases. On the other hand, their analysis equated
turnover with neighborhood instability and a lack of social investment in community building and
place making, with the long-term effect being an erosion of housing stock and greater risk to the
maintenance of property values. This latter conclusion reveals the true nature of racial capitalism,
and thus the project of the racial state underlying the WSURA redevelopment. To quote from the
Planning Commission’s study of the WSURA:
The size of the Puerto Rican in-migrant population and the fact that they have
contributed to the over-crowding and deterioration of the Area have aroused fear
and hostility. This reaction is often in excess of what actual conditions might
warrant. Much of the fear of crime and violence expressed by long-time residents
of the Area is not related to knowledge of specific incidents. It is often generalized
and associated with Puerto Ricans. (33)
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Figure 2.1. Overview Map of the West Side Urban Renewal Area (Source: Urban Renewal Board
1959)
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Figure 2.2. Map of the West Side and Seward Park Expansion Urban Renewal Areas
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Over the preceding decade, the WSURA experienced significant demographic
changes—white flight coupled with a roughly 35% increase in the Black and Puerto Rican
populations. Therefore, inasmuch as the Plan aimed to “retain the traditional diversity of the area
while attracting a more permanent population” (Urban Renewal Board 1959), the inference is that
it targeted the stabilization of white populations and geographical fixation of capital investment
through the management and containment of Puerto Rican populations racialized as non-white.
This racialized tension between securing the WSURA for capital and maintaining its existing
populations reveals itself as the core conflict over the state capacity mobilized through federal and
local housing policy and urban renewal programs across the US from the 1930s through the 1970s.
The WSURA Plan would become an important battleground in this war over the capitalist
racial state. The Plan leveraged funding from the Housing Acts of 1949 (42 US Code § 1441) and
1954 (Public Law 560, 68 Stat. 590) to publicly subsidize its urban renewal and redevelopment
objectives.3 Because the Housing Act of 1954 emphasized the minimization of displacement
resulting from urban renewal efforts, the Plan was required to include low-income housing to
accommodate existing Area populations. However, the conservative realignment of state
sponsored urban development efforts brought by the Housing Act of 1954, meant that low-income
housing and anti-displacement measures were subsidiary concessions to maintain political
legitimacy, while the primary objective of the Plan was to attract capital investment in the area
through federally subsidized mortgages and infrastructure development. Richard Flanagan (1997)
points out that the Housing Act of 1954 marked a more conservative departure from previous
3

Specifically, Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 states: “The Congress declares that the general
welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require
housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing
shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of
slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and
a suitable living environment for every American family, thus contributing to the development
and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security
of the Nation.” Thus, it is the primary driver of “slum clearance” efforts in the 1950s, and is
redoubled under the subsequent Housing Act of 1954.
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efforts at providing adequate public housing for poor and middle class urban populations because
of its focus on commercially oriented urban renewal rather than public housing. It was essentially
an early neoliberalization of housing policy that shifted funds away from state sponsored public
housing toward the neoliberal model of subsidized private development, with low-income
housing provisions merely riding the coattails of broader efforts to bolster increases in real estate
equity and returns.
Like the Lincoln Center Renewal Project that preceded it a dozen blocks to the south, the
WSURA Plan was essentially a gentrification project disguised as a welfare state project to
revitalize the neighborhood for the benefit of existing populations. In other words, the
low-income housing provisions funded by the program aimed to maintain, without increasing,
non-white populations in order to promote—and publicly finance—private development and
investment while attempting to allay capital’s racist insecurities around communities with large
non-white populations. Thus, poor and working class Black and Puerto Rican populations became
the subjects of both direct and indirect forms of displacement or containment in favor of publicly
subsidized private mixed-use real estate developments with greater profit and property value
potentials. The proposed slum clearances would eliminate existing housing and consolidate
displaced residents in newly constructed high-density public housing projects. Yet despite the
concessions made by the Plan for the sake of capital, the state was still committed to increasing
the stock of publicly owned and operated housing in an attempt to maintain the neighborhood’s
existing demographic composition against the pressure to liberalize the housing and real estate
markets.
The WSURA Preliminary Plan, submitted on May 28, 1959, called for 400 new “low-rent”
public housing units in a single housing project, with an additional 1,050 units in rehabilitated
structures. During public hearings, the City Planning Commission received criticism for these
paltry numbers and the inevitable displacement they presaged, and so the Commission
recommended an increase of another 400 low-rent units and an increase from 2,400 up to 3,600
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tax-abated or middle-income units.4 In June 1959, the City Planning Commission approved this
Preliminary Plan, however housing advocates continued pressing for additional low-income
housing allowances during public hearings held by the Board of Estimates to solicit feedback on
the funding plan for the WSURA. As a result of these organizing efforts, the WSURA plan was
further amended to include a minimum goal of 1,000 “low-rent” units, along with 4,200
middle-income units, of which 630 were to be made available at rents comparable to those in
public housing; additionally, 496 units would be made available in three perimeter sites outside of
the WSURA.5 The City Planning Commission finally approved the revised plan in 1962, but
community activists still weren’t satisfied despite the increased commitments within the plan for
low-income housing. The day before the Board of Estimates hearing that would finalize the
WSURA plan, Mayor Wagner issued a press release announcing his executive directive to more
than double the number of low-income units from 1,000 to the final figure of 2,500, with 1,010 of
those coming from an increase in the number of units in mixed-income developments, in place of
the 630 “public housing-rate” units described above. The press release also indicated that
additional units would be made available in other surrounding developments in the immediate
vicinity of the WSURA.6
From the outset, the WSURA Plan was fraught with controversy and sharply divided the
neighborhood along racial and class lines. Advocating for replacement housing on behalf of
lower-income residents in the WSURA, as well as people displaced by the Lincoln Center
redevelopment, were a handful of community-based organizations including the Stryker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council and the Goddard Riverside Community Center, along with a number of
state officials such City Council member Ruth Messinger, who earned the title of “poverty czar”
from her opponents (Wilson 1987). On the other side of the aisle were a number of powerful
business and property owners, white upper-middle class residents, local institutions such as the
4

Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974).
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974).
6
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974).
5
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Trinity Episcopal School Corporation, and a coalition called Committee of Neighbors To Insure a
Normal Urban Environment (CONTINUE). They generally favored market-rate housing under
the liberal banners of property value protection while maintaining the “integrated character” of
the neighborhood, a reference to the area’s historically mixed income and racial composition, but
which was still a majority white. They opposed the perceived threat that an increase in lower
income, non-white populations within the neighborhood would, as Andrew Alpert, the Vice
President of the West Side Chamber of Commerce put it, lead to “falling property values, rising
crime and a return to decay and poverty which had historically plagued the Upper West Side” (qtd.
in Wilson 1987). Fears of the neighborhood becoming majority low-income and non-white were
likely far overblown given the pre-existing trend of increasing property values and rents
throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Smith 1987; Wilson 1987). The pervasive sentiment
characterizing this camp is captured in a 1961 New York Times account of a fight that occurred on
West 84th Street:
The block is lined with brownstone houses that were once the homes of well-to-do
middle-class families. Today they are virtually all rooming houses, occupied by
Negro and Puerto Rican tenants.
“It sure is a rough place,” a policeman said yesterday after the brawl. “It’s no spot
for anyone with a decent job and a family to raise to live in.”
Only a block away is Central Park West, an area of well-kept, rent-controlled
apartment houses in the medium or high priced rent bracket. The residents of
Central Park West are almost exclusively white. (“Fight Embroils 400 In a
’Trouble’ Block” 1961)
The conflict surrounding the WSURA Plan did not end when it finally received approval
by all requisite parties and entered the first phase of implementation in January 1963. Indeed, as
construction commenced, so too did the next round of conflict over who would be able to live and
resettle in the Upper West Side. By 1968, four public housing projects had been completed and
five Mitchell-Lama co-ops and rental buildings had opened to residents, with between 1,200 and
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1,500 units occupied by low-income tenants.7 However, increasing construction costs caused
Mitchell-Lama rents—those presumably for middle- to moderate-income residents—to skyrocket,
and led to the suspension of all new construction. The City’s ability to fulfill its commitment to
2,500 low-income units in the Area was clearly in doubt. A series of revisions to the WSURA
Plan, and newly available federal funds from the Fair Housing Act of 1968, allowed for an
increase in the number of low-income units available in the mixed-income developments by
reducing the number of middle- and moderate-income units and subsidizing their cost with
federal funds, thus keeping the project viable while also meeting the ever-increasing demand for
additional low-income housing.8
Despite the additional low-income units, the Plan was still falling short of its targets so as
a stop-gap measure, the Department of Social Services even began placing welfare-assisted
families in middle-income units in excess of the allocations in the Plan or its revisions. But these
concessions still left a gap of nearly 1,000 units between the City’s agreed upon goal of 2,500
low-rent units and the number of units inhabited by low-income households by January 1969. In a
bold move, the City decided to convert two additional sites, Sites 4 and 30 (see Figure 2.3), from
proposed middle-income developments to low-income public housing projects. This conversion
upset the members of the conservative coalition, so they organized opposition to the public
housing conversion, and a local private school and several homeowners, on behalf of the larger
7
8

Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974).
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974). Without the federal
(Section 236) funding allocated under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which were designated for
middle- and moderate-income households—rents on those units would have been prohibitively
expensive in order to cover the additional low-income units. Thus, even though the funds were
designated for middle- and moderate-income households, they were effectively used to subsidize
additional low-income units to help the City meet its goal of 2,500 low-rent units. It also bears
mentioning that the Fair Housing Act of 1968, also known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act,
in part resulted from uprisings in cities across the country that precipitated following news of the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Although the Fair Housing Act is historically
significant as a capstone to Civil Rights era legislation, much of the anti-discrimination and
anti-segregation measures that it codified generally were already operating as substantive goals
in federal housing policy.
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coalition, filed a lawsuit against HUD to prevent HUD from funding the building conversion.

Racial “Tipping” and “Pocket Ghettos”

The City’s decision to construct additional low-income units caused the conflict over housing
within the WSURA to boil over into the courts. Prior to construction, but after federal funds were
committed to the public housing project on Site 30, HUD conducted a Special Environmental
Clearance Study to satisfy their own internal policies with regard to NEPA.9 In acknowledging
the controversy surrounding the Site 30 proposal, the HUD study concluded that the proposed
project would not have “a significant adverse impact on the environment” despite “considerable
organized opposition to the project…motivated by alleged social impacts…[but such] impacts are
not environmental impacts within the context of Section 101(b) of NEPA.”10 With this
environmental clearance in place, construction was set to begin on Site 30. But then in 1971, the
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation (Trinity), joined by two “brownstone” homeowners, Karlen
and Hudgins, and members of the pro-market rate housing coalition CONTINUE (see above),
sued HUD to halt construction of the public housing project on Site 30.11 In defense of the Site 30
proposal and HUD, the housing advocacy group Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council joined the
9

Depending on the type of project being proposed, HUD typically requires either a Normal
Environmental Clearance, Special Environmental Clearance, or a full EIS depending on the size
of the proposed housing development, with a full EIS being required only for the largest projects
of over 500 units (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 1972; “HUD Handbook
1390.1” 1973)
10
HUD qtd. in Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974).
11
“Brownstone” homes refer both to the construction materials—a brown sandstone used for
exterior walls—and a type of row house found throughout much of New York City’s borough of
Brooklyn, but the UWS is one of the few neighborhoods in Manhattan where brownstones are
still common. Trinity is a private K-12 (lower, middle, and upper) school located across 91st
Street from Site 30. At the time of the lawsuit, it had recently expanded its facilities to include a
mixed-use development that also included middle-income housing, as part of the WSURA Plan,
and it was in the negotiations with city officials that they claimed contracts were signed ensuring
the 2,500 figure would be a maximum number of low-income units throughout the WSURA.
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Figure 2.3. Detail Map of the WSURA Showing Site 30 (Source: Urban Renewal Board 1959)
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case as an intervening defendant alongside HUD.
The suit contained four issues: the first two were breach-of-contract claims, a pair of
brownstone homeowners, Karlen and Hudgins; the third issue was the claim that the housing
project would cause a “tipping” condition within the WSURA and lead middle-class residents to
flee, and that it the project would create a “pocket ghetto” in the immediate vicinity of Site 30;
and the fourth issue was that HUD had not complied with NEPA requirements for environmental
impact assessment in its approval to fund construction of the public housing project. In 1974, the
District Court issued a lengthy ruling in favor of HUD on all four issues. The two breach of
contract claims related to the plan for 2,500 units of low-income housing and the revisions to the
plan to use Sites 4 and 30 for the construction of public housing projects were dismissed based on
legal and contractual terms, and are not really pertinent to the discussion at hand. The tipping,
pocket ghetto, and NEPA claims were also dismissed by the District Court, but their
particularities warrant further discussion since they remained important issues in the subsequent
appeals leading ultimately to the case being heard by the Supreme Court.
The issues of tipping and the creation of a pocket ghetto evoked throughout the Strycker’s
Bay cases draw from a precedent set by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in 1973, in Otero v. New
York City Housing Authority.12 At issue in Otero was the claim that the New York City Housing
Authority (NYCHA) ignored internal regulations specifying that in urban renewal housing
projects, first priority for tenancy should be granted to the people displaced by the urban renewal
activities and development. NYCHA was accused of violating the regulations by granting a
majority of leases in a newly constructed public housing project to white residents who had
previously resided outside of the urban renewal area. The suit was brought against NYCHA by a
class of 322 predominantly Puerto Rican applicants who were denied housing at the new housing
project in Manhattan’s Lower East Side that was constructed as part of the Seward Park Extension
Urban Renewal Area (SPURA; see Figure 2.2), a similar undertaking to the WSURA. The
12

Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F. 2d 1122 (1973).
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plaintiffs argued that NYCHA’s actions constituted racial discrimination under the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, also known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (42 USC §3608(e)(5), 1976), and
that their Constitutional rights of due process and equal protection were also violated. NYCHA,
supported in their defense of the lawsuit by the group of low-income, predominantly Jewish
residents whose applications were approved even though they were not among the former area
residents who were displaced by the urban renewal project, defended the resident selection
process by claiming that granting first priority to the displaced families would create a so-called
“pocket ghetto” and cause tipping in the neighborhood in violation of their affirmative obligation
to achieve residential integration under the same Fair Housing Act. Of more than 1,800 families
displaced by the SPURA, approximately 60% were non-white; 161 of the 360 available leases in
the new housing project went to displaced former area residents at the same three-to-two ratio of
non-white to white families; 171 of the remaining leases went to the defendant class, with only
12% going to non-white families; two units went to resident employees, and the remaining 26
units were unallocated (see Table 2.1). The case was ultimately decided on appeal in favor of
NYCHA, with the ruling judge determining that the state’s obligation to promote residential
integration outweighed its duty of nondiscrimination.
Table 2.1. Racial Composition of Seward Park Extension Urban Renewal Area Displacement and
New Leases in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, by Family.13

White
Non-white

Former Area
Residents Displaced
by Urban Renewal
Project

Leases Granted to
Former Area
Residents
(undisputed)

Disputed
Leases

Total
Leases

40%
60%

40%
60%

88%
12%

64%
36%

The tipping argument used in the Otero case was defined in relatively unambiguous terms
13

Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 354 F. Supp. 941 (1973).
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with a clear bias toward maintaining white majorities as an indicator that the neighborhood was
racially integrated. Tipping is the sociological phenomenon where the increase in a
neighborhood’s non-white population reaches a so-called tipping point, analogous to adding
weight to a balance beam until it tips, though the tipping point is not necessarily equivalent to a
one-to-one ratio of white people to non-white people. After the neighborhood reaches the tipping
point, white people, feeling psychologically threatened for whatever reason, would increasingly
desire to leave the neighborhood in favor of other places with greater concentrations of white
people, resulting, according to the case, in overall greater degrees of racial segregation between
different neighborhoods (see McDougall 1981, 185 note 57). It’s worth pointing out that in the
legal construction of what constitutes a segregated community or concerns about tipping, the
prospect of a supposedly integrated neighborhood becoming inundated with white people, or poor
people being forced out of a neighborhood due to increasing rents, i.e., gentrification, never gets
raised as a plausible concern regarding neighborhood “integration” or desegregation because of
the tipping argument’s valorization and normalization of whiteness (see Harris 1993; Pulido
2000). Additionally, as I discuss below in greater detail, the relationship between poverty and
race is confounded throughout the tipping argument, especially when comparing the Otero case
with the Strycker’s Bay case because in the latter, the white residents who evoked the tipping
argument claimed it was not about the race of people moving in, but rather about their class
backgrounds, though the defendants as well as the court cut through the claim to reassert tipping
as a raciological phenomenon. But in the case of Otero, class really had nothing to do with
tipping, as all of the potential residents for the disputed public housing project qualified for
housing assistance within the state’s purview of social welfare assistance.
Beyond the Otero case’s relevance for providing a legal definition of tipping, an important
consideration in the case is that racial tipping was debated based on the claim that a dense
concentration of non-white residents in a single building could itself constitute a pocket ghetto
and would create the conditions leading to an area-wide tipping that would drive white flight, and
thus, further neighborhood segregation. This reveals several crucial aspects of the ways in which
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the racial state operated to effectively dismantle the plaintiffs’ arguments: the co-optation of
racial categories, jumping scale, and the disarticulation of race and class. The manner in which
NYCHA’s attorneys argued the tipping claim depends on the homogenizing use of the racial
category “non-white” as constituting a collective majority over the white racial category.14 Given
this claim, the meaning of integration was skewed such that a 60% white population in the
renewal area was deemed acceptable to the court since it was closer to a 50-50 mix (see Table 2.2)
even though the 40% non-white population depended on the lumping together of Black, Latino,
and Asian populations within the racially homogenizing and whiteness-normalizing umbrella
category of non-white.
Table 2.2. Projected Racial Composition of Seward Park Extension based on the outcome of
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, by Family.15
Within Disputed Project
if Otero
if NYCHA
prevailed
prevailed
White
Non-white

20%
80%

60%
40%

Across Urban Renewal Area16
if Otero
if NYCHA
prevailed
prevailed
73%
27%

82%
18%

Interestingly, the use of the “non-white” racial category was initiated by the
predominantly Puerto Rican plaintiffs as a political move to collectively argue as a unified class
that was the target of racial discrimination; the district court judge affirmed the use of this racial
category. Thus despite the anti-racist project of solidarity intended by evoking the non-white
racial category in opposition to the similarly homogenizing white racial category, the racial
14

The distinction between white and non-white is not the least bit ironic given that 1970 was the
first year that the “Hispanic” question was added to the Census to disaggregate white (and
Black) populations.
15
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 354 F. Supp. 941 (1973).
16
Estimates contested by NYCHA upon appeal. See Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,
484 F. 2d 1122 (1973).
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state—here represented by the court and NYCHA—co-opted and reified that category as being
antithetical to the goal of integration under the Fair Housing Act, rendering in its wake a defanged
racial liberalism that displaced—both materially and discursively—the potential for anti-racist
coalitional solidarity.
This state’s appropriation of the non-white racial category that was leveraged in favor of
NYCHA worked in concert with a geographical sleight of hand that reappeared in the Strycker’s
Bay case: “jumping” geographical scales from the neighborhood to the individual housing project.
NYCHA successfully reinscribed the scale of conflict, and in this case racial domination, from the
broader SPURA neighborhood scale down to the scale of the individual housing project, a
strategic process of political geography that Neil Smith (1992) refers to as jumping scales in order
to reorganize the politics of, in this case, social reproduction. Despite the numbers supporting the
claim that the urban renewal area as a whole would remain extremely white regardless of the
court’s decision (see Table 2.2), NYCHA argued, and the Court of Appeals judge concurred, that
a predominantly non-white population within the individual housing project was unacceptable for
the purposes of integration under the Fair Housing Act. Quoting from the Otero ruling:
Defendants rejoin that large concentrations of non-whites in one or more pockets
within the community would act as a “tipping” factor which would precipitate an
increase in the non-white population in the surrounding neighborhoods, leading to
a steady loss of total white population over a given period of time. It argues that it
is under an obligation to prevent the formation of such concentrations or pockets
of non-whites rather than limit itself to consideration of the overall current
community proportions of whites and non-whites.
We agree with the parties and with the district court that the Authority is under an
obligation to act affirmatively to achieve integration in housing.17
In addition to the clear indication that NYCHA was attempting to maintain the status quo
white majority throughout the neighborhood, the NYCHA argument supported by the court
17

Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F. 2d 1122 (1973).
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presupposes that a 60% majority of white residents within the project represents a victory for
racial integration at both the building and neighborhood scales even though this would result in a
roughly 82% white population across the entire urban renewal area. Furthermore, this numbers
game reifies the position that the remaining 40% non-white population within the individual
housing project represented an achievement of “racial integration” since the non-white families
would cumulatively represent a homogeneous bloc of non-white racial “others”—despite any real
or perceived racial and ethnic heterogeneity—in the dichotomous view of integration as a
quantifiable measure of white versus non-white populations. Thus, NYCHA’s and the court’s
confinement of their arguments regarding racial integration to the scale of the housing projects
resulted in the production of coupled geographical scales of domination at both the building and
neighborhood scales, whose function is to ensure the social reproduction of white families, and
the rendering of non-white people as surplus populations within the logics of the welfare state.
Moreover, this production of space represented an inversion of the attempt of individual
claimants—the potential non-white residents—to jump scales from the individual as the site of
discriminatory actions, up to the project, neighborhood, city, and even national policy scales as
the terrain of racially and economically articulated struggle over the housing and social
reproduction responsibilities of the racial state.
Expanding upon both of the previous points, there is further irony in the defendants’ use
of the phrase “pocket ghetto” because it demonstrates the insidiousness of the racial formation
process at work in the Otero case specifically, and in the racialized production of space more
generally (see Omi and Winant 1994). The predominantly Jewish defendants, whose applications
for the housing project were approved by NYCHA, used the phrase “pocket ghetto” in a
derogatory fashion to describe a locally concentrated population of non-white residents. In this
way, they engaged in a racial project that reified their status as white people to legitimize their
entitlement claim over space, in the form of state sponsored housing, through their disassociation
with the Jewish ghettos of Europe. In turn, this affirms the idea that Puerto Ricans—who
constituted the majority of the plaintiffs—are not white, and it reasserts the racial-geographical
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formation of the “ghetto” as a decidedly non-white space marked by poverty and undesirability,
and antithetical to capitalist property relations. Furthermore, the particular phrase “pocket ghetto”
bears the connotation of a particular geographical scale that is both manageable and surplus to the
larger neighborhood. Something pocket-sized is easily contained and dealt with before it spreads
the contagion of the ghetto—that is, dense concentrations of non-white bodies—and with it, the
degeneracy that mark it as surplus to the relations of American capitalism. Thus, the idea of a
pocket ghetto works as a discursive production of space that is inextricably linked to the
organization of material space in terms of the social reproduction of “deserving” white
populations through the displacement, exclusion, and rendering as surplus of non-white
populations.
The last point about the Otero case that bears relevance to the Strycker’s Bay cases is that
the court decision disarticulated race and class as mutually constituting forces in the operation of
housing discrimination and segregation that the Fair Housing Act ostensibly aimed to combat. On
its face, the Act is aimed at remedying the enduring spatial effects of historical practices of racism
and discrimination. These effects frequently materialize in conditions of environmental racism,
where non-white populations are geographically differentiated from their white counterparts in
terms of access to infrastructure, social services, resources, and employment opportunities, and a
predisposition to hazards or other environmental burdens (Pulido 2000). In this light, the Fair
Housing Act’s mandate to promote integration is on its face designed to operate as a form of
affirmative action to remedy these historical inequities by using integration as a proxy measure
for equality of access, not a racially liberal end in itself. Interestingly, this position was
recognized, only to be upended, in the Court of Appeals decision:
Action must be taken to fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open, integrated
residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos,
of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat. […]
[District Court] Judge Lasker recognized these mandates. However, he further
concluded that because the primary intention of the Act’s sponsors was to benefit
minority groups, the affirmative duty to integrate public housing should not be
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given effect where it would deprive such groups of available and desirable housing.
We disagree. Such a rule of thumb gives too little weight to Congress’ desire to
prevent segregated housing patterns and the ills which attend them. To allow
housing officials to make decisions having the long range effect of increasing or
maintaining racially segregated housing patterns merely because minority groups
will gain an immediate benefit would render such persons willing, and perhaps
unwitting, partners in the trend toward ghettoization of our urban centers.18
The last sentence in this quote from Court of Appeals ruling makes clear that integration was the
end unto itself despite its language of considering the “long range effect” because its consideration
of “ghettoization” is confined to the scale of the individual housing project even though the
“opportunities the Act was designed to combat” are hardly confined to that particular geographical
scale. Furthermore, the court determined that a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs resulting in a dense
concentration of non-white residents in a single housing project was unacceptable because it
reproduced conditions of segregation, when in fact its ruling in favor of the defendants actually
resulted in racial discrimination, displacement, denial of access to housing, and an increasingly
gentrified neighborhood that was hostile to an increase in concentrations of non-white residents.
The court’s ruling in the Otero case affirmed that the overriding force in the NYCHA
selection process should be their duty to take affirmative measures toward achieving a racially
integrated housing project and urban renewal area, even if, as reality would have it, this meant
blatantly discriminatory practices that contributed to gentrification, further displacement, and
disenfranchisement of non-white populations in addition to those families already displaced by
the SPURA. Instead of providing housing to non-white former area residents, NYCHA used the
Fair Housing Act as a means for racial exclusion. Although the Fair Housing Act is explicit in its
mandates to end housing discrimination based on protected classes, as well as in its promotion of
residential integration, it does not explicitly specify priorities for addressing these mandates.19 In
18
19

Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F. 2d at 1134 (1973).
Constitutionally protected classes include race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex,
pregnancy, citizenship, familial status, (dis-)ability, veteran status, genetic information, and as
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a decision whose rhetoric strikes a chord with juridical challenges to affirmative action policies in
the 1990s and 2000s, the judge in the Otero case ruled that the liberal objectives of integration
where it promotes a white-normative status quo, overrides the protection of people within suspect
classes from discriminatory practices and the ability to benefit from spatially differentiated social
welfare provisions. This ruling demonstrates the success of the contemporary racial state in
leveraging strict legal interpretation to reduce integration to a pluralistic end, and as such, it
reproduces the uneven historical conditions that anti-discrimination policies ostensibly exist to
combat. And importantly, Otero succeeds both in its accomplishment in expanding, and as a
successor to, what amounts to de facto exclusionary zoning practices in light of the Fair Housing
Act.
Turning back to the Strycker’s Bay cases, whereas the Otero ruling relied upon a careful
disarticulation of race and class as mutually constituting forms of oppression in order to support
the use of affirmative action housing policy on behalf of white populations at the expense of
excluding non-white populations, the District Court decision in the Trinity I case leading up to
Strycker’s Bay was much more ambiguous on this point. Because the racial composition of future
residents of the proposed public housing project was unpredictable, the plaintiffs decided to rely
on the certainty that they would all fall into the category of low-income residents in order to
qualify for leases. Thus, they claimed that the suit was not racially motivated, but rather, based
purely on the class backgrounds of potential future residents, but they argued that the net effect of
low-income residents moving en masse into the neighborhood would have a cumulatively similar
impact as the non-white residents in the Otero case. They argued that the concept of tipping used
in Otero should be expanded to include economic factors in addition to the racial categories
already accepted under Otero. The tipping arguments and evidence forwarded by the plaintiffs,
however, was inconsistent in laying out a strictly economic argument and conflated racial and
economic factors throughout, basing their arguments in large part on the subjective racial
of June 2013, to a limited extent, sexuality.
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prejudices and fears of white middle-class residents while attempting all the same to deny that
their claims were racially prejudiced. This is demonstrated in the legal analysis of the tipping
claim in the court decision to Trinity II:
tipping, as a phenomenon, cannot be discussed satisfactorily in terms of the
income levels of housing residents. Plaintiffs claim, nonetheless, that an increase
in the number of low income residents would be synonymous with an increase in
the number of nonwhite tenants and that if the Area tips, middle income non-white
residents will also flee. (Tr. 263-264, 301-303, 2526-2530). Plaintiffs’ expert
witness Roger Starr testified that tipping in the Area has nothing to do with the
extent of the racial prejudice of its residents because they expected that the Area
would contain a mixture of races and that they would not have moved in were they
prejudiced. Rather, he contended, the Area will tip if the number of low income
units exceeds 2,500 because these residents relied upon alleged representations of
that figure as the maximum number of such units and because if this understanding
is violated, their “subjective reactions” will cause them to flee. (Tr. 300-307).20
This excerpt shows that, on the one hand, the plaintiffs racialize poverty as non-white, while also
claiming not to be racially prejudiced because they celebrate the idea of liberal pluralism. On the
other hand, they claimed that the only way to avoid white middle-class residents from fleeing the
area was by excluding additional low-income residents from the neighborhood, and by extension
of their own logic, this also implied the necessary exclusion of non-white residents. Clearly, the
plaintiffs were attempting to justify the exclusion of a particular class of residents from their
neighborhood based on the combined anxieties around personal safety and property values. Their
contradictory understandings, or at least their articulations, of who and what constituted this
threat seem to indicate an underlying desire for a space dominated by white middle-class people
and values, mixed with a nascent desire for liberal multiculturalism-as-capital, but which is
tempered by a legal framework premised on anti-discrimination principles.21 However, because
20

Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. at 1064-1065 (1974)
I am referring to the capitalist productions of multicultural space, where a desire for an
“integrated community” can be interpreted as the desire for the ability to consume ethnically

21
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the plaintiffs’ claim relied on the impact of these anxieties, namely white flight, as opposed to the
direct potential of low-income and non-white residents to actually engage in the anti-social
behaviors attributed them by the plaintiffs, it was possible for the court to recommend that these
factors be considered in weighing alternatives under the statutory requirements of NEPA of
Sections 102(c)(iii) and 102(e).22
Looking at the Otero case in relation to the Strycker’s Bay case reveals the ways that the
changes in the racial state due to conflicts over the Fair Housing Act became further articulated
within the armature of the racial environmental state. The same types of arguments about
integration and tipping that emerge in the Otero case get reworked in the Strycker’s Bay case as
being more than just considerations for state sponsored housing development, and instead as
qualified areas of environmental impact that warrant incorporation within the EIA process more
broadly. Where the Otero case deals in the domain of the Fair Housing Act and Constitutional
protections and a specific conflict over the hierarchy of agency priorities, Strycker’s Bay operates
in the realm of NEPA and the EIA process that is specific but not limited to the particular case. As
such, the arguments in Strycker’s Bay that echo those made in the Otero case regarding
neighborhood integration, tipping, and pocket ghettos under the Fair Housing Act, though
rejected by the courts on their face, still end up being institutionalized as environmental
considerations as a result of the Strycker’s Bay cases, meaning that federal agencies could evoke
diverse cultural amenities such as museums and restaurants, but which aren’t necessarily spaces
for the social reproduction of economically, ethnically, or racially diverse populations. See for
example, Arlene Davila’s Barrio Dreams (2004).
22
Section 102 of NEPA (42 USC § 4332) states: “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the
fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal Government shall … (c) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on … (iii) alternatives
to the proposed action, … (e) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to
recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources.”
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the race liberal discourses of integration in assessing and justifying future projects, as I discuss in
the subsequent section.

Integrating Race and Class into NEPA

After the District Court ruled in favor of HUD in the initial lawsuit (Trinity I), the case was
appealed in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v.
Romney (Trinity II).23 The ruling in Trinity II upheld the ruling in Trinity I, except on the NEPA
issue, for which it ordered HUD to revise its Special Environmental Clearance to explicitly
consider alternatives to Site 30, and remanded the case to the District Court. In the second round
at the District Court, Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Harris (Trinity III),24 the court
approved the revised environmental clearance, and this decision was again appealed by the
plaintiffs in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Karlen v. Harris (Karlen).25 In Karlen, the
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, imposing an injunction on the construction of the housing
project on Site 30 on the basis that the HUD selection of Site 30 over other alternatives
represented an abuse of discretion because it was not in holding with the ideal of neighborhood
integration. Finally, case was appealed to the Supreme Court in Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood
Council v. Karlen (Strycker’s Bay), which was ultimately decided in favor of HUD on what
amounted to a combination of administrative procedures and judicial jurisdiction.26
The Supreme Court decision declared that in issuing the Karlen ruling, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals overstepped its judicial bounds defined by the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) in reordering HUD’s substantive priorities. The Court found that HUD had fulfilled its
NEPA responsibilities by considering alternatives to converting Site 30 into a public housing
23

Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 523 F. 2d 88 (1975).
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204 (1978).
25
Karlen v. Harris, 590 F. 2d 39 (1978).
26
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
24
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project based on their agency discretion, and therefore had no other overriding substantive
obligations.27 However, by tacitly rejecting the tipping claim before it on procedural grounds
without weighing on the substantive arguments about the applicability of demographic changes
and tipping fears to NEPA, the Supreme Court held with the Court of Appeals decision in Trinity II
requiring consideration of these impacts and analyses under NEPA. These rulings have important
implications for the EIA process and understanding the relationships between federal agencies
and the judiciary, and between the NEPA and other federal statutes. The subsequent sections of
this chapter provide an analysis of the various court decisions and discuss their importance to
understanding how the EIA process and the NEPA function, particularly as a state mechanism that
mediates different national priorities, especially regarding racial and environmental conflict.
Although in Trinity I the District Court rejected the racial tipping arguments based on
unsubstantiated claims, and while this rejection was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Trinity II,
the judge in Trinity II essentially took the sociological and psychological anxieties behind the
tipping argument, veiled in the language of neighborhood integration, to suggest that
consideration of such phenomena should be included within the social-environmental impact
assessment required by NEPA. The District Court ruling in Trinity I rejected the use of economic
classifications as a tipping category “because, unlike the racial characteristics of a neighborhood,
which are easily measurable, any definition of low income is imprecise and depends upon an
arbitrary income ceiling, the family size, and the cost of living, none of which remains
constant.”28 That same court also rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the tipping anxieties,
reflected in the “attitudes and fears of community residents…do not lend themselves
to…objective analysis and are not required in a NEPA study,” citing other cases in which similar
arguments were made regarding the difficulty or impossibility of quantifying psychological
environmental impacts.29 In Trinity II, the Court of Appeals concurred generally with the District
27

Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. at 1065 (1974).
29
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. at 1079 (1974); see Hanley v.
28
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Court ruling, and upheld the District Court’s rejection of the tipping claim, but the presiding
Judge Moore explicitly linked the substantive goal of integration to the procedural requirements
of NEPA in remanding the case to the District Court:
The statement of possible alternatives, the consequences thereof and the facts and
reasons for and against is HUD’s task. Such a statement should be made, not as
HUD’s concept or the Housing Authority’s views as to how these agencies would
choose to resolve the city’s low income group housing situation, but as to how
within the framework of the Plan its objective of economic integration can best be
achieved with a minimum of adverse environmental impact…The purpose of the
Plan is integration—not concentration. That purpose would not be achieved by
concentrating low-income housing on 91st Street and compensating for this
segregation by an equal concentration of middle-income housing on 97th Street.30
Thus, even though the courts refrained from expanding the tipping precedent from Otero to
include economic class as a legal basis for protection under the Civil Rights Act, the Court of
Appeals asserted that NEPA requirements created an obligation for HUD to consider tipping and
integration as environmental impacts within the environmental assessment and site selection
processes, effectively expanding the tipping argument of Otero through the mechanisms of NEPA.
This outcome provides a key insight to how and why NEPA works so well as a mechanism
of governance within, and helps establish the foundations of, the racial environmental state.
NEPA is highly flexible, meaning it can be applied to a broad swath of potential environmental
impacts; yet it is also easily constrained by agency discretion and judicial narrowing. This
flexibility allows NEPA to be selectively applied within agency decision-making, which in turn
allows it to be leveraged in service of various state objectives such as the two sides of the same
post-Civil Rights Movement coin: racial integration on the one hand, and maintenance of
racialized class hierarchies and uneven development on the other. Yet the question remains as to
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (1972); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Association v. Lynn, 372 F.
Supp. 147 (1973).
30
Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 523 F. 2d at 94-95
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the source of this malleability, particularly regarding the racialized governance of space.
The language of NEPA is deliberately vague and encompasses a broad range of potential
impacts under the umbrella concept of “human environment.” Entire volumes exist to explain the
details and nuances of what falls within the legal scope of NEPA and how the law defines the
requirements and obligations of state institutions with respect to considering these impacts within
the EIA and decision-making processes (e.g., Anderson 1973; Fogleman 1990). However, in
considering the ways in which NEPA shapes the racial environmental state as a nexus for social
justice struggles, the most pertinent aspects of EIA are those relating to social impacts on human
environments. The range of social impacts covered under NEPA is broad, yet subject to judicial
narrowing, or the exemption of specific impacts as determined by courts. Social impacts
determined to be covered under NEPA include health and safety related to urban infrastructure
such as sewage and solid waste management, roads, traffic, mass transit, and fire and police
services, and access to controlled substances; impacts to social services such as education,
healthcare, business, and parking; impacts to land uses, zoning, and aesthetics; urban planning
impacts to things like neighborhood stability, growth, renewal, and blight; and impacts to
historically or culturally significant resources (Fogleman 1990).
Through the use of linguistic analysis of NEPA, courts and legal analysts have inferred
Congress’s legislative intent as to just about every aspect of the policy, including the meaning of
words such as “significant,” “impact,” and “environment” (Daffron 1975), and as a result, the
effective scope of NEPA is limited specifically to impacts resulting from changes in the physical
environment. It does not apply to purely psychological or socioeconomic impacts lacking a
physical component, even if physical changes might ensue as a secondary result of the proposed
action; this means the exclusion of impacts to factors such as employment or speculative impacts
related to fears of things like increased crime or nuclear meltdowns (Fogleman 1990).31 But
31

For example, Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear Energy (460 U.S. 766
(1983)) determined that psychological effects of restarting one of the nuclear power reactors
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despite the meticulousness with which courts have dissected the language of NEPA and debated
over the legislative intent of Congress in passing NEPA, there remain a number of gray areas
where rulings have either been contradictory or ambiguous as to NEPA applicability such as
psychological impacts related to changes in the physical environment or the significance of
aesthetic impacts (Fogleman 1990; Daffron 1975).
The inherent ambiguity within the scope and legislative intent of NEPA is crucial to
understanding its flexibility as a mechanism of governance and site of struggle because it leaves
open the possibility for the selective incorporation or dismissal of various environmentally
situated claims. For instance, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. US
Postal Service established that the influx of a particular class of people did not constitute a form
of environmental pollution cognizable under NEPA.32 However, in Strycker’s Bay, it was exactly
that phenomenon—the influx of a dense population of low-income residents, and the
psychological threat they posed to existing white residents, as antithetical to the goals of
integration—that the Court of Appeals in Trinity II implored HUD to consider in their site
selection alternatives as required by NEPA. The difference between the two cases is largely a
matter of semantics, nuance, and judicial interpretations, where the integration-as-impact
argument is allowed in one case, but essentially the same underlying phenomenon—and the white
middle-class anxieties surrounding it—are disallowed from NEPA consideration in the other.
following the Three Mile Island disaster were not covered under NEPA; Como-Falcon
Community Coalition, Inc. v. Department of Labor (609 F.2d 342 (1979)) determined that
establishment of a Job Corps center that would introduce low-income populations into a wealthy
white neighborhood was not covered under NEPA since “people pollution” was not a cognizable
environmental impact; First National Bank of Homestead v. Watson (363 F. Supp. 466 (1973))
determined that the potential urban development that might ensue from the establishment of a
bank was not covered under NEPA because it was a secondary impact ensuing from the primary
impact of the bank itself.
32
Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. U.S. Postal Service, 487 F. 2d
1029 (1973)
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Legacies of Strycker’s Bay and the Continuing Battle over Housing

The Strycker’s Bay case provides an important example of how the EIA process institutionalizes
and reworks racial logics vis-à-vis environmental knowledge within an environmental policy
framework. As analytical concepts, both racial and environmental knowledge were transformed
over the course of the decade long legal battle, and politically, large scale public housing projects
were dealt another legal and procedural setback despite the ultimate ruling in favor of HUD. In
effect, the plaintiffs succeed in their lawsuit by delaying the public housing project until it was no
longer relevant to the City’s immediate problem of providing adequate affordable housing as a
social welfare consideration to offset displacement within the WSURA. Site 30 eventually opened
as public housing for the elderly in 1994, and was named the Sondra Thomas Apartments in
honor of the longtime Executive Director of the Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council. By this
point, the political landscape of public housing had already shifted away from the construction of
large-scale public housing in favor of Section 8 vouchers and public subsidies of private
mixed-income developments.
The demise of large-scale public housing developments in the wake of a series of court
battles such as Strycker’s Bay and Otero was bittersweet. While there is no question that such
developments contributed to de facto racial segregation, abandonment by the state, and social
disinvestment in places like Chicago and St. Louis, they have been largely successful in New
York despite the constant need for housing advocates to push for adequate funding for
maintenance work (see Bloom 2008). The highly publicized failures of large-scale public
housing, the rise in anti-welfare rhetoric lumped on the back of the figure of the “welfare queen”,
and the tide change away from a Keynesian social welfare state toward neoliberal market idealism
all meant that the loss of public housing developments would result in a deficit of urban housing
that was actually affordable for poor and working class people.
This series of cases represent part of a major battle over racial and class segregation and
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integration in urban housing that endured throughout most of the mid-20th century. New York
City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston were home to some of the most visible struggles over the
construction of public and subsidized low-income/low-rent housing where questions of
segregation, integration, displacement, and clustering poverty emerged as battleground issues in
defining the contours of Civil Rights legislation and the role of the racial welfare state. At issue
was the geographical problem of addressing the legacies of de facto housing segregation while
also increasing the stock of affordable housing, particularly in dense urban areas with significant
non-white populations. From the perspective of the state, constructing high-density housing
projects to ease the demand for affordable housing seemed to contradict the substantive goal of
racial integration. Since these housing developments often resulted in clusters of low-income,
predominantly Black and Brown residents, the middle class white residents in the surrounding
areas, as well as developers and property owners, argued that this outcome increased
neighborhood segregation and ran counter to the goal of integration.33
In terms of social reproduction, desegregation is a matter of reducing uneven access to
adequate housing, social services, labor, and healthful environments; the debates over public
housing reproducing conditions of segregation, however, are completely divorced from these
concerns and represent a clever way of co-opting civil rights discourses to distract from the
intersection of white anxieties about people of color. Within both the Strycker’s Bay and Otero
cases, desegregation discourses get taken up as part of the state’s mechanisms of racial liberalism
that reinforce the twinned maintenance of property values and the “protection” of white
populations from the encroachment of non-white populations. That is, the racial state subsumes
33

Piven and Cloward point out that support for low-income housing projects in New Jersey was
achieved when accommodations were made from the outset to site housing for predominantly
white tenants in the outlying “country club” neighborhoods and to site housing for non-white
tenants in “central ghetto wards” (1966). In New York and other cities where existing urban
populations were more racially and economically diverse, Not-in-My-Backyard (NIMBY)
politics seemed to predominate, causing the site selection process to be the primary point of
contention, source of delays, and in some cases, death blow to the proposed projects.
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desegregation discourses and reworks them to meet the dictates of capitalist property relations,
and in so doing, reshapes the terrains of racialized struggle over placemaking. In the Otero case,
NYCHA took affirmative measures to ensure that Manhattan’s Lower East Side remained
predominantly white to mitigate the potential for white flight, thereby reducing the possibility for
previous area residents to maintain their proximity to their former neighborhood community. In
the Strycker’s Bay case, it was the urban renewal area’s existing white residents who were
threatened by the potentially changing racial composition of their neighborhood due to the
addition of new public housing units. They therefore used similar arguments about white flight to
force the state to consider desegregation policy as an affirmative measure within the EIA process
to maintain a critical mass of white residents. But in the Strycker’s Bay case, there was the
important additional consideration of class as a proxy for both race per se, as well as the basis for
protecting their capitalist interests in property values. In both cases, the state was ultimately
charged with the duty to consider a racially liberal reworking of neighborhood desegregation that
would uphold both public and private property as institutions operating in service of the social
reproduction of white residents through the minimization, dispersal, and displacement of poor
people of color.34
While residential segregation continues to be a structural problem producing uneven
access to and distributions of social services among other things, the argument against public
housing because it promoted segregation was completely misguided from a civil rights
perspective. The segregation argument obfuscates geographical access to social
services—including adequate housing—behind a quantitative facade of demographics. In their
assessment of the situation, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1966) hit at the heart of the
dilemma:
The myth that integrationist measures are bringing better housing to the Negro
34

See Tighe (2012). Also, ironically, a number of studies have shown that affordable housing has
little to no negative impact on surrounding property values, revealing that the basis for this
anxiety is entirely based on racist and classist assumptions (Nguyen 2005).
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poor comforts liberals; it placates (and victimizes) the Negro masses; and it
antagonizes and arouses the bulk of white Americans. The “backlash” is part of its
legacy. While turmoil rages over integration, housing conditions worsen. They
worsen partly because the solution continues to be defined in terms of
desegregation, so the energies and attention of reformers are diverted from
attempts to ameliorate housing in the ghetto itself. (20)
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the declining welfare state faced the serious problem of
considerable demand for additional affordable housing units, while at the same time, the evolving
racial state needed to negotiate white anxieties through careful legal maneuvering so as not to tip
the balance of racial “tolerance,” or putting up with people of color in decidedly white spaces,
forged through Civil Rights activism legislation while still attending to the rise of neoliberal
market economism and new forms of coded racism and “colorblindness” (see Bonilla-Silva 2001;
Mills 2011; Omi and Winant 2015).35 Given this context, the Strycker’s Bay and Otero cases
reveal the EIA process under NEPA as one of the means and capacities through which space is
regulated vis-à-vis racial conflict in the post-Civil Rights Act era. The Otero case demonstrates
how sociological factors and psychological fears get worked into Fair Housing Legislation, and in
the process, reify racial categories and the sociological meaning attached to those categories with
respect to white and non-white populations. In turn, this becomes embedded as a mechanism for
the racial state to assert control over the ways in which space is racialized, in the case of Otero,
through the establishment of a predominantly white neighborhood. The project succeeds because
it appeals to quantitative, decontextualized, race-liberal notions of racial integration that are
35

Contradictions abound in looking at the outcomes of state practices around housing and
desegregation, for example, in ongoing debates over how to use policy and planning to reduce
concentrations of poverty (e.g., McClure 2008), the unaffordability of subsidized housing (e.g.,
Quigley and Raphael 2004; Begley et al. 2011), racist lending practices (e.g., Williams, Nesiba,
and McConnell 2005; Wyly et al. 2007; Beeman, Glasberg, and Casey 2011), uneven access to
health care and adequate schooling and related issues of environmental racism (e.g., Bryant
1995; Bullard 2001; Cole and Foster 2001), and racist policing and incarceration practices
across the country (e.g., Hall et al. 2013; Camp 2016 Camp and Heatherton (2016)). See also
Keating (2010).
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divorced from justice-oriented notions of antiracism and desegregation. That is, the notions of
racially integrated space in the Otero case depend solely on the presence, absence, and quantity of
white and non-white populations without regard to the intentionality behind such quantification
metrics.
On the other hand, the Strycker’s Bay cases build on the racial state’s innovations of
tipping and pocket ghettos, but reworked under the guise and insulating capacities of the NEPA
legislation, and through the newly evolving post-Civil Rights racial regime of covert “raceless”
racism. The arguments put forward in the case eschew the language of race, opting instead to
align with the other side of the same coin that is racial capitalism—the protection of property and
surplus value. While both cases operate under the premise and promise of racial diversity,
Strycker’s Bay makes the important link between diversity and the structural forces of systemic
racism, criminalization, and exclusion that continue to permeate contemporary racial capitalism.
Though the plaintiffs in the Strycker’s Bay cases were unsuccessful in their attempts to renovate
the tipping and pocket ghetto arguments using economic classification schemes to differentiate
desirable and undesirable populations, their arguments were pernicious nevertheless. The
plaintiffs substituted the purportedly race neutral language of “class,” “income,” “economic
factors,” and “crime” to represent racialized white anxieties over poor people of color occupying
and even taking over what they saw as their entitlement to space via property ownership and
capital appreciation realized through property values.
Despite striking down the tipping and pocket ghetto arguments on their face, the Court of
Appeals made the case for how and why these same considerations should be incorporated into
the environmental review process, making the arguments that failed in this particular case
applicable to other projects more generally. And though the courts ruled that quantifying
economic factors was incongruous with measuring racial factors—problematic in and of itself for
the ways it reifies racial categories and normalizes whiteness—the court still provided a means
for assessing economic tipping points that on the one hand recognizes the interconnectedness of
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race and other sociological factors, but on the other, attempts to qualify neighborhood tipping in
the absence of explicitly racial considerations.36 That is, the courts go along with the use of
colorblind proxy metrics for assessing the race-liberal forms of integration that we see operating
under the Fair Housing Act in Otero, but institutionalize them within the EIA process as a
potential way for federal agencies to weigh racially and geographically differentiated
environmental impacts—a precursor to the official environmental justice requirements of
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898.
Despite HUD’s ultimate victory in the Strycker’s Bay case, what remains is the significant
legal and institutional legacy of the Supreme Court and Appeals Court decisions. From a legal
standpoint, Strycker’s Bay is often cited as the case that defanged the NEPA legislation as a
potential means for enforcing environmentally friendly decision making within federal agencies,
and by way of precedent, public agencies more generally (see Lindstrom 2000). The Supreme
Court decision in Strycker’s Bay essentially eliminates the possibility for courts to weigh on the
substantive merits of agency decision making, effectively rendering the EIA process as an
exercise in procedural environmental knowledge production. So long as an agency is
thorough—and not arbitrary and capricious—in its duty to investigate, document, disseminate,
and respond to environmental impacts of a proposed project, courts after Strycker’s Bay cannot
override agency discretion in weighing environmental concerns versus its other priorities. The
institutional legacy of Strycker’s Bay can be thought of as the tacit requirement for agencies to
consider the social, racial, and classed impacts of their actions on the environment under the
NEPA. Though this is still a gray area due to the limitation of the EIA process to impacts that
36

Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974). The court outlines
three criteria to determine whether a neighborhood has reached the tipping point: “(1) the gross
numbers of minority group families or families in a measurable economic or social group which
are likely to affect adversely Area conditions; (2) the quality of community services and
facilities; and (3) the attitudes of majority group residents who might be persuaded by their
subjective reactions to the first and second criteria to leave the Area” (Trinity, 387 F. Supp. at
1066 (1974)).
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stem directly as a result of changes to the physical environment, in the case of housing, impacts to
a neighborhood’s character need to be considered as they pertain to an agency’s overlapping
obligations under the Fair Housing Act and other civil rights legislation. This outcome is less a
direct result of this particular case, but rather, the accretion of numerous legal, administrative, and
individual decisions of which Strycker’s Bay played a key role.
The combination of these legal and institutional legacies of Strycker’s Bay mean that
agencies have a responsibility and prerogative to make informed decisions about how their
racialized actions impact urban environments. Though in many ways this was not new or unique
under the NEPA legislation since the state has long been able to exercise its sovereign power in
such a fashion, the NEPA legislation and the EIA process altered the institutional framework
through which the decision making process and public intervention occur. This framework, and
the Strycker’s Bay decision are also important because they established a means and process for
evaluating what amounts to an institutionalized form of environmental justice within agency
decision making. Though environmental justice considerations were officially added as a separate
requirement for all federal agencies under Executive Order 12898 signed by President Bill
Clinton in 1992, the much of the framework and many of the administrative procedures for
implementing this Order were already in place within the EIA process, and decisions were already
officially factoring in similar considerations—or at least were required to investigate and report
on environmental justice-type factors—within NEPA-based environmental studies.
The decline of the welfare state throughout the latter half of the 20th century marked the
ascent of several other particular aspects of the state, most notably for the purposes of this chapter,
new contours in the environmental state. This is not to say that the environment has not always
been one of the fundamental axes of the state’s operation, since land and property regimes,
resource management, territoriality, and conquest of peoples vis-à-vis the land have always been
central to the functioning of contemporary racial capitalist states. Rather, the environmental state
is marked by a shift in political discourse related to the popular recognition of “environmentalist”
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issues, inaugurated in the US with the passage of NEPA and the first Earth Day in 1970, as well as
an attendant shift in the ways in which the environment gained purchase as one of the
fundamental means for the state to manage social difference without explicitly dealing with
“racial” issues. That is, the racial environmental state takes on new political and geographic
contours when state functions were restructured under Civil Rights legislation of the 1950s and
1960s, as well as under the NEPA legislation that took effect in 1970. One of the areas in which
this was most pronounced was in the regulation and management of property. Indeed, if one
considers property regulation as one of the primary functions of a state, the environmental state of
the late 20th century is host to new principles organizing the use of land and environment under
capitalist property regimes. The explicit use of racial categories as an organizing principle of both
property and public space under Jim Crow and other forms of discriminatory policy were replaced
by covert forms of racist management such as redlining and predatory lending. Meanwhile, NEPA
brought new requirements for interrogating the sociodemographic characteristics of
neighborhoods and the impacts of state actions on the physical environment, which invariably lead
to racially and geographically differentiated impacts to underlying communities and land uses.
Though the Otero case didn’t deal directly with the EIA process or NEPA legislation, it
helps pinpoint the racialized conflicts over placemaking and the environment that the EIA process
helps to resolve. The unstated outcome of the Strycker’s Bay case was the understanding that
sociological changes that directly impact geographically differentiated communities as a result of
physical changes to the environment under federally funded projects such as in urban
redevelopment programs, were cognizable environmental impacts under the NEPA legislation. As
such, the EIA process provides an institutionalized site for the working out of racialized conflicts
over the visions of place that take shape under federal programs. While the scope of these
conflicts can easily exceed the limitations of the EIA process, the process of weighing these
impacts in a systematic fashion insulates the racial environmental state from a great deal of
conflict, in large part because as the Strycker’s Bay and other legal cases held, the EIA process is
little more than a procedural requirement that leaves agencies largely immune from judicial
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intervention so long as administrative procedures are followed and all areas of environmental
impact are sufficiently considered. The inextricability of poverty, non-white racial status, and
crime, in both the Stryker’s Bay and Otero cases demonstrate how the category of “environmental
impact” provides a novel sociopolitical structure within which to couch preexisting sociological
prejudices, which perpetuate and reconstitute longstanding forms of racial and class domination
embedded within the capitalist racial state. In the next chapter, I look at a case in which this
structure is used as the foundation for challenging the state’s racist practices around incarceration,
and a movement built around radical approaches for combining and reworking racial and
environmental logics in order to foster unlikely alliances in service of shared environmental
interests.
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Police, Prisons, and Pollution: EIA as an Environmental Justice
Organizing Strategy

Once the heart of farm labor organizing and the birthplace of the United Farm Workers labor
union, the City of Delano, in California’s verdant San Joaquin Valley, is host to three prisons,
whose combined population accounts for around 16-20% of the city’s roughly 53,000 residents
(US Census Bureau 2010; Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, State of California 2011;
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, State of California 2016). The City’s transition
from being a hub of union labor to one of prisons emblematizes broader shifts in the state’s and
country’s political economy with the erosion of the Keynesian welfare state into a permanent
crisis workfare-welfare state (Gilmore 2007). Where racial capital’s demand for farm labor
previously necessitated a steady stream of immigrant workers to suppress both wages and
capacities for labor organizing, the unemployment rate for the past two decades has remained
several times higher than the statewide average, and populations toiling in the fields have been
replaced by populations idled in prisons.1 Horrifyingly, and yet unsurprising given the high rates
of unemployment, these populations, rendered surplus within the local economy, live in the
county which, in 2005, had the highest per capita rate of people killed by law enforcement
1

At the close of the first quarter of 2016, the citywide unemployment rate was just below 14%,
roughly 2.5 times higher than the statewide average of 5.4% (State of California Employment
Development Department 2016; State of California Employment Development Department
2016). Incredibly, this high rate of unemployment is a marked improvement compared to the
1990s, when the unemployment rate in Delano was consistently over 30% and nearly hit 40% in
1993, while the statewide average never exceeded 10% (US Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2016a; US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016b).
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officers anywhere in the US (Swaine et al. 2015). How might we begin to account for the changes
that have occurred in Delano and across the South San Joaquin Valley? In this chapter, I examine
the relationships between the state, capital, labor, and environmental policy that facilitated and
resisted social and environmental changes in Delano over the past 150 years, culminating with the
construction of a second massive state prison in the City of Delano in 2005. I also foreground one
particular site of resistance to this narrative, a campaign to stop this third prison from being built,
situated within the conditions for its possibility, the racial environmental state.
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which the racial environmental state and the social
relations of production, that is, the particular geographical arrangements of labor and capital, have
shaped the development of Delano over the past two centuries, resulting in its current state as a
prime example of what Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2008) describes as “organized abandonment.” By
organized abandonment, Gilmore is referring to the concept developed by David Harvey (2006)
to describe the product of “intricate arrangements” of “market, institutional, and state” capacities
“for the production, modification, and transformation of spatial configurations of the built
environment” in order to meet the “variegated requirements of both capital and labour in general”
(397). Tracing the long history of Delano reveals points of crisis where the state, labor, and
capital erupt in conflicts that shape the racial and environmental landscape of the town.
Furthermore, this history provides an important context for understanding the social, cultural,
legal, and political economic conditions from which anti-prison community organizers
established a campaign to stop the California department of Corrections (CDC) from building its
second state prison within the City of Delano.2
Scholars have previously used the Delano II campaign as a case study in creative social
justice organizing strategies that links prison abolition with environmental justice. Rose Braz and
Craig Gilmore (2006) situate the Delano II case study within the ongoing fight to halt the massive
2

The California Department of Corrections was renamed the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2004.
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expansion of prisons and incarceration in California since the early 1980s, to document and reveal
the radical potential of coalitional strategies like those developed throughout the Delano II
campaign. They show how the campaign came to embody the struggle against the biggest threats
identified by youth environmental justice activists: the “three Ps” of police, prisons, and
pollution.3 Extending this analysis, Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007; 2008) uses the campaign to
highlight the possibilities that emerge for developing new structures for understanding, and social
relations for engaging social change through the process of coalition building like that around the
Delano prison. She describes the way that activists started with a flexible understanding of
environmental justice as highlighted by Braz and Gilmore, to organize people across disparate
social identities, political struggles, and urban/rural geographical divides by identifying the ways
in which their struggles are linked by dominant and dominating flows of capital, people, and
resources under racial capitalism. For Gilmore, carefully examining sites of organized
abandonment that are “intensely occupied by the antistate state,” such as Delano, reveals the types
of conceptual and political linkages that can emerge through and between “marginal people and
marginal lands in both urban and rural contexts and raises the urgent question of how to scale up
political activity from the level of hyper-local, atomized organizations to the level of regional
coalitions working for a common purpose, partly because their growing understanding of their
sameness trumps their previously developed beliefs in their irreconcilable differences” (Gilmore
2008, 38).
In analyzing the Delano II campaign, I extend Gilmore’s analysis to show how the EIA
process and juridical framework in which that process operates provide a specific set of
conditions and possibilities for social movement building and confrontational engagement with
the state that aims to produce social change. I am interested in how the structures of the racial
3

Ruth Wilson Gilmore brought to my attention that the three Ps were misquoted by Braz and
Gilmore (2006), and that the specific triad used by the youth activists was “police, prisons, and
pesticides,” lending a higher degree of specificity to the forms of environmental threats faced by
rural farm communities.
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environmental state, and particularly the EIA process, facilitates these important forms of
coalitional politics while simultaneously establishing limitations on the legitimate forms and
modes of challenging the state through these means. The broad scope of the EIA process, and its
embedded public feedback mechanisms seem to provide an intrinsic opportunity for coalition
building and the development of unexpected political structures such as those foregrounded in
previous scholarship about the Delano campaign. Yet the very structures that enable engagement
with the state, specifically the EIA process, are circumscribed by the administrative and juridical
bounds of public policy. The ways of knowing, shaping, and stretching the concept of racialized
and multiply inhabited environments are still bound to legal definitions and precedents. Likewise,
the rules of engagement depend upon Cartesian definitions of place and belonging, further
delimiting the scope of impacted environments and populations, even as political mobilizations
attempt to reinscribe the material and affective geographies of struggle. By reexamining the
campaign to stop the Delano II prison, I demonstrate both the capacities and limitations of
engaging the racial environmental state to bring about social and environmental change.
The campaign to stop the construction of the second prison in Delano was one fight in an
ongoing struggle to curtail growth of the prison industrial complex and mass incarceration of
people across the US (Braz and Gilmore 2006). Campaign organizers had three primary goals for
the campaign. First was to stop the proposed prison in Delano from being constructed. Second,
was that stopping the prison from being built might, at least temporarily, end California’s massive
20-year prison construction spree that had begun in the 1980s. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the campaign was an opportunity for galvanizing broad opposition to the continued
expansion of the prison system from constituencies throughout the state. Even though stopping
the prison from being built was an uphill battle, working toward that goal enabled the campaign
organizers to establish relationships with other organizations and state institutions around the
central idea that prisons are bad for the environment, that the environment is more than just the
air, land, water, and animals that exist outside of human society, and that these environmental
impacts of prisons resonate throughout the region and are not confined to the immediate vicinity
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of the selected project site.
In addition to the strategic significance of stopping the construction of the Delano prison,
the campaign itself, and the tactics used within the campaign, demonstrate the viability of
environmental justice principles as a heuristic for organizing diverse struggles within and against
the racial environmental state. Environmental justice activism emphasizes the structural
interrelatedness of social, economic, and cultural factors in producing and reproducing
environmental conditions that render geographically differentiated populations vulnerable to
premature death (Bullard 1994; Pulido 2000; Gilmore 2007). As others have shown, and I discuss
later in this chapter, the conceptual flexibility of the environmental justice framework helps to
map the impacts of prisons onto the diverse places where prisoners and their families come from,
the communities and environments where prisons are erected, and the regions whose economies
and resources are burdened by the material effects of prisons (Braz and Gilmore 2006; Gilmore
2008). The campaign hooked into this flexibility to engage a diverse and unlikely coalition of
people and organizations opposed to the prison in the public feedback portion of the EIA process
and subsequent legal battle. Thus, even though the short-term goal of stopping the Delano prison
was significant, the campaign’s overarching objective was to strengthen the broader movement
against the state’s use of prisons as a “catch-all solution to social and political problems”
(Gilmore 2008, 142).

Transformations in California’s Central Valley

White Settlement throughout the Valley

When the Delano II campaign began building steam in 2001, the proposed prison was slated to
become the second prison, and third detention facility including the City-owned community
corrections facility adjacent from the proposed Delano II site, in a small agricultural town still
reeling from the construction of its first prison less than a decade earlier. The first prison was
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supposed to be a boon to the local economy, but never lived up to those promises; while the
statewide unemployment rate was nearly halved between 1993 and 2000, from approximately
9.5% to just under 5%, unemployment in Delano remained high and only decreased about a third,
from approximately 35% to 23% over the same period (US Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2016a; US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016b). But more
than just their lack of contribution to the local economy, the Delano prisons stand in for the social,
cultural, and political economic shifts that maintain relationships of domination between capital
and racialized labor throughout the Valley. The prisons’ imposing presence on the outskirts of
Delano serves as a physical reminder of the ways in which the state punitively disciplines people
on the margins of capitalist society. They are yet another outcome of a long history of racial
projects aimed at dehumanizing and delegitimizing people racialized as illegal, foreign,
unassimilable, and exploitable within California (cf. Ngai 2004; Molina 2014). This section
explores the history of the City of Delano to provide a geographical and historical context for the
campaign to stop the Delano II prison construction, and to shed light on the ways that the political
economic shifts throughout the City’s history helped shape the political possibilities for
organizing the campaign in the way that it was.
For thousands of years, the Paleuyami and other groups of people associated with the
Yokuts and Shoshonean linguistic groups prospered throughout California’s southern San Joaquin
Valley—the vast stretch of fertile lands nestled between the Tulare Lake basin, the Tule River,
Sierra Nevada Mountains, Tehachapi Mountains, and Pacific Coastal Mountains, including the
area now incorporated as the City of Delano (Kroeber 1907a; Kroeber 1907b; Kroeber 1925;
Spier 1978).4 In addition to the Paleuyami, some 50 Yokuts tribelets, with a combined population
4

Yokuts (also Yokote, Yokots, or Yokoch) and Shoshonean are general terms that refer to
linguistic families, not specific tribes. Yokuts is a word meaning “people” in most of the Yokuts
dialects, while Shoshonean identifies peoples whose dialects derived from the Shoshoni
language. Most of the Yokuts peoples were divided into tribes with distinct names and dialects.
The area where the City of Delano now sits was primarily inhabited by Paleuyami peoples when
the Spanish and Americans settled in the valley. Their neighbors were other Foothill and Valley
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of at least 19,000, inhabited the greater Tulare Lake region, making it one of the most heavily and
densely populated regions in the state prior to the arrival of Spanish settlers (Kroeber 1925;
Preston 1981). The first documented expeditions into the San Joaquin Valley by white people
were led by Spanish missionaries Pedro Fages and Francisco Garcés in 1772 and 1776,
respectively (Brewer 2001; Garone 2011). Over the next 75 years, small numbers of Spanish and
Mexican cattle and pig ranchers, and white American fur trappers settled throughout the Valley.
Relations between the white settlers and Yokuts may have initially been amicable; the Spanish
and Mexican ranchers looked to the Yokuts for their labor and as the objects of religious salvation
and “civilization” (Cook 1971; Preston 1981). However, the racial attitudes of the Spanish toward
the Yokuts as “fickle, unreliable thieves” (Preston 1981, 53), led to exploitation of Yokuts through
manipulation, coercion, and enslavement (Preston 1981). Unsurprisingly, the incursion of these
early white settlers precipitated a sharp decline in Yokuts populations as a result of raids on
Yokuts rancherías, the spread of diseases such as malaria and syphilis, forced removal, and
displacement due to the depletion of resources by settlers’ agricultural activities. By the middle of
the 19th century, the Yokuts population was reduced to a quarter of its size prior to contact with
white settlers (Preston 1981; Garone 2011).
Following the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in 1848, prospectors began scouring the
San Joaquin Valley for other mining opportunities. The discovery of gold in the Greenhorn River
around 1851 led to the Kern River gold rush and massive settlement boom in the Valley
throughout the 1850s (Menefee and Dodge 1913; Preston 1981; Vredenburgh 1991). Many of the
white American settlers drawn to the Valley by the gold rush established agricultural settlements
on the fertile soils of the greater Tulare basin in fulfillment of American Manifest Destiny.
Settlers’ agricultural activities initially consisted primarily of cattle ranching, but later
transitioned to intensive wheat production. The wheat boom drove further settlement of the
Yokuts tribes including the Yauelmani, as well as the Shoshonean Giamina.(See Kroeber 1907a;
Kroeber 1907a; Kroeber 1925)
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Valley, and introduced capitalist relationships between people and the land. Though the
indigenous populations throughout the region largely depended upon cultivated subsistence
agriculture for their survival, the white settlers introduced intensive farming techniques and
concentrated livestock grazing to produce marketable commodities and accumulate surplus value
(Preston 1981).
The capitalist restructuring of the San Joaquin Valley began with the social and
environmental transformations of the Valley that flowed from the colonial mentality of American
Manifest Destiny. The increase in white settlement of the Valley and conversion of the land to
agricultural uses further entrenched the remaining Yokuts populations and former “Mission
Indians” who fled to the Valley in refuge from the coastal missions (Gorenfeld 1999). The
introduction of non-native flora and fauna, coupled with the expansion of intensive farming, and
especially open-range livestock grazing, dramatically altered the Valley environment and
significantly reduced the availability of usable resources for the remaining indigenous populations.
According to Preston (1981), the threats of starvation and alienation from the land pushed the
Yokuts to develop new subsistence strategies throughout the 19th century, such as raiding white
settlements for livestock and incorporating the newly introduced grains into their diet. Like the
Spanish and Mexican settlers that preceded them, the white American settlers developed racial
logics that marked the Yokuts as “savage” and “treacherous,” but unlike the Spanish, they did not
view the Yokuts as a potential source of labor (Preston 1981, 81). Rather, the white Americans
viewed the Yokuts as a population that needed to be eliminated or removed as a necessary, and
indeed inevitable (following from the idea of Manifest Destiny), condition for further capitalist
development of the Valley. The Yokuts, pushed to the limits of survival, resisted through increased
raids and warfare, with a number of skirmishes with US militias leading up to the “Indian War” of
1856 (Menefee and Dodge 1913; Cook 1971; Preston 1981; Gorenfeld 1999). Although a number
of treaties were negotiated on behalf of the US government in the 1850s, the US Senate refused to
ratify any of them, denying payment to the Yokuts for any ceded lands, availing lands set aside for
reservations for white settlers, and reinforcing the status of indigenous peoples as outside of
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Constitutional protections and essentially without rights. After the failure of the Senate to ratify
the treaties, the Army established separate reservations, and by 1860, the majority of Yokuts had
been relocated to these poorly managed reservations with scarce food resources, sealing the fate
of the valley under white capitalist settlement (Heizer and Elsasser 1980; Gorenfeld 1999).5
With the flood of white settlers arriving in the Valley during the Kern Valley gold rush,
and the simultaneous elimination of the last significant Yokuts populations, the capitalist
transformation of the Valley shifted focus from domination of people to domination of nature
through the technologies of capitalism. Until the 1850s, the US government’s primary
involvement in the colonization of the San Joaquin Valley was through military conquest and
Indian Affairs. However, once the State of California was admitted to the Union in 1850, the
process of state making switched from military conquest to geographical domination through
systems of knowledge, law, and infrastructure—the technologies of capitalism that helped to
reorganize the “wilderness” of the Valley into a social space for the production of wealth (Smith
1984).
The first of these endeavors in state making involved the use of geological surveys to take
stock of the lands and therefore consolidate control over the territories under both the State and
Federal governments. Between 1851 and 1855, the US Department of the Interior conducted the
first Public Land Survey in the San Joaquin Valley to classify, grade, and subdivide parcels of
land to facilitate their transfer from the “public domain” of federal control into the hands of
private speculators and developers. William Preston (1981) notes that this conversion of land into
a real estate commodity drove speculation among settlers in terms of the land’s potential for
agricultural yields as well as in world commodity markets. As a commodity, however, the lands
5

The systems of reservations established by the US Army for the resettlement of indigenous
populations in California went through much turmoil throughout the 1850s due to widespread
corruption and abuse by government officials. Food on the reservations was scarce, funds
intended to support reservation life were embezzled by local government agents, and the military
did little to protect the reservation populations from white marauders (Heizer and Elsasser 1980).
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were geographically differentiated in their value as farmland, and therefore required further
interventions to ensure their productive value.
Another limitation to land use the surveys helped overcome was that of transporting
commodities to markets. Surveyors, some commissioned by the federal government and others by
private rail companies, identified routes for rail lines that would eventually connect the San
Joaquin Valley to San Francisco and Los Angeles, as well as to Sacramento where they met with
the transcontinental railroad (Menefee and Dodge 1913; Preston 1981; Rails West 2014). The
establishment of rail lines throughout the Valley allowed for cheaper transportation of commercial
agricultural goods, while also allowing for quicker transport of troops to ensure continued
military dominance of the white settlers against the remaining indigenous populations still
scattered throughout the Valley and foothills. With construction of the transcontinental railroad
completed in May 1869, the Central Pacific Railroad Company initiated construction later that
year of a rail line down the San Joaquin Valley to eventually connect Sacramento and San
Francisco to Los Angeles. Around the same time, Central Pacific started a cemetery along the
planned route, just south of the border between Tulare and Kern Counties, where many of the rail
workers would be buried (“History of North Kern Cemetery District” 2014). Due to financial
troubles, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, which had been purchased by the “Big Four”
controlling shareholders of Central Pacific in 1868, halted construction of the railroad tracks and
set up a railhead in the vicinity of the cemetery, establishing the town of Delano in 1873, named
in honor of Columbus Delano, Secretary of the Interior under President Grant (Dunne 1967; Rails
West 2014; “History of North Kern Cemetery District” 2014). This rail connection spurred a new
wave of growth as investors, homesteaders, and laborers flocked to Delano to take advantage of
the commercial agriculture possibilities opened by the improved connectivity and sense of
“security” the railroad line provided for white settlers.
While the surveys and railways enabled the commodification of land throughout the
Valley, one of the most enduring and contentious issues addressed unevenly by the state has been
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the use and availability of water for irrigation, and protection from flooding. Again, the state
intervened by conducting further land surveys, setting the stage for the later establishment of
infrastructure to control flooding and provide irrigation throughout the Valley (Alexander,
Mendell, and Davidson 1874; Preston 1981). Although much of the early irrigation infrastructure
was privately funded, the state provided both the geographical knowledge that facilitated water
diversions for irrigation, as well as the legal system for establishing water rights (cf. Hanak et al.
2011). Starting in 1854 near Visalia, large-scale irrigation projects began diverting water from the
tributaries to Tulare Lake in order to increase arable lands, to protect against drought and dry
seasons, and by the 1860s, to increase commercial crop yields, especially on smaller farms
lacking the economic buffers afforded by scale. Through the middle of the 19th century, Tulare
Lake, situated along the western edge of the San Joaquin Valley, was the largest areal body of
fresh water in the western part of the continent. In the latter part of the nineteenth-century,
diversions of the tributary rivers to Tulare Lake for agricultural irrigation led to the disappearance
of all of the lake’s surface water except in times of floods (Alexander, Mendell, and Davidson
1874; Preston 1981; Vredenburgh 1991).
The last two major factors that contributed to the capitalist transformation of the Valley
were establishing means for protecting farmland from grazing livestock and the development and
incorporation of mechanized technologies as a means of production. Prior to the No Fence Law of
1874 and invention of barbed wire fencing that same year, ranchers largely relied on open range
grazing for their stocks of cattle and sheep, both of which were in heavy demand for food and
wool, respectively. Prior to that year, the prohibitive cost of enclosing farms with fencing
effectively discouraged large-scale farming due to the risk of livestock damaging crops; but the
new law and inexpensive barbed wire tipped the scales toward farming. The introduction of
barbed wire allowed farmers enclose their farmland with a much smaller outlay of time and
capital than that needed for traditional fencing. Furthermore, the No Fence Law made it possible
for farmers to sue ranchers for damages incurred by livestock or to confiscate stray livestock that
wandered onto their farmland. The availability of cheap rail transportation for delivering goods to
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eager markets, both domestic and foreign, combined with the means for high-surplus production
opened up by farm enclosure, resulted in a wheat boom throughout the Valley from the 1860s
through the 1880s (Menefee and Dodge 1913; Preston 1981; Community Planning Laboratory
2009). With wheat booming, farmers throughout California’s Central Valley were quick to adopt,
and in many cases, contributed to the innovation of, mechanization technologies such as larger
gang plows and combined harvesters. The dependence on mechanization, combined with the
uneven availability of water throughout the Valley meant that farming generally required large
outlays of capital, meaning that larger-scale farms run by capitalists tended to win out over the
smaller family farms prevalent in other parts of the US (Olmstead and Rhode 2003).

Water Rights and Management

Water rights have played an important role in shaping settlement and development throughout
California since the Gold Rush of 1848. Miners relying on water for hydraulic mining techniques
in hills far from surface water sources typically turned to appropriative rights, or the “first-in-time,
first-in-right” principle to resolve disputes over water rights (Hanak et al. 2011). This conflicted,
however, with the common-law practice of riparian rights that gives landowners the right to use
water from sources within their landholdings. When agriculture began to become a commercially
viable enterprise, the need to resolve disputes between appropriative and riparian rights grew into
numerous lawsuits, and eventually, state intervention through legislation (Hanak et al. 2011).
In 1887, the California legislature passed the Wright Act, allowing the formation of local
irrigation districts. These districts, essentially collectives of landowners, planned and financed
acquisition of water rights and water infrastructure improvement projects to divert or otherwise
distribute water for irrigation (Hanak et al. 2011). Even though the State Supreme Court had
previously ruled that riparian rights still maintained priority over appropriative rights, the Wright
Act, its subsequent revision passed in 1897, and the Reclamation Act of 1902 cemented the place
of appropriative rights by ensuring access to water for all landowners and by establishing the
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doctrine of “most beneficial use” to mediate disputes between riparian and appropriative uses
(Preston 1981; Hanak et al. 2011).6 Within a few years of the Wright Act, irrigation districts were
established throughout the Valley, including the Poso Irrigation District directly east of Delano,
and the Kern and Tulare Irrigation District, which encompassed Delano (US Geological Survey
1898). Unlike many of the newly established irrigation districts, however, the Kern and Tulare
Irrigation District never realized any of its infrastructural construction plans and it was dissolved
by 1898 (US Geological Survey 1898). Despite the dissolution of the irrigation district in Delano,
the overall impact of these districts throughout the Valley is unmistakable as numerous dams,
levees, canals, ditches, and diversions were constructed, transforming the distribution of water
across the Valley and made water available to lands previously lacking riparian rights.
Significantly, the irrigation districts also transformed the real estate market by tethering land sales
to the purchase of water rights from the district (Preston 1981).
By the start of the 20th century, the large number of irrigation districts resulted in
competition between neighboring districts over water usage and resulted in a fractured water
management landscape (Hanak et al. 2011). To ease tensions, as well as to coordinate statewide
efforts toward flood control management, the California legislature eventually passed the Water
Commission Act of 1913, establishing a central agency to regulate and permit water rights for
unimproved lands. Then, in the 1920s, the federal government began funding large scale water
projects to redistribute water throughout the state, including the Central Valley Project, which
would eventually regulate and transport water from Northern California and the Sierra Nevada
Mountains to the San Joaquin Valley. In response to the Central Valley Project, the Southern San
Joaquin Municipal Utility District (SSJMUD) formed in 1935 to allow landowners in northern
Kern County to purchase water rights from the Central Valley Project (Southern San Joaquin
Municipal Utility District 2012). The SSJMUD jurisdiction includes lands previously serviced by
the Poso Irrigation District and Kern and Tulare Irrigation District, including the cities of Delano
6

Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 275 (1886).
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and McFarland, though it does not provide service within either city (Southern San Joaquin
Municipal Utility District 2012). In addition to regulating and distributing irrigation water
obtained through surface water supplies and the Central Valley Project, the SSJMUD also
regulates groundwater use to avoid significant overdrafts and promote groundwater recharge.
Although the irrigation districts, as well as individual landowners, developed pumped and
artesian groundwater wells to supplement surface water supplies throughout the latter half of the
19th century, the use of groundwater remained limited throughout most of the Valley due to high
capital requirements and technological limitations, and wouldn’t become widely used until the
turn of the 20th century when decreasing surface water supplies drove landowners and irrigation
districts to begin developing more wells (Preston 1981; Olmstead and Rhode 2003; Hanak et al.
2011). Over the first three decades of the 20th century, groundwater usage rapidly expanded,
especially throughout Tulare County. Overdrafting, or drawing more water from the ground than
that which is recharged by infiltration from surface supplies, became more frequent, leading to a
dramatic decline in groundwater levels by the 1930s, which in turn led to deeper wells and
increased competition over groundwater supplies (Preston 1981; Hanak et al. 2011). The ensuing
competition and between neighboring districts and individual landowners contributed to the
demand for state and federal intervention through large scale water infrastructure projects like the
Central Valley Project (Hanak et al. 2011). With its rights to water from the Central Valley Project
and other surface water supplies, the SSJMUD does not regularly rely on groundwater supplies,
and discourages groundwater pumping within District boundaries, although many property
owners served by the district also operate their own pumps to supplement their SSJMUD
allocations (Southern San Joaquin Municipal Utility District 2015).
The cumulative impact of the establishment, growth, and consolidation of irrigation
districts in the Central Valley has been the development of infrastructure to support water
distribution to most of the Valley’s arable lands and a more stable system of rights (and rates)
management under a combination of local districts and the statewide Water Commission, and
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later, the State Water Resources Control Board. Water districts allowed landowners to expand
their operations by easing the burden of infrastructural capital required to develop lands lacking
riparian rights, and in the process, ensured the continued growth and profitability of agriculture
throughout the 20th century. Interestingly, the combination of urban development and
construction of prisons throughout the Central Valley, have reduced the acreage of irrigated
farmlands, and at least in the case of the SSJMUD, have led to new land acquisitions, apparently
to maintain both federal water allocations as well as financial solvency (Southern San Joaquin
Municipal Utility District 2015). Maintaining consistent agricultural acreage within the SSJMUD
service area would prove to be an important factor in the campaign to stop the Delano II prison
construction, as I detail later in this chapter.

Agricultural Growth and Labor Militancy

Though transformations of the Valley through water policy and land use are essential pieces to the
puzzle of how California’s Prison Alley came into being, equally important are the people,
particularly those employed to work in the fields and whose labor militancy led the state and
capital to develop in the particular ways that they did (Mitchell 1996). The wheat boom
throughout the Central Valley in the mid-19th century gradually gave way by the 1880s to the
expansion of fruit orchards and row crops such as sugar beets and cotton due to the widespread
cultivation of wheat elsewhere in the country and the high profitability of fruit production.
Whereas wheat was easily planted and harvested on small farms, the transition to these capitaland labor-intensive crops resulted in the renewed growth of large commercial farms in favor of
the smaller family farms and an increased demand for a low-wage workforce (Daniel 1982;
Mitchell 1996; Olmstead and Rhode 2003).7 The diversification of agriculture, however, meant
7

One of the reasons the higher profit margin crops were feasible for the planters was that the early
consolidation of farmlands afforded the large landholders to diversify and experiment with their
planting and gradually transition to the fruit trees that needed time and capital to mature and
become profitable. Had the “family farm” model dominated instead, it’s unlikely that many
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that the various crops and fruit trees had different picking seasons, and so farm laborers could
follow the harvests across the western states, reducing their seasonal unemployment, and
cementing the migratory farmworker as a fixture in California agribusiness. The mobility of the
labor force, lack of fixed geographical social structures resulting in social isolation, invisibility to
landowners, and constant threat of seasonal unemployment transformed the social relations
between farms and farming with the migratory farmworkers into that of industrial “factory” and a
proletariat class of labor (Daniel 1982; Mitchell 1996). In addition to maintaining the lowest
possible wages that would still compete with those in urban factories, landowners provided
migratory workers with deplorable living and working conditions and treated and portrayed them
as little more than the means of production (Mitchell 1996).
As the commercial agricultural industry grew in Delano and throughout the San Joaquin
Valley, so too did the tensions and contradictions of growth premised on racial capitalism. Racial
differentiation and fragmentation exploited by growers, as well as US immigration policy,
factored heavily in farm employment throughout the entire period of agricultural growth in
California. The growth of commercial agriculture over the last half of the 19th century meant
increasing demands for low-wage labor. The Yokuts and other native peoples, slave or free, were
all but eliminated from the farmlands by the time the railroads came through. Chattel slavery was
prohibited by the state constitution and free Black people initially denied entry to the state, so
Black farmworkers were scarce. White European immigrants rarely took to the fields, as farm
work was deemed unsuitable to whites. So the landowners looked enthusiastically to Chinese
laborers coming off their work on the railroads. These workers, racialized by employers as
“docile, industrious, trustworthy, and reliable…[and whom], because they were not white, did not,
planters would be able to afford the capital outlays to convert their fields from multiple-harvest
wheat to slower maturing, labor intensive crops (See Mitchell 1996; Olmstead and Rhode 2003).
Ironically, this growth in large scale commercial farming was at odds with measures taken by the
state and smaller landowners to promote family farms, including their support for the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 because of its intentions to dry up the supply of low-wage laborers that
helped maintain the profitability of the larger commercial farming operations (Daniel 1982).
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indeed could not, have aspirations or expectations comparable to those that white workers might
harbor or consider a matter of right on the basis of whiteness alone” (Daniel 1982, 27). The
supply of Chinese laborers dwindled, however, after the growers lost out to the prevailing tide of
mostly urban white working-class anti-Chinese sentiment resulting in the Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882, barring further immigration of Chinese laborers and forcing the growers to search
elsewhere to meet the increasing demand for labor in the intensive farming boom that coincided
with the Exclusion Act.8
After the Exclusion Act, growers searched for other sources of labor to fill their needs.
Growers initially turned to Japan to serve as a surrogate for China in supplying low-wage
workers, and, as Daniel (1982) recounts, this seemed like an ideal solution as many of the
Japanese immigrants arrived having previous experience in agricultural work and were willing to
accept substandard wages negotiated for them by labor contractors. As the growers soon
discovered, however, this was a calculated bargaining strategy, as the Japanese labor contractors
were highly organized and strategic, and the wage suppression was a tactic used to gain exclusive
control of the fields so that the workers could threaten to strike right before the time-sensitive
harvests in order to negotiate better contracts.9 Furthermore, growers viewed Japanese workers as
a threat to the stability of the commercial agricultural industry they were building because many
of the workers had ambitions to become landowning agriculturalists—clearly threatening the
8

Simultaneous to, and in many ways in support of the growers’ racialization of Chinese laborers
as ideally suited to farm labor, came widespread vitriol about urban, predominantly male,
populations of Chinese laborers from state officials, popular media, “respectable Chinese
merchants,” and the white working class (Shah 2001). Whereas growers took to Chinese laborers
because of their apparent willingness to work the fields at whatever wages offered them as “the
practical equivalents of slaves” (Daniel 1982, 27), the white urban populations, as well as the
agrarian proponents of family farming, viewed Chinese farmworkers as a threat both to wage
depression and heteronormative, middle-class, domestic respectability (Daniel 1982; Mitchell
1996; Shah 2001).
9
Don Mitchell (1996) and Cletus Daniel (1982) both point out that not only did the Japanese labor
contractors work in solidarity with the laborers, but that this was markedly different from the
Chinese labor contractors who more frequently exploited the labor gangs for their own profit and
likely to maintain contracts with employers.
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nascent racial capitalist order.10 Growers instead turned to Indian, Mexican, and Filipino workers,
but facing similarly racist attitudes as the Japanese and Chinese laborers who preceded them,
Indian workers—racialized under the catch-all category of “Hindus”—were only allowed to
immigrate until the US passed the Immigration Act of 1917 (Mitchell 1996; Ngai 2004). Despite
Filipino revolutionaries’ declaration of independence from Spain in 1898, the US claimed it as a
colony following the Spanish-American War and subsequently imposed colonial rule in the wake
of the bloody Philippine-American War. The colonial relationship between the Philippines and
the US meant that Filipino workers could emigrate to the US without restrictions despite the 1917
Immigration Act, up until the Philippines gained independence in 1934, at which point they were
subject to extremely limited immigrations quotas (Ngai 2004). For Mexican immigrants and
transnational migratory workers, coming to California was relatively easy prior to World War I
due to lax immigration enforcement, but as Mae Ngai (2004) points out, “[d]uring the 1920s,
immigration policy rearticulated the US-Mexico border as a cultural and racial boundary, as a
creator of illegal immigration” (67), thus hindering but hardly stopping, a steady stream of
Mexican agricultural workers to meet the needs of growers.
The effects of agricultural growth and the rise of nonwhite migrant labor in the first third
of the 20th century deeply shaped the California landscape, and transformed US racial,
immigration, and labor politics, or the forms and forces of US racial capitalism (Mitchell 1996;
10

In 1908, anti-Japanese sentiment peaked from both the top and bottom when the US entered into
the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Japan that de facto restricted Japanese immigration to the
US due to Japan’s growing imperial power as well as the perceived threat to white working-class
populations posed by Japanese laborers, their families—San Francisco segregated schools in
1906—and their entrepreneurial and agriculturalist aspirations. Unsurprisingly, the State of
California passed the Alien Land Law in 1913 to prohibit “aliens ineligible for citizenship”
from owning or holding long-term leases of land. The presumption that Japanese and other
Asian immigrants were ineligible for citizenship had already been upheld in federal courts,
though it wasn’t until a decade later that the Supreme Court would famously codify the
“common sense” white supremacist logics of race and citizenship in Ozawa v. US (261 US 178
(1922)) and US v. Thind (261 US 204 (1923)) by declaring Asians nonwhite (and non-Black),
and therefore excluded from naturalization (See Lowe 1996; Mitchell 1996; Ngai 2004).
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Ngai 2004). Part of the central contradiction of this agricultural growth was the rise of racialized
labor militancy. Growers innovated and reshaped the ways that racial differentiation and racial
codes were used as a means for recruiting workers and implementing divide-and-conquer
strategies to discipline and proletarianize labor. Despite this, workers were able to organize
themselves, and organized labor unions such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or
Wobblies) and the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU), were able to
successfully mobilize agricultural workers to fight for things such as fairer wages, improved
living conditions, and eight-hour workdays (Mitchell 1996).11 Don Mitchell (1996) asserts that
these labor struggles, most of which were led by or involved nonwhite workers, had the profound
effect of mobilizing resistance—a movement in both senses of the word—that “took hold of the
established spatial practices of industrialized agriculture and other resource-based industries in
North America and utilized them for its own purposes” (66). He continues:
Here lay the very subversiveness of mobility. By connecting place-based struggles,
migratory workers were able to transcend the spaces and places of their
oppression; they were able—at least potentially—to rattle the patterns that
underlay capitalist productivity. In this sense, mobility was both necessary and
subversive to the aims and desires of capital and the state. (66)
However, just as farmworkers were able to organize themselves in collective resistance, the
capitalist class of growers and canners had been corporatizing through a long process of
consolidation, as well as horizontal and vertical integration, or, respectively, the coordination
between growers, and controlling every step of production from the farm to the packing houses to
shipping companies, and even produce exchanges (Mitchell 2012). And when the Dust Bowl
droughts and dust storms struck the Great Plains in the early 1930s, thousands of predominantly
white “Okies” and “Arkies” migrated to California and the San Joaquin Valley, creating new labor
11

Mitchell (1996) cites the Wheatland riot of 1913 for kick starting an epochal period of labor
militancy on the west coast of the US that included numerous strikes and labor organizing
activities, including the Wheatland hop riot in 1913, and especially in the 1930s leading up to
the Bracero program in 1942.
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surpluses, racial tensions, and diminished possibilities for labor organizing. The combined impact
of the flood of Dust Bowl laborers and the consolidation of capitalist power gave growers an
advantage despite by the mid 1930s, and they used every tactic at their disposal to
suppress—often violently—the farmworkers and raise barriers to organizing. They even worked
alongside local, state, and even federal agencies to coerce or forcefully deport to Mexico,
hundreds of thousands of Mexican, and even some Filipino workers, regardless of their
citizenship status (Mitchell 1996; Ngai 2004; Molina 2014).
When the US ramped up its military industrial machinery during World War II, most of
the white farmworkers were drawn away from the fields and into the battlefields or manufacturing
sectors. As a result of the labor shortages, and at the prompting of growers, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt initiated the Emergency Farm Labor Program, or “bracero” guest worker program in
1942 to ensure the continued surplus of labor power and avert the potential for organized labor to
gain power. The poorly regulated program and lack of enforcement mechanisms served to further
discipline labor, and led to inhumane living conditions, withheld pay, and mistreatment among
farm workers; a large influx of non-contract Mexican farm workers; and virtual collapse of
organized agricultural labor unions on the west coast (Mitchell 2012). Yet the bracero program
eventually gave rise to renewed forms of labor activism, with organized strikes and boycotts
eventually leading to the program’s abandonment in 1964 (Mitchell 2012). Among the
organizations that formed under the bracero program were the National Agricultural Workers
Union (NAWU), the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), as well as the
National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) in 1962, under the leadership of César Chávez and
Dolores Huerta.
A year after the bracero program folded, and on the heels of a successful NFWA grape
pickers strike at Martin Ranch, the Delano AWOC, comprised primarily of Filipino grape pickers,
and led by Philip Vera Cruz, Larry Itliong, Benjamin Gines and Andy Imutan, organized a strike
against table grape growers in 1965. They immediately reached out to the NFWA for support,
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knowing that the campaign’s success depended on the unified front of Filipino, Mexican, and
Chicanx laborers, as well as other organizations such as the International Longshore and
Warehouse Union. A week after AWOC walked off the fields, NFWA voted in Delano to join the
strike, and a year into the campaign, AWOC and NFWA merged, forming the United Farm
Workers of America (UFW). The campaign endured for five years, but the UFW emerged
victorious, securing contracts with both of the growers in the campaign’s crosshairs, and marking
the first major victory for union organizing amongst farm workers after the bracero program, and
setting the tone for the use of a combined strategy of a nonviolent field strike, labor boycott,
consumer boycott, marches, and hunger strikes.
The victory in the table grape strike at Delano marks the birth of the UFW and a
significant turning point in farm labor unionization, both of which, in turn, are important
dimensions of the solidification of Chicanx and Latinx political power throughout the state. The
enduring legacy of Chicanx activism and agricultural labor militancy in California factors
significantly in the broader politicization and mobilization of Chicanx and Latinx communities
beyond the agricultural industry (Pulido and Peña 1998), and undoubtedly contributed to the
campaign to stop the Delano II prison gaining traction amongst Delano residents and others
involved in environmental justice organizing throughout the Central Valley.
However, the period of renewed labor militancy in the 1960s, combined with the growers’
loss of what Don Mitchell calls the “labor market insurance braceros,” put growers on the
defensive and contributed to the ensuing “labor market adjustment” (2012, 409) that saw the rapid
adoption of mechanization for many crops and subsequent stagnation or declines in the migrant
agricultural workforce. This reduced demand for agricultural labor dovetailed with significant
structural changes in agricultural production over the last three decades of the 20th century, and as
Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007) explains, created a crisis of surplus land, labor, and capital that set
the stage for California’s prison building boom, particularly in the Central Valley.
Less than a quarter century after the table grape strike victory, plans were underway to
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build the first state prison in Delano, the North Kern State Prison. Like other small towns in
California’s Central Valley and elsewhere in the state, the Delano City Council saw the prison
boom as an opportunity to bolster the declining local economy so they lobbied the CDC to get a
prison. In addition to the purported boost to the retail and service economy, the state had been
establishing mitigation funds for municipalities to bolster local infrastructure that would be
impacted by the increased population and resource demands created by new prisons so inviting a
prison meant a “free” boost to civic development, though the state subsidies only covered a
portion of the costs for the infrastructural and social development needed to accommodate
prison-fueled population growth (Pyle and Gilmore 2008; “CA Codes (Pen:7000-7050)” 2016).
The reality faced by most of the towns that won prison bids is that the economic development
came in the form of chain stores that displaced local businesses, and despite the promise of jobs, a
very small number actually went to local residents. So rather than an economic boom, the prisons
by and large represented a drag on local economies (Pyle and Gilmore 2008).

The Delano Prisons

Shortly after the first prison in Delano, North Kern State Prison (NKSP), began accepting inmates
in 1993, the CDC began planning for a second state prison within the City of Delano, which it
designated the California State Prison-Kern County at Delano II (Delano II). Since the early
1980s, the State of California had been engaged in a prolonged expansion of its prison system,
and beds were being filled with new inmates just as fast as they were being constructed. Ruth
Wilson Gilmore (2007) describes this expansion as California’s “use of prisons catchall solutions
to social problems” (5), and Delano II was slated to become the latest addition to California’s
prison construction boom.
Within the State of California, the majority of prisons are located in rural areas,
particularly in the “prison alley” that stretches along the Central Valley’s Interstate 5 freeway and
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California Highway 99 (see Figure 3.1), with 18 facilities between Tehachapi and Folsom, 13 of
which were built during the prison construction boom (see Appendix A); the vast majority of
prisoners, however, come from urban areas, and especially the greater Los Angeles Metropolitan
Area (Gilmore 2007; California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Data Analysis
Unit 2011). Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007; 2008) meticulously argues that the geographical
connections between the urban and rural that link prisoners and prisons emerged as part of the
spatial fix provided by publicly funded prison construction to the crises of surplus land, labor, and
capital (accumulation) that accompanied political economic restructuring throughout the latter
part of the 20th century. The City of Delano, having already successfully petitioned the CDC for a
first prison, probably seemed like and ideal location for the next prison expansion, particularly
since it met the prerequisites of having abundant surplus agricultural lands ripe for acquisition by
the state and existing municipal and social infrastructure needed to run a new prison.
In 1994, the CDC commenced their planning efforts for the Delano II prison by publishing
an environmental impact report (EIR), the state-level equivalent of the EIS, as required by the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the State of California’s “mini-NEPA” statute.
Whereas federally funded projects in the US are subject to NEPA and its EIA process, the State of
California requires state funded projects to adhere to CEQA. Like NEPA, CEQA mandates an
EIA process, which includes the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and a published Notice of
Determination (NOD), or the state equivalents to the EIS and ROD under NEPA. While there are
significant differences between NEPA and CEQA, for the purpose at hand they dissolve beneath
their structural imperatives to get state administrators thinking about environmental factors in
their decision making, and to open that process up to public scrutiny.
The Delano II EIR produced by the CDC in 1994 called for a 400-acre, 4,180 inmate
facility with a Level IV maximum security designation. Through the process of feedback and
revision, however, the planned facility was scaled back. By the time the CDC certified the EIR
and issued its NOD in 1995, the proposed prison called for a site on 320-acres, housing 2,200
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Figure 3.1. California State Prisons and Correctional Facilities, 2016
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inmates—a significantly smaller facility, but massive nonetheless (California Department of
Corrections 2000a). The property the CDC selected for the prison is located approximately four
miles west of California Highway 99, approximately 2.5 miles west of Delano’s urbanized area,
about half a mile south of the existing North Kern State Prison, and adjacent to the 500-bed, City
owned Delano Community Correctional Facility (see Figure 3.2). When the CDC proposed the
new prison, the site was being actively used as farmland, and was surrounded on three sides by
productive farmland.
The CDC successfully completed its statutory requirements to begin construction of
Delano II in 1995, however the plans had to be placed on hold when the state legislature failed to
provide funding for the prison. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, California was struck
harder by economic recession and recovered much more slowly than the rest of the US (California
Legislative Analyst’s Office 1995b). Furthermore, reductions in military spending following the
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s had a particularly strong effect on the California economy
due to widespread military base closures and reduced contracts to the aerospace industry, one of
Southern California’s largest industries (Dertouzos and Dardia 1993). As a result, the state shifted
its budget priorities, making significant reductions to spending across the board, particularly in
areas of health and welfare, with modest increases in corrections and education spending.
However, the roughly 8% increases in corrections spending in both the 1994-1995 and 1995-1996
state budgets merely covered the costs associated with housing increasing prison populations, due
in no small part to the projected growth resulting from the “Three Strikes” law enacted in 1994
(California Legislative Analyst’s Office 1995a). As a result, the 1995-1996 budget did not
allocate any new funds for the construction of prisons including Delano II, although it continued
to fund the construction of the prison being built in Corcoran. Despite projections of continued
growth in prison populations and overcrowding in existing prisons, the 1995-1996 budget did not
allocate any funds for the construction of new prisons, including Delano II, so the project was put
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Figure 3.2. The City of Delano, CA and Its Three Correctional Facilities
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on hold pending budgetary approval.12
Even though the California legislature didn’t allocate any funds for additional prison
construction from 1995-1999, the policing and sentencing practices that kept prison beds filled,
continued doing their worst. Despite the long-term trend of decreasing crime rates between the
mid-1980s and 2000, the continued growth in California’s prison populations throughout the
1990s—fueled in part by enactment of the notorious “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law in
1994—led to unsustainable overcrowding (California Legislative Analyst’s Office 2005; Gilmore
2007). In 1999, the newly elected Democratic Governor Gray Davis indicated his willingness to
fund further expansion of the state’s prison system by proposing a budget that allocated $335
million for construction of the Delano II prison and the planning of a second additional prison in
San Diego (California Legislative Analyst’s Office 1999). In May 1999, a month before the final
budget would be approved by the legislature, Governor Davis pushed through urgency
legislation13 allocating over $311 million toward Delano II implementation, including $4 million
for the cost of mitigating the prison’s impacts on the municipal government (Braz and Gilmore
2006).14 Funding for the prison came in the form of lease-purchase financing and lease-revenue
bonds, which, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007) compellingly argues, are one of the pieces to the
partial “fix” to crises of accumulation that enabled the California prison boom over the last two
decades of the twentieth century. She further explains that this process also establishes prisons as
an infrastructural securities investment mechanism with higher returns for private firms than
12

Although the state legislature didn’t allocate any funds for new prisons, they continued funding
the construction of the Corcoran prison, whose construction was already underway. See also,
(Gilmore 2007).
13
In the State of California, “urgency legislation” is a term used to describe legislation that takes
immediate effect once passed by the legislature and signed by the governor, and requires a
two-thirds vote for approval. In the case of budget items, urgency legislation can make funds
available for immediate appropriation, rather than when the full budget is signed by the
governor (California Department of Finance 2012).
14
Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558
(2003).
104

CHAPTER 3. POLICE, PRISONS, AND POLLUTION
standard municipal bonds with little added investment risk, and a whole lot less potential for
political fallout from the increased tax burden of voter-approved municipal bonds.
With a budgetary green light, the CDC resumed planning for Delano II in 1999. Due to
the continued growth in prison populations over the intervening years, the CDC increased the
planned prison capacity by 235% from the initially approved capacity of 2,000 inmates, up to
5,160 inmates, and from a 320-acre site up to a 480-acre site.15 This design change triggered the
need to amend the previously approved 1995 EIR with additional analyses considering the
environmental impacts of the newly proposed design revisions. In February 2000, the CDC
published the Draft Supplemental EIR (SEIR) for a 45-day period for public review and comment
and held a subsequent public hearing to receive oral comments, in accordance with CEQA
guidelines (2014, sec. 15105). On May 22, 2000, the CDC published a Final SEIR containing a
record of the comments received and the CDC responses to those comments, followed by the
publication of the Notice of Determination (NOD) approving the Final SEIR on June 7, 2000,
which is the California equivalent to the NEPA Record of Decision granting final approval of the
environmental review process. Typically, this is the point at which the lead agency may proceed
with project implementation. However, in the case of Delano II, this was the point at which
organized opposition to the prison led to a five-year delay in prison implementation with a lawsuit
built around the requirements of California’s EIA process.

Taking the CDC to Court

When Governor Davis pushed to pass the urgency legislation to fund the Delano II prison
construction, prison abolition organizers from across the state rallied opposition to the funding
bill at the state capitol. Despite their efforts, the bill was passed by the legislature. However, the
15

The original EIR evaluated impacts for up to 4,180 inmates on a 400-acre site, however the
certified decision only called for 2,200 inmates on 320 acres. (California Department of
Corrections 2000a, 1)
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energies directed at opposing the bill were not for naught. The organizers continued pressure to
keep the prison from being funded and used the momentum from the initial push at the state
capitol to expand the fight into two other strategies for social movement building: a legal strategy
targeting the prison through the EIA process under CEQA and expanding their campaign to reach
new constituencies to support the legislative and legal battles.

Public Feedback on the SEIR

The strategy to use the EIA process to stop the proposed prison from being constructed began to
take shape during the initial public comment period held by the CDC for the SEIR. Several
groups opposed to the prison submitted written comments expressing their concerns about the
prison’s environmental impacts that weren’t addressed in the Draft SEIR. These organizations
included Critical Resistance (CR), the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), the National
Lawyers Guild (NLG) Prison Law Project, Friends of the Kangaroo Rat (FKR), and Critical Mass
(CM) (California Department of Corrections 2000b). The majority of the comments submitted on
behalf of these organizations followed the lead of CBD in its lengthy critique of the SEIR for its
inadequacy in addressing the impacts to the endangered Tipton kangaroo rat, San Joaquin kit fox,
burrowing owl, and their habitats, the need for an Incidental Take Permit under the Endangered
Species Act, and the inadequacy of the proposed mitigation measure of setting aside an
equivalently sized plot of land as a habitat reserve. Other comments related to the construction of
an on-site wastewater treatment facility, the mitigation of traffic impacts, the lack of consideration
given within the SEIR to a “no project” or “no build” alternative to the proposed prison, the
impacts of electrified fences on migratory birds, impacts to school overcrowding, impacts to
groundwater supplies, and the cumulative impact of prison-related local development and growth
on biological resources. The breadth of comments regarding impacts to endangered species and
their habitats was well within the domain of expertise for CBD, which has a record of building
similarly comprehensive cases to block, curtail, or mitigate profit-driven development projects
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throughout the US southwest. The organization was founded in 1989 to protect sensitive plant
and animal species, along with their habitats, from destructive commercial practices and
exploitative uses of natural resources. Their work focuses on the systematic use of “biological
data, legal expertise, and the citizen petition provisions of the Endangered Species Act” to gain
legally binding protections for species and their habitats across much of the US, as well as the
Pacific and Atlantic oceans (The Center for Biological Diversity 2016).
The expert knowledge of endangered species and their habitats provided by CBD, allowed
the other groups in the campaign to get involved in the SEIR public feedback process despite their
primary political interests and areas of technical expertise being in other areas. Critical Resistance
(CR) is a nonprofit organization that formed in 1997 to build a movement to eliminate the prison
industrial complex (PIC), beginning with a three-day conference in 1998 that “brought together
over 3,500 activists, academics, former and current prisoners, labor leaders, religious
organizations, feminists, gay, lesbian and transgender activists, youth, families, and policy makers
from literally every state and other countries” (Critical Resistance 2016). For CR, stopping the
prison would mean slowing the growth of the PIC, while the campaign to stop the prison would
provide an opportunity to build their broader movement. The National Lawyers Guild Prison Law
Project is a project and committee within the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) that, in addition to
providing a platform for jailhouse lawyers to connect with one another, provides informational
resources regarding Constitutional and civil rights violation claims for persons in prison or jail
(National Lawyers Guild 2016). As an organization, the NLG works to defend Constitutional
rights and to basic human rights, and as such, advocates against “the systemic abuse of solitary as
a routine form of punishment, and the greater system of discriminatory over-incarceration,”
(“Written Statement of the National Lawyers Guild Before the United States Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights” 2014) which would both be
expanded under the proposed Level IV Security “Supermax” prison in Delano. Even though both
CR and the NLG Prison Law Project wanted to stop the Delano II prison because of the
consequences of the new prison for incarcerated and incarcerable populations, their official
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involvement in the SEIR public feedback process relied on the tactic of forcing the CDC to
strictly adhere to its legal and statutory obligations under CEQA, focusing on topics well
supported by existing case law: ecological impacts overlapping with the Endangered Species Act,
evaluation of cumulative impacts, and full consideration of the no project alternative. Building on
the comments submitted by CBD, CR, and the NLG Prison Law Project, Babak Naficy, an
environmental lawyer who would later represent the anti-prison coalition in court, submitted a
detailed set of comments on behalf of both FKR and CM that additionally called on CDC to detail
the various required permits for water discharge, as well as to provide documentation for some of
its data sources. FKR was a group of area residents who organized to protect the kangaroo rat and
its habitats. CM is a non-hierarchical (dubbed “Xerocracy”) association of individuals who
participate in direct action cycling events to reclaim public space (Critical Mass 1994).
In addition to the comments filed on behalf of the organizations aiming to stop the
proposed prison, comments were filed by city and state administrators and several local residents.
While many of these comments raised similar issues to those made by the anti-prison organizers,
one comment made by Bill Hylton, a retired city employee and local business owner who spoke
during the oral hearing expanded on the “significant and unavoidable” impact of taking 480 acres
of Farmland of Statewide Importance out of cultivation. While others made mention of the fact
that this impact was unmitigated within the SEIR, Hylton expanded the scope of feedback by
adding the possibility of utilizing other uncultivated lands as a possible mitigation measure
(California Department of Corrections 2000b). Though the CDC’s response to comments
dismissed Hylton’s suggestion and concern, his comment would become relevant during the court
proceedings because it helped established an administrative record of public concern for, and a
proposed solution to, the unmitigated impact of removing farmlands from cultivation. In a similar
fashion to their response to Hylton’s comments, the CDC responded in a cursory manner to most
of the other comments with little acknowledgement of the inadequacies of the SEIR in addressing
all of the requirements of the CEQA legislation. The exceptions to this were the addition of
several minor mitigation measures within the SEIR to reduce impacts to endangered species
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during both construction and operation of the proposed prison and an agreement to initiate
consultation with the US Fish and Wildlife Service to obtain an Incidental Take Permit for the
Tipton kangaroo rat under the Endangered Species Act (California Department of Corrections
2000b).
The CDC published its response to the SEIR comments in May 2000, followed less than a
month later by the publication of an NOD approving the SEIR and the proposed prison in June
2000. Almost immediately thereafter, the anti-prison organizers filed a lawsuit against the CDC
with the Kern County Superior Court of California. The lawsuit called on the court to prevent the
CDC from implementing the proposed prison until the CDC addressed the inadequacies of the
SEIR and the failure of the CDC to meet its statutory obligations under the CEQA legislation.16
The plaintiffs in the lawsuit included three of the organizations that had filed comments with the
CDC during the public response period for the SEIR: CR, the NLG Prison Law Project, and FKR.
Being that the lawsuit was part of a broader movement to stop the prison and the growth of the
PIC in general, campaign organizers used the lawsuit as an opportunity to rally greater support
against the prison. They contacted local residents, state and local politicians, and people within
institutions such as the SSJMUD to convince them that the proposed prison was bad for Delano
and populations throughout the state, and to get them to understand the negative environmental
impacts the prison would have related to the particular political or social stakes of different
stakeholders.

“Joining Forces: Environmental Justice and the Fight Against Prison Expansion”

Several months after filing their lawsuit against the CDC, the campaign organizers held a
conference in Fresno, about 90 miles north of Delano, to bring together prison abolitionists and
16

Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558
(2003).
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environmental justice activists from across the region. This conference, titled “Joining Forces:
Environmental Justice and the Fight Against Prison Expansion,” aimed to build political
formations that took advantage of the conceptual linkages between existing anti-racist social
justice struggles and environmental justice networks throughout California.17 In addition to CR,
sponsoring organizations included the California Prison Moratorium Project, the Southwest
Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, the Center on Race, Poverty and Environment,
Fresno State University MEChA, and the West County Toxics Coalition. These organizations
each work on sometimes-overlapping, but often geographically and thematically distinct
community based struggles for social justice and/or environmental justice in various parts of
California. For example, the Center on Race, Poverty and Environment, a community-centered
legal advocacy organization based out of Delano, uses legal strategies based around the Civil
Rights Act to fight for environmental justice (Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment 2011).
The California Prison Moratorium Project, on the other hand, explicitly focuses its efforts on
stopping all prison construction in California, both public and private. They frame the issue in
terms of the environmental injustice that prisons “are normally built in economically depressed
communities that eagerly anticipate economic prosperity,” and view them in the same light as
other toxic industries that negatively “affect the quality of local schools, roads, water, air, land,
and natural habitats” (California Prison Moratorium Project 2015).
One of the organizers who helped set the agenda for the conference and who served as the
conference’s opening speaker was Juana Gutiérrez, the co-founder and president of Madres del
Este de Los Angeles, or Mothers of East LA (MELA). Gutiérrez used her opening address to
describe how she and her fellow organizers worked tirelessly for nine years to stop a prison from
being constructed in their neighborhood, and how along the way, they caught wind of plans to
build a hazardous-waste incinerator in the neighboring town of Vernon, which became the second
17

This conference is discussed and analyzed in far greater detail by Rose Braz and Craig Gilmore
(2006) as well as Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007; 2008), all of whom were in attendance during the
actual conference. This summary is based on their documentation of the conference.
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focus of their organizing efforts. Through their anti-prison organizing, members of MELA
discovered that the state officials planning the prison assumed that all the prisoners in California
came from East LA and therefore decided that the state’s next prison might as well be located
there as well. Digging deeper into the logics behind this reasoning, the organizers saw that the
state officials pointed to the abundance of “risk factors” such as not graduating from high school,
as correlating with a greater likelihood for people to become incarcerated. Gutiérrez pointed out
that students who missed a lot of school tended to be less likely to graduate, and a lot of students
missed school due to health complications from asthma. Extending this line of reasoning even
further, members of MELA realized that people in their community were more likely to suffer
from asthma, and then discovered that asthma can develop from prolonged exposure to airborne
toxics, such as those produced through hazardous-waste incineration and in other polluting
industries that abound in East LA.
By identifying the connections between environmental hazards and the logics behind
expanding the prison system, MELA developed a complex analysis of the ways that
environmental racism functions simultaneously across a range of domains to shorten the lives of
populations rendered vulnerable by the structures of racial capitalism—the state officials
justifying a new prison to keep people locked in cages; the toxic industries drawn to poor
neighborhoods with large non-white populations; an educational system that at best is ill equipped
to prepare students for success, and at worst prepares them for failure or incarceration; the police
and policies that target poor communities of color to keep the prisons filled. It was because of the
organic way that MELA developed an environmental justice position from their anti-prison
activism, and because of the shared experiences with environmental racism between East LA and
the Central Valley that Gutiérrez’s opening remarks at the Joining Forces conference were so
appropriate to the type of expansive, cross-issue thinking and urban-rural coalition building
envisioned by the conference organizers and coalition working to stop the Delano II prison.
Rose Braz and Craig Gilmore (2006) describe the conference as the “first statewide
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gathering designed to explore the place of prisons in the environmental justice movement and the
ways that anti-prison activists can learn from environmental justice examples” (98). They
highlight one of the critical moments during the conference, when youth environmental justice
activists helped others recognize that one of the key linkages between communities of color
throughout the Central Valley and those in urban areas where many of the prisoners were from,
was the common environmental threats of the “three Ps”: police, prisons, and pollution.18
Borrowing from Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s (2008) definition of racism, each of these represent state
sanctioned, structural forms of environmental hazard or violence that produce group differentiated
vulnerabilities to premature death. Though not popularly represented as environmental factors in
and of themselves, police and prisons both dramatically shape environmental landscapes by
controlling populations through group- and geographically differentiated forms of surveillance,
displacement, violence, and disenfranchisement. Furthermore, the physical infrastructure of
prisons in particular, shapes local economic development, resource utilization, and ecological
landscapes—rarely in ways that benefit those populations on either side of the barbed wire that
are rendered as surplus to capitalism by the carceral state.
The insights from the conference didn’t stop with the three Ps. Rather, building on the
three Ps led participants to recognize that the concept of environment was indeed conceptually
flexible, both as a rallying point for justice organizing, as well as an organizing logic for
environmental policy. It was through these insights developed at the Joining Forces conference
that disparate populations from disparate places began to recognize their shared struggles, which
in that moment manifested itself through the campaign to stop the Delano II prison. Coming out
of the conference, organizers scaled up their campaign using the full range of insights developed
through the conference by recruiting additional populations from a range of backgrounds whose
shared concerns for environmental justice, in all its various forms, was sufficient to bring them
18

See previous footnote explaining that the three Ps highlighted by youth organizers were actually
police, prisons, and pesticides.
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together to fight against the Delano II prison despite any preconceived notions or prejudices about
the irreconcilability of their varied interests or priorities (Gilmore 2008). This meant that the
lawsuit against the CDC, which was made possible by California’s NEPA-modeled environmental
review process and the US Administrative Procedures Act, gave organizers an opportunity to
scale up, both horizontally and vertically, their legal case by bringing in a range of supporters,
from both urban and rural parts of the state, who recognized in the struggle their own senses of
environment that were threatened by the proposed prison. The conceptual flexibility of the
concept of environment within environmental policy meant that all of these supporters could find
traction for their seemingly—and in some cases realistically—incongruous visions of place for
the Central Valley, and for the state as a whole.

The Lawsuit

The lawsuit filed on behalf of the three plaintiff organizations, CR, the NLG Prison Law Project,
and FKR, made several arguments against the CDC that all centered around the failure of the
SEIR to fully consider the environmental impact of the prison. These arguments included the
failure to fully and adequately describe the proposed prison development project; failure to
consider a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed prison including the “no project”
alternative; failure to adequately consider the cumulative impacts of past projects in addition to
the proposed prison; and failure to propose adequate measures to mitigate the significant
foreseeable impacts on wastewater treatment, local schools, and the habitat of the Tipton
kangaroo rat and the San Joaquin kit fox. The Tipton kangaroo rat is a subspecies of the San
Joaquin kangaroo rat whose habitat is limited to a relatively small stretch of land in Kern County.
The San Joaquin kit fox is a small nocturnal fox whose diet includes kangaroo rats and whose
habitat is limited to portions of the San Joaquin Valley; it is one of the most endangered animals
in California (Defenders of Wildlife 2012). Neither species was identified on the specific plot of
land proposed for the Delano II prison during the short five-day trapping survey conducted by the
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CDC during preparation of the SEIR. However, numerous comments submitted to the CDC in
response to the SEIR pointed out that they had both been found on adjacent lands in previous
surveys, including on the site of the North Kern State Prison located across the street from the
proposed Delano II prison site (California Department of Corrections 2000b).
Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, the CDC challenged the legal eligibility of CR and the
NLG Prison Law Project to be parties to the suit. The CDC claimed that the underlying intent for
both organizations was not predicated on “environmental harms” that might result from
shortcomings in the SEIR, but rather, on a non-environmental political agenda aimed solely at
stopping prison expansion.19 The court agreed with the CDC position and issued a preliminary
ruling disqualifying both organizations from continuing as parties to the lawsuit on the grounds
that both organizations lacked legal standing to bring suit under CEQA.
The concept of standing is an extremely important part of environmental law because it is
the factor that establishes whether or not a person or organization can legitimately use the courts
to challenge environmental policy decisions (Fogleman 1990). Standing in the Delano II lawsuit
rested on the plaintiffs’ claim that there were three areas of environmental impacts not considered
under the SEIR that would cause harm to the plaintiffs. The Court ruled that neither CR nor the
NLG Prison Law Project sufficiently substantiated that any of these three areas of impacts would
directly inflict injuries upon members of either organization since they did not bring forth
evidence that their members lived, worked, or played within the local environments that would be
affected if the prison were to be constructed.20 Even though the EIA process is intended to
consider a range of environmental impacts including social and economic impacts resulting from
changes to the physical environment, the court chose not to accept the argument that the prison’s
physical presence would directly impact the lives, livelihoods, and communities of incarcerated
19

Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558
(2003).
20
Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558
(2003).
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people since those impacts were not part of the plaintiffs’ legal claims against the CDC under
CEQA. This setback did not stop the prison abolitionist and environmental justice coalition from
continuing to support FKR, but there is some irony in that the environmental policy established to
protect the human environment, ultimately only functioned to serve those people whose interests
were explicitly in protecting kangaroo rats, and not those people fighting on behalf of the people
whose lives and environments would be most directly impacted by the proposed prison. But it’s
not in the least bit ironic or coincidental that the campaign organizers deliberately worked to bring
together these disparate organizations for the common cause of stopping the proposed prison and
all of its negative environmental impacts.

The Court Rulings

After the trial court issued its preliminary decision that removed CR and the NLG Prison Law
Project as plaintiffs, the trial proceeded, and in July 2001, a year after the lawsuit was originally
filed, the Kern County Superior Court issued its final decision in the case. The court issued a
ruling that favored the anti-prison coalition, finding that the CDC had failed to adhere to CEQA
guidelines by not fully considering the combined environmental impacts of the proposed prison in
light of the existing North Kern State Prison and community corrections facility on the adjacent
lots. In light of this ruling, the court issued an injunction preventing the CDC from proceeding
with its plans to implement the Delano II prison until they fulfilled their obligations under
CEQA.21 Though the court ruling generally favored the anti-prison coalition, the court only
21

Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558
(2003) and Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, Ordered Not
Officially Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400 (2003). The ruling was
originally published by the California Appellate 4th District Report, however it was later
depublished and portions were stricken from the original Report; the depublished court ruling
appears in the California Reporter, 3rd District. The difference between the two is that the
court’s discussion of the water and traffic issues do not appear in the depublished ruling. A copy
of the full original ruling containing the court’s discussion of the water and traffic issues was
obtained directly from the environmental lawyer who represented FKR in the case, Babak
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granted one of the plaintiffs’ arguments, rejecting the other arguments about the need for
additional mitigation measures including those for the endangered species and the need for further
consideration of the no project and no build alternatives. The court determined that the CDC had
already fulfilled its CEQA obligations regarding these two additional points. Though the
anti-prison coalition argued, both in their original comments on the SEIR and during the trial, that
the mitigation measures outlined by the CDC were insufficient, the court held that the mitigation
measures contained within the SEIR were in fact adequate. Regarding the no project alternative,
CDC argued and the court concurred that it had already fulfilled its obligation to consider the no
project alternative by virtue of its baseline investigation of the proposed site as well as in its
original 1995 EIR for the prison. By granting the cumulative impact argument and rejecting the
rest of the arguments, the court reduced the scope of future legal arguments that the anti-prison
coalition could use to hold the CDC accountable for complying with CEQA. In any case, the
court ordered the CDC to postpone construction until it addressed these deficiencies in its analysis
by returning to the EIA process to conduct further studies of the cumulative impacts of past and
probable future projects, and circulate that study for an additional round of public comments.
The CDC complied with the court order and produced a Draft Revised Cumulative Impact
Analysis (RCIA). This document provided a brief history of the region and detailed analysis of
the projects developed in the 15-year period leading up to Delano II, as well as several projects
planned for the region over the next few years (California Department of Corrections 2001). As
the RCIA was still published as part of the EIR process, the CDC circulated it for public review
and comments in August 2001. During the review period, the campaign organizers, along with
other members of their anti-prison coalition, scrutinized the RCIA and submitted comments
repudiating the CDC’s findings. The CDC responded to the comments in a Final RCIA, issued a
NOD, and submitted both to the Superior Court, along with a petition asking the court to lift the
injunction stopping them from commencing construction of the Delano II prison.
Naficy.
116

CHAPTER 3. POLICE, PRISONS, AND POLLUTION
Following a second trial to hear arguments from both parties as to the sufficiency of the
RCIA, the court ruled in April 2002 in favor of CDC, approving the RCIA and lifting the
injunction against the implementation of the proposed prison. The anti-prison coalition, however,
was not ready to give up their fight so in July 2002, they filed an appeal with the California Fifth
Appellate District Court, causing the injunction to remain in place until the case was decided by
the appellate court. The appeal made by the anti-prison coalition contained three issues: the
“water issue,” “traffic issue,” and “farmland issue.”22 The water issue concerned the CDC’s
findings in the RCIA regarding the impacts of the proposed prison on local water supplies and on
the municipal water district. Regarding the traffic issue, the coalition argued that CDC had not
addressed cumulative impacts to traffic patterns in any of the environmental analyses. On the
farmland issue, the coalition argued that the CDC’s conclusion that the significant and
unavoidable impacts to farmland were unmitigable failed to consider mitigation measures such as
establishing an agricultural easement in the vicinity of the proposed prison. The appeal process
lasted until August 2003, more than three years after the initial lawsuit was filed. Ultimately,
however, the appeals court ruled against FKR and the anti-prison coalition on all three points,
clearing the path for the CDC to commence construction of the Delano II prison. Importantly, as I
discuss later in the chapter, following the decision handed down by the Court of Appeals, FKR,
many of the other member organizations in the anti-prison coalition, and a number of uninvolved
parties successfully petitioned the court to depublish its decision to prevent the rulings from
establishing new legal precedents.23
22

Notably absent in the appeal was the argument that the RCIA did not adequately address the
cumulative impacts of the proposed prison on sensitive species, e.g., the Tipton kangaroo rat
and San Joaquin kit fox. The sensitive species issue was raised during the trial court hearing on
the RCIA alongside the other three issues argued on appeal, but the sensitive species issue was
dropped from the appeal.
23
Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558
(2003) and Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, Ordered Not
Officially Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400 (2003). The ruling was
originally published by the California Appellate 4th District Report, however it was later
depublished and portions were stricken from the original Report; the depublished court ruling
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The court decision contains several points warranting discussion related to the use of a
legal strategy based around the EIA process as part of a social and environmental justice
campaign. Part of understanding how this campaign functioned through and against the racial
environmental state is interrogating the operation of the legal and procedural aspects of the state
in relation to both the anti-prison coalition’s ambitions and the CDC’s functional objectives. In
the sections that follow, I dissect the court decision in order to highlight the potential openings
and limitations that come with a legal strategy that engages the state in a racial and environmental
conflict through the EIA process.

The Water Issue

The water issue concerned the CDC proposal within the RCIA to switch the source of water
supplying the proposed prison. The existing farmland on the proposed site used surface water
supplied by the South San Joaquin Municipal Utility District (SSJMUD), supplemented by a
small amount of groundwater when needed. The CDC proposed supplanting the surface water
supplied by SSJMUD with groundwater pumped from on-site wells, and redistributing treated
wastewater from the proposed prison for the irrigation of neighboring farmlands. The CDC
concluded that groundwater pumping would be cumulatively beneficial to the groundwater
supply, and despite posing significant impacts to the ground and surface water supplies, no further
mitigation steps were necessary (California Department of Corrections 2000a; California
Department of Corrections 2001). FKR argued that these conclusions were not supported by
sufficient evidence, that the additional groundwater pumping would negatively impact the aquifer,
appears in the California Reporter, 3rd District. The difference between the two is that the
court’s discussion of the water and traffic issues do not appear in the depublished ruling. A copy
of the full original ruling containing the court’s discussion of the water and traffic issues was
obtained directly from the environmental lawyer who represented FKR in the case, Babak
Naficy.
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and that this change would have negative economic impacts on SSJMUD.24 Even though
SSJMUD was not a party to the lawsuit, the campaign organizers had successfully reached out to
individuals within SSJMUD and convinced them of their aligned interests in stopping the prison.
The result of this coordination was that SSJMUD representatives worked with the anti-prison
coalition to further scrutinize the CDC environmental analyses, which is how FKR came to
represent SSJMUD’s interest in court with the water issue.
Rather than directly address the points that FKR raised regarding the water issue, the court
ruled that CDC was shielded from the water issue because the anti-prison coalition “failed to
exhausted its administrative remedies with regard to the issue it [raised] concerning the use of
water at the site.”25 In order for an issue to be raised as the basis for legal action in a CEQA case,
the party bringing the lawsuit needs to provide evidence that the issue was previously brought to
the attention of the lead agency conducting the environmental review process during one of the
official public feedback periods through appropriate channels such as at a public hearing or by
submitting written comments to the agency’s public liaison. FKR argued that two separate letters
regarding the water issue were submitted to the CDC as public feedback to the RCIA, and
therefore, legitimate attempts were made by the anti-prison coalition to exhaust their
administrative options. The court, however, ruled that neither of the letters sufficiently met the
legal criteria for exhaustion of administrative options.
The court additionally rejected a third letter, sent on behalf of the SSJMUD, that discussed
the water issue as argued by FKR, and which was submitted as evidence to the trial court prior to
the hearing on the RCIA. According to Ruth Wilson Gilmore, this letter was originally submitted
during the RCIA public comment period, however it was not recorded in the administrative
record because the date that displayed on the letter appeared to be after the end of the public
24

Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, Ordered Not Officially
Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400 (2003)
25
Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, Ordered Not Officially
Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400, p. 7 (2003)
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comment period. However, the letter was sent as a Microsoft Word document and the date
recorded within the letter automatically updated itself each time the letter was opened, meaning
that when it was opened by the CDC after the end of the public comment period, it displayed the
current date and not the date the letter was actually submitted. The letter was therefore
erroneously excluded from the administrative record, subsequently ignored by the trial court, and
ruled as irrelevant and inadmissible by the appellate court.26
The court’s rejection of the first two letters was based on a combination of administrative
technicalities and subjective interpretation of how environmental impacts fit within the bounds of
environmental policy. The first letter was sent by an administrator at SSJMUD, while the second
was sent by Craig Gilmore, one of the anti-prison campaign organizers. The court ruled that the
first letter was invalid because it was addressed to someone other than the designated EIR contact
person, it didn’t explicitly state that it was in reference to the EIR or RCIA, and because it was
dated April 10, 2001, which was prior to the official public review period that began on August
25, 2001.27 Even though it was clear by the content of the letter that it was addressed directly to
the CDC and commented on the impacts of the proposed prison, the “administrative record”
submitted by the CDC in the form of the published public comments on the RCIA did not include
the letter, and the court ruled that the letter therefore did not qualify as evidence that FKR had
exhausted its administrative options to seek relief directly from the CDC.28 Does this mean that
there was no evidence that the letter could have qualified as part of the administrative record thus
potentially preserving the water issue in the lawsuit? Hardly, yet the court used its discretion to
reject it as valid evidence for not adhering strictly to the acceptable administrative procedures.
26

R. Gilmore, personal correspondence with the author (2016); Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v.
California Department of Corrections, Ordered Not Officially Published, Previously Published
at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400, p. 21-22 (2003).
27
Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, Ordered Not Officially
Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400, p. 13 (2003)
28
Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections, Ordered Not Officially
Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400, p. 14-15 (2003)
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The court’s ruling highlights the need for administrative exactitude when dealing with legal
proceedings, even in instances of intra-agency communications.
The court further ruled that even had the first letter been included in the administrative
record, neither it nor the second letter addressing the water issue sufficiently linked the potential
impacts of the prison to physical changes in the environment, and were therefore premised around
impacts outside the scope of CEQA. The first letter petitioned the CDC and the State Legislature
to remedy the fact that SSJMUD was excluded throughout the prison planning process despite the
fact that the proposed prison would directly impact SSJMUD operations. The letter specifically
pointed out that the proposed use of groundwater and the redistribution of treated wastewater to
neighboring farms would potentially “[endanger] both farming in the area of the prison as well as
the District’s ability to retain its current water allocation and financial stability.”29 The second
letter further clarifies this point:
By ignoring the fiscal impacts of their water plans on SSJMUD and its landowners,
the CDC has in fact not provided convincing evidence that the project would have
beneficial cumulative impacts. Conversation with SSJMUD suggest that the
CDC’s plan could result in higher water costs for other SSJMUD water users. If
higher water costs might be anticipated, the RCIA must determine whether higher
water costs might cause more agricultural losses, bankruptcies, further
consolidation of small farms into larger operations, whether the lack of affordable
water might keep other developments from locating in Delano.30
As in NEPA, socioeconomic considerations in and of themselves are not directly covered
by CEQA impact analysis requirements. However, socioeconomic effects directly caused by, or
which result in changes to the physical environment do fall within the scope of both CEQA and
NEPA if it can be shown that there is a direct chain of causality linking changes in the physical
29

SSJMUD qtd. in Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections,
Ordered Not Officially Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400, p. 14 (2003)
30
C. Gilmore qtd. in Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections,
Ordered Not Officially Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400, p. 16 (2003)
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environment to socioeconomic impacts (Daffron 1975; Fogleman 1990).31 In the case of the
second letter that raised the water issue, the Court determined that the basis for dissent lay only in
economic impacts to SSJMUD due to changes in water usage, and not due to changes in either the
physical surface water or groundwater conditions. Because neither letter explicitly linked the
social and economic impacts of the prison to the physical environmental impacts related to
groundwater pumping—which the EIR makes clear there would be—the court used its discretion
to rule that the impacts to SSJMUD were outside the scope of environmental impacts covered
under CEQA, and therefore did not qualify as having raised the water issue within the
administrative record. Even though the letter referred to the physical environmental impacts on
groundwater levels, the court decided that the language within the letter did not adequately
establish a chain of direct causality between groundwater impacts and the economic impacts to
SSJMUD that formed the basis for the claim regarding the adequacy of the RCIA. It didn’t matter
31

CEQA guidelines §15131(a) reads: “Economic or social effects of a project shall not be treated
as significant effects on the environment. An EIR may trace a chain of cause and effect from a
proposed decision on a project through anticipated economic or social changes resulting from
the project to physical changes caused in turn by the economic or social changes. The
intermediate economic or social changes need not be analyzed in any detail greater than
necessary to trace the chain of cause and effect. The focus of the analysis shall be on the physical
changes.” However, §15131(b) clarifies this point by adding: “Economic or social effects of a
project may be used to determine the significance of physical changes caused by the project.
For example, if the construction of a new freeway or rail line divides an existing community, the
construction would be the physical change, but the social effect on the community would be the
basis for determining that the effect would be significant…Where an EIR uses economic or
social effects to determine that a physical change is significant, the EIR shall explain the reason
for determining that the effect is significant.” Finally, part (c) lays out the responsibility of the
lead agency regarding any economic or social impacts of a project: “Economic, social, and
particularly housing factors shall be considered by public agencies together with technological
and environmental factors in deciding whether changes in a project are feasible to reduce or
avoid the significant effects on the environment identified in the EIR. If information on these
factors is not contained in the EIR, the information must be added to the record in some other
manner to allow the agency to consider the factors in reaching a decision on the project”
(Association of Environmental Professionals 2014). See also Citizens Assn. for Sensible Dev V.
County of Inyo (132 Cal. App. 3d 151 (1985)), Citizens for Quality Growth v. City of Mt.
Shasta (189 Cal. App. 3d 433 (1988)), cf. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy (460 US 766 (1983)), Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC (462 US 87 (1983)).
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that FKR made valid arguments regarding physical environmental impacts during the trial since
the court disqualified the issue entirely based on the specific way the argument was raised in the
initial comment letter to the CDC during the public feedback period. This nuance of causality,
dependent upon physical changes to the environment, and the technical framing required to craft
an argument that adequately addresses it, is one of the important ways in which judicial narrowing
decreases the scope and applicability of NEPA and similar EIA statutes to social environmental
impacts. Even if the causal relationship between physical and social environmental impacts is
established, it is up to the lead agency and courts to use their discretion in determining whether or
not the issue has been properly framed and the chains of causality properly established.

The Traffic Issue

The second issue in the Court of Appeals decision was the traffic issue. The core of this issue was
the claim that the CDC did not adequately consider the cumulative impact on traffic of the prison
in conjunction with past and probable future projects within the vicinity of the proposed prison.
FKR based its argument on several points, but the two most contentious were that the California
Department of Transportation had submitted comments to the effect of calling on the CDC to
perform a 20-year traffic study, and that the CDC cumulative analysis did not consider Delano’s
General Plan and the Kern County Council of Government regional transportation model. The
court rejected this issue on two fronts. First, the court followed a similar set of technicalities as it
did with the water issue to reject the administrative record that would allow FKR to raise the
traffic issue on appeal. Second, the court ruled against both the traffic study and consideration of
the local and regional planning documents based on the premise that the CDC did conduct some
cumulative traffic modeling considering other past and future projects, and therefore, had fulfilled
their obligations under CEQA since neither of the other considerations was a statutory
requirement under CEQA. The legal basis for this ruling doesn’t contribute to the current
discussion, however the point worth reiterating is that the comments submitted during the EIR
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public feedback period that raised the traffic issue came from the City of Delano and the
California Department of Transportation, both of whom were opposed to the new prison,
reinforcing the idea that the EIA process facilitated the political organizing strategy of developing
unexpected partnerships based on their shared interests in protecting their individual interests as
they relate to environmental impacts.

The Farmland Issue and Depublication of the Court Opinion

The third and final issue raised in the Court of Appeals decision, the farmland issue, was
important not just within the scope of this case, but within environmental law and policy more
generally. In the revised cumulative impact analysis, the CDC concluded that constructing the
prison would result in a total of 2,300 acres of agricultural land being converted to nonagricultural
uses, and that no mitigation measures were available to reduce this environmental impact.
Therefore, it concluded that the conversion of farmland was a significant and unavoidable
environmental impact.32 FKR argued that this conclusion was insufficient to the requirements of
CEQA because it failed to consider, among other things, the possibility of mitigating the
environmental impact through the establishment of agricultural easements on farmland in the
vicinity of the proposed prison. FKR made the case that establishing an agricultural easement
might function as a mitigation measure for developing over agricultural lands by preserving in
perpetuity, a similarly sized portion of land outside of the project area for exclusive use as
agricultural land. Creating such an easement, FKR argued, would shield farmland around Delano
from future projects, thus minimizing the cumulative effects of urban development from further
eroding agricultural land uses in Delano. Such an arrangement would presumably meet the State
of California’s objectives to prevent the overall loss of farmland throughout the state. The Court,
however, rejected this argument, stating that once the farmland was taken out of agricultural use,
32

Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 564
(2003).
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there was no way to get it back, and no mitigation would remedy this; the only way to mitigate the
loss of farmland would be to not build the prison in the first place.33
In rejecting FKR’s argument regarding the possibility of using agricultural easements as a
mitigation measure, the court stated that such measures would not, in its interpretation, meet the
criteria for mitigation as outlined in the CEQA guidelines. The court stated that a legal
arrangement such as an easement would fail to compensate for a loss of farmland by “replacing or
providing substitute resources or environments.”34 The court’s ruling was based on the argument
that establishing an agricultural easement outside the proposed project site would not actually
reduce the loss of farmland caused by the proposed prison or other probable future developments
since once the farmland was converted to a prison, that farmland was gone, there would be a net
loss of farmland, and no easements would change that fact. The court did not consider that the
State encourages—and provides funding for—the use of easements on private farmland as one
measure to protect agricultural lands (California Department of Finance 2012).
Had the court ruled in the anti-prison coalition’s favor on this issue, the CDC would likely
have simply produced another revision to its EIR that provided for an agricultural easement on a
nearby property as mitigation for the prison’s reduction of farmland, not unlike the many other
concessions frequently negotiated between developers and local agencies. Indeed, the State’s
budget for the Delano II prison included roughly six-million dollars set aside for infrastructure
like schools as part of the CDC’s local concessions acknowledging the necessary mitigations to
the prison’s impacts. In terms of the analysis at hand, the question is not whether or not
agricultural easements can mitigate the loss of farmland, nor whether such considerations would
stop the proposed Delano II prison from coming into being. Rather, it is how raising the farmland
issue in court changed the political stakes for the anti-prison coalition. The farmland issue
33
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allowed the coalition to reach out to farmers, farmworkers, and the agricultural industry broadly
to bring them into the fight against prisons. Though on any other day the members of FKR would
likely argue that agricultural land uses pose as much if not greater risk to small mammals like the
endangered Tipton kangaroo rat than might a prison, the farmland issue in particular, and the
campaign against the prison more generally, brought the two sides together in a unified fight
against the prison.
The ramifications of the court’s ruling on the farmland issue extend beyond this case study,
with continuing relevance in ongoing debates as to whether or not the loss of agricultural lands to
development can be reasonably mitigated, and what responsibility government agencies have to
evaluate and mitigate the effects of development projects on agricultural and other protected lands
(e.g., Safran 2004; Bass 2014). Farmland is considered an important economic and environmental
resource within California, and the state has taken measures to reduce the impacts of urban
development from encroaching on agricultural production. Indeed, the state runs a Farmland
Conservancy Program that provides funding to “encourage the long-term, private stewardship of
agricultural lands through the voluntary use of agricultural conservation easements” (“California
Farmland Conservancy Program Act” 2011). Therefore, when the court rejected the argument
made by FKR about the need for the CDC to at least consider mitigation efforts through the
establishment of agricultural easements, people throughout the state who were otherwise
unconcerned with the prison began to take notice. After the Court of Appeals issued its decision
rejecting the FKR appeal, the organizations within the anti-prison coalition, as well as numerous
other agencies and organizations from across the state successfully petitioned the Court to
depublish the final ruling, meaning that the case cannot be cited as legal precedent by either
courts or parties in future cases.35
Requests to depublish the court ruling came from a broad range of organizations and
individuals that are worth mentioning because they speak to the wide-reaching ramifications of
35

Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558.
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this decision. The initial request, made by the California Farm Bureau Federation and the Sierra
Club, was joined in support by the Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency, a Public Policy
Specialist from the University of California Cooperative Extension, the American Farmland Trust,
the Amador Land Trust, the Fresno County Farm Bureau, the City of Davis Farmland
Preservation Program, Protect Our Water, the San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, the San Joaquin
Valley Conservancy, the Central Valley Safe Environment Network, the Community Alliance
with Family Farmers, the County of Sonoma and Sonoma County Agricultural Preservation and
Open Space District, the California Resources Agency, and an independent environmental
attorney. [ˆ3116]
Depublication of the Friends ruling has had an important and lasting impact on case law
regarding mitigating the loss of agricultural lands within and beyond California, because even
though it cannot be cited as legal precedent, the case still informs both administrative and legal
decision making (Safran 2004; Meserve 2011; Bass 2014). Courts have differed in their findings
regarding the validity of easements or fees in-lieu as mitigation measures required to be
considered under CEQA. In 2004, the California Court of Appeals for the third district issued a
conflicting ruling in South County Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Elk Grove (2004
Cal. App. Unpub. 1 (2004)) that agricultural easements or conservation fees could mitigate the
loss of agricultural lands to future development pressures, and therefore, the lead agency had an
obligation under CEQA to address the issue in its impact assessments. Like Friends, the South
County Citizens decision was not published, so it similarly could not be cited as legal precedent.
However, a decade after the Friends case was decided, the California Court of Appeals for the
First District issued a decision in the case of Masonite Corp. v. County of Mendocino (218 Cal.
App. 4th 230 (2013)) in which the Court ruled, like in the South County Citizens decision, that a
lead agency has a CEQA obligation to consider the use of easements or fees as appropriate
mitigation measures for the conversion of agricultural lands.36 Unlike the previous two cases, this
36
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case was published, so at least in the First District, a precedent was finally established requiring
consideration of agricultural mitigation within the CEQA process (Bass 2014).

Building a Movement to Abolish the PIC

Even though the Appellate Court lifted the injunction that was preventing the CDC from
implementing the Delano II prison construction, the anti-prison coalition continued with the other
two prongs of their strategy to put an end to California’s prison construction boom—the
legislative strategy and the movement capacity building strategy. Throughout the entire litigation
process, the campaign organizers never let up on their legislative campaign to convince the
lawmakers in Sacramento to defund the prison construction (Braz and Gilmore 2006). As the
legal case drew to a close, the organizers redoubled their efforts in petitioning the State
Legislature with the added support from the numerous individuals, organizations, government
officials, and public agencies who were drawn into the EIA campaign and court battle. Despite
their best efforts, the State Legislature went through with the lease-purchase financing to fund the
prison construction. The Delano II facility began receiving prisoners in 2005 under its new name,
the Kern Valley State Prison.
The opening of Kern Valley State Prison did not mark the end of the organizers’ struggle.
Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2008) argues that the multi-pronged Delano II campaign solidified
political structures that stretched across the rural-urban divides to bring together disparate
communities in the environmental justice struggle to stop the growth of, and ultimately abolish,
the prison industrial complex. The Delano campaign demonstrates the conceptual flexibility of
the environmental justice framework for engaging the racial environmental state through the
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process mandated by state and federal environmental
policies. At the Joining Forces conference held shortly after the campaign began picking up
speed, the campaign organizers urged participants to think about the possibilities for community
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organizing and building political power by stretching the concept of environmental justice to
include other factors beyond just toxics to consider, for example, the impacts of prisons on both
rural and urban communities. Bringing this framework back to the Delano II campaign allowed
the anti-prison coalition to use the broad range of environmental impacts identified by the CDC to
reach new constituencies. The organizers showed how all of the prisons impacts, to schools,
water, traffic, urban development, agriculture, and protected species, made the proposed prison
incompatible with visions for Delano as anything but a place for locking people in cages.
This strategy allowed organizers to convey to a broad constituency their common sense
message that prison construction was neither a prudent nor effective way of building safer
communities or spurring local economic development, and thus extended the reach of the
campaign to stop the prison beyond longtime prison abolitionists and traditional
environmentalists opposed to new construction. Together, these area residents, local and state
officials, environmental justice advocates, and prison abolitionists formed a loose coalition
cohered in their opposition to the prison and the conversion of farmland into carceral space that
tapped into longstanding regional institutions and capacities that that have shaped development
throughout the region, such as the water district, the agricultural industry, the cultural and
political economic legacies of farmworker organizing, and the networks of social and
environmental justice activists who had already been organizing within the Central Valley to rid
their communities of toxic pollutants and pesticides.37 For the campaign organizers,
understanding the historical and geographical specificity of Delano as more than just another
prison town allowed them to tap into these capacities to identify potential supporters, even if it
initially seemed that they had little common cause.
37

Examples of earlier environmental justice struggles in the San Joaquin Valley that provided
inspiration are the campaign led by El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio to stop a toxic waste
incinerator from being built in Kettleman City in 1991 and the longstanding campaign led by
the West County Toxics Coalition—one of the participants in the Joining Forces conference—to
hold Chevron and other companies accountable for making Richmond a hotbed of
environmental racism (Kay 1994).
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Despite the success of the campaign in rallying opposition to, and significantly delaying
construction of the Delano II prison, the prison still eventually opened, and as of 2016, keeps
nearly 4,000 people locked in cages (Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, State of
California 2016). One of the remaining questions that this case study leaves unanswered is
whether the campaign was ultimately successful as part of the broader prison abolition movement,
or if the limitations of the legal strategy premised on the EIA process only served to prolong what
some might argue was a losing battle against the state on the state’s terms. On the one hand, the
state only rarely loses NEPA-type court cases outright without external intervention such as an
executive override or legislative action, so it was relatively unlikely that the legal strategy alone
would permanently stop the prison from being built (Lazarus 2012). Within the EIA process,
project abandonment or the no action alternative rarely emerges as the decided outcome, even in
the face of lawsuits that might try to compel such a decision as in the Delano II case. Rather, the
public participation process—and even litigation—is more likely to result in modifications to the
parameters of the proposed action or concessions made within the implementation plan, such as
additional environmental mitigation measures or payment of concession fees-in-lieu to
compensate for environmental impacts. In the case of Delano II, however, such concessions
would still have meant that a new prison would be built and more people could be locked in cages.
The only legal outcome that would have represented a victory for the organizers was for the CDC
to completely abandon its plans for any new prisons, in Delano or elsewhere. Moreover, in this
particular case, because an EIR had already been approved in 1995, the no action alternative
within the SEIR was actually for the CDC to proceed with its earlier plans rather than the revised
plan that triggered the need for reopening the EIA process and the SEIR, which the CDC pointed
out in its response to comments (California Department of Corrections 2000b).
On the other hand, the organizers had a broader vision of success in mind for the
campaign as a whole beyond the legal strategy. While stopping the prison through the EIA
process would have been a phenomenal victory, engaging the EIA process provided a concrete
way for the anti-prison coalition organizers to reach out to and politicize new constituencies who
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could identify their own visions for justice and placemaking in the struggle. The EIA process
itself provides structures through which people can mobilize, gain an understanding of the logics
used to justify and legitimize state actions, and formally and legally engage in conflicts over the
state that are grounded in the material conditions of their environments. By building a campaign
that hooked into these structures of the racial environmental state, the campaign organizers were
able to bring together a patchwork coalition of people and organizations through the recognition
of their shared understandings that the proposed prison was an environmental harm in all of the
different ways that people relate to their environments throughout their daily lives. Furthermore,
thinking about the proposed prison through the lens of environmental impacts provides a way for
people throughout the state to grasp the very real ways in which the prison affects communities
and social environments that span the rural-urban divide because of its impacts to the places
where prisoners come from and the policing practices used to keep the prisons filled. It therefore
seems likely that the campaign organizers—those prison abolitionists and environmental justice
activists who helped publicize, organize, and materialize opposition to the prison
construction—engaged the EIA process because they recognized its potential capacities for
building and sustaining a broader social movement against the use of cages as a racist and violent
method for resolving structural problems plaguing rural economies like that of Delano and urban
communities like those throughout Los Angeles County where so many of the state’s prisoners
originate (Gilmore 2007).
For people who were mobilized around the campaign’s call for an expansive struggle for
social and environmental justice, the fight to stop Delano II provided an entry point to, or path for
continuity in, developing an environmental justice-oriented political identity, and engagement in
anti-racist community organizing.38 The campaign built on and helped to consolidate the existing
loose networks of environmental justice, environmentalists, labor unions, and immigration rights
38
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organizations operating between the Central Valley and other parts of California. One of the
sponsoring organizations of the Joining Forces conference, the Center on Race, Poverty, and the
Environment, established a coalition called the Central California Environmental Justice Network
(CCEJN) the year before the Joining Forces conference, and that conference was one of the first
CCEJN initiatives. The combination of the Joining Forces conference and the extensive
organizing efforts around the campaign to stop the Delano II prison helped to consolidate CCEJN
into an enduring and important formation within the Central Valley for developing organizational
capacities to combat all of the overlapping and intersecting forms of environmental injustices
affecting their communities.
For those public administrators, members of local government, and others who were not
entirely swayed by the abolitionists’ broader vision for a social movement to end the PIC, the
campaign shifted people’s attitudes toward the state’s prison construction program, particularly
given the widespread negative economic impacts of prisons on small rural town. It’s difficult to
assess the impact of the campaign on the CDC or others within the statewide government
bureaucracy who advocated for the new prison. But challenging the state institutions behind
prison construction through a locally situated struggle allowed the prison abolitionists to engage
the state across geographical and political scales, and to use the conflicting political agendas of
state institutions operating at these different scales against each other, for example by pitting the
local city officials against the state officials once the locals recognized the detrimental
ramifications of the additional prison. Even though the legal case built around the EIA process
didn’t accommodate the abolitionists’ arguments regarding the environmentally racist differential
impacts of the prison on local populations and communities of color across the state, as part of a
broader social movement, the campaign succeeded in shifting discourses within and against the
state about the racist institution of mass incarceration and the policing practices that sustain it, as
well as the ineffectiveness of the “colorblind” policy of transforming rural landscapes into
carceral spaces as a means of combating crime and stimulating rural economies, rather than
investing in institutions and infrastructure to support, for example, education or ecologically
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sustainable workforce development.
Gilmore (2008) and others have pointed out that when groups of people come together to
fight for justice in a common cause like they did in the Delano II campaign, they sometimes face
the dilemma of formalizing their organization through the legal and institutional structures of the
state in order to gain recognition and legitimacy, which in turn serves as both an opportunity to
expand their capacities for political engagement, but also potentially inhibits other possibilities
for struggle.39 Engaging the racial environmental state as an entry point for social change,
whether through the EIA process or otherwise, carries similar structural opportunities and
constraints. This case study demonstrates both the opportunities provided for generating new
structures for organizing people across space and place, but also the constraints of both the EIA
and judicial processes that establish limitations on the ways that people can engage the state
through those means.
Engaging the EIA process as part of a legal geographical strategy for building a social and
environmental justice movement clearly has its advantages and disadvantages. The public
participation process institutionalized within the EIA process provides key intervention points for
forcing the state to consider not just a range of environmental impacts, but to consider them from
the perspective of a range of stakeholders with diverse environmental interests and visions of
place in mind. The strict procedural requirements of the EIA process mean that the lead agency is
forced to fully consider and evaluate the range of public concerns, and to address the ways in
which the proposed project does or does not address and mitigate those areas of concern. Failure
on the part of agencies to adhere to their own rules, regulations, and guidelines opens the door to
litigation, which in turn has the potential to establish new legal precedents and thus shift the
39
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terrains of struggle. If much of the racial environmental state’s framework is shaped through
policies such as NEPA and CEQA, then it is given meaning through practices such as the EIA
process, and force through the operation of laws and courts. Though abstract in its conception, the
racial environmental state bears real consequences in the ways that these structures govern and
produce the built environment and the populations, both human and otherwise, that inhabit them.
Consequently, struggles that can engage the legal process as a means of redirecting practices and
influencing policy have the potential to transform the state in the abstract and the material and
environmental conditions affecting peoples’ daily lives.
But the administrative procedures of the EIA process are a double-edged sword because
they require public participants to adhere to similarly strict procedures in order for their
comments to be included within the administrative record and therefore legally valid points of
contention in subsequent rounds of the EIA process or litigation proceedings. The ease with
which the Appellate Court dismissed the water issue based on the technicalities of the
administrative record points to just one of the many ways that the state is insulated through
bureaucracy. Additionally, the highly technical and precise fields of environmental and social
sciences employed in the EIA process set a high barrier to entry for technical analysis of
environmental statements, making the process intimidating to non-experts and people whose
geographical and environmental knowledges aren’t represented in the technical language of
environmental statements. But as the case study in the following chapter shows, sometimes
marginalized forms of knowledge and cultural understanding can be made legible within the EIA
process with the right legal framing and organizing strategies. Neither the CDC nor the court did
anything to honor the request to translate the environmental reports, but even had the translation
been made available, it still wouldn’t make it any easier for the general public to gain access to
the highly technical language used throughout the SEIR and RCIA. This limitation of
accessibility within the EIA process is also discussed in greater detail in the next chapter where I
highlight one of the strategies used by activists—pushing the government agency to establish a
technical assistance fund to allow community groups to hire technical experts who could
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scrutinize the environmental reports and translate the report’s findings into plain language to
allow a greater degree of access and participation by members of the affected communities.
Though the EIA process allows members of the general public to participate and intervene
within the administrative procedures governing state actions, and even though through this
process people can raise issues about environmental impacts unforeseen by the lead agency, the
process itself is rife with complex bureaucratic and legal proceduralism. As this case shows,
identifying a potential issue within an EIS/EIR isn’t in itself sufficient to carry a lawsuit since
there are specific procedures dictating when and how the issue can be raised. Furthermore, even if
the procedures are followed according to official guidelines, the reports themselves can be
extremely dense and lengthy, and therefore potentially inaccessible to all audiences. One of the
points raised by supporters of the anti-prison coalition during the public comment period of the
RCIA was a request for the reports to be made available in Spanish and for a subsequent public
comment period to be held so that people could have time to read the Spanish translation and
provide their feedback.40 This demand lays bare the racialized stakes of this conflict over the
environment and over the possible visions for Delano’s future waged through the state. Such
demands stake a claim over the state processes that control the production of space for the large
number of people within Delano and across California for whom English is not the primary
language used to communicate and for whom the capitalist racial environmental state works to
alienate, marginalize, and render as surplus.
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This comment was submitted by Kevin Bundy and was quoted from in the unpublished appellate
court ruling. See Friends of the Kangaroo Rat v. California Department of Corrections,
Ordered Not Officially Published, Previously Published at 111 Cal. App. 4th 1400, at 33 (2003).
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Sacred Environments: Resisting Militarization through Cultural and
Ecological Preservation

In the previous chapters, I examined the ways in which the EIA process operates alongside Civil
Rights and urban planning policy, and how it can provide an entry point for mobilizing diverse
constituencies in service of a common cause as part of a broader social movement building
strategy. This chapter looks at a case study in which the EIA process provided a platform for
articulating cultural and historical claims over contested and militarized space. As in the previous
chapter where I showed how the EIA process establishes new institutional structures and
mechanisms for the governance of contested racialized space vis-à-vis the Fair Housing Act, this
chapter again looks at how the EIA process and NEPA interact with another federal land use and
placemaking policy, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA). I ask what the
political ramifications might be of thinking about the EIA process as supplementary to the NHPA,
and how linking the two might offer new possibilities for social movement building. I also
examine the ways that culturally specific understandings of and relationships to the environment
get taken up within the EIA process, and ultimately exceed the legal reach of the NEPA, serving as
both an organizing and legal basis for instituting social and environmental change within Mākua.
The case study focus of this chapter is an ongoing series of legal and political battles
between the US Army and a coalition of community organizations over the use of Mākua Valley,
located on the Hawaiian Island of Oʻahu, for military training exercises involving live weapons
and explosives. The contested land has been used by the US military for these “live-fire” training
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exercises since before World War II, back when Hawaiʻi was still a US territory and not yet a state.
Area residents, including many Kānaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians), and other community groups
have been organizing opposition to the military presence in Mākua Valley for decades, including
an ongoing lawsuit against the Army on the basis of a NEPA violation. With a few exceptions, the
military has suspended live-fire training on the contested lands for the duration of the conflict,
and has even opened the site to a limited extent for public visits to archaeological sites and sites
with cultural significance for Kānaka Maoli. This begs the question of what is special about this
case that has caused it to endure for so long, largely in favor of the community groups against the
military, particularly given the post-9/11 state of perpetual US militarization. Through a
NEPA-focused recounting of major events in the history of the Mākua struggle, I address some of
the legal, cultural, political, and geographical issues that have shaped this case and make it useful
for thinking about how the EIA process can operate as a springboard for building and sustaining a
social movement around counter-hegemonic cultural values and Kānaka Maoli racial identity.
Mākua Valley, located on the leeward coast of the Island of Oʻahu within the Hawaiian
Archipelago (see Figure 4.1), has been the focus of a protracted battle between the US Military
and Native Hawaiians, or Kānaka Maoli, and their allies since at least the 1920s. The Valley is
rich with biodiversity, including some 50 endangered or protected species of plants and animals
(US Army Environmental Command and US Army Corps of Engineers 2008). Prior to Western
contact, and dating back hundreds of years, it was home to many Kānaka Maoli, whose homes,
shrines, sites of prayer, and other culturally significant sites remain intact in spite of half a century
of military training and bombing within the Valley (Kelly and Quintal 1977).
The US military initiated its formal occupation of Mākua Valley in 1929 when it acquired
three parcels of land for howitzer emplacements (artillery guns), followed shortly thereafter by
“military games” and amphibious landings on the Waiʻanae coast and Mākua Beach in the 1930s.
Immediately after the Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US government declared
martial law throughout the Territory of Hawaiʻi and seized the entire northwestern tip of Oʻahu
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Figure 4.1. Military installations on the Hawaiian Island of Oʻahu
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including Mākua and Kaʻena for military security and training purposes.1 Over the next half
century, Kānaka Maoli continued using and living at Mākua Beach despite the military
occupation, setting up small communities without permanent structures that endured numerous
evictions; many of these “houseless” people turned to Mākua as a place of refuge, healing, and
peace, or puʻuhonua (Kajihiro 2009; Kelly and Aleck 1997).
In the 1970s, Kānaka Maoli and their allies, including some of the people evicted from
Mākua during World War II, began pushing for the restoration of the Valley and its eventual
return to Kānaka Maoli. These activists were directly inspired by the Kānaka Maoli activists who
fought for and occupied the island of Kahoʻolawe, which was similarly under US military control,
and which spurred the “Hawaiian renaissance” social movement (Kajihiro 2009; Lasky 2010).
The struggle around Kahoʻolawe, led by the group Protect Kahoʻolawe ʻOhana (PKO), not only
inspired the Mākua activists, but as this chapter will show, it provided a template for a legal
campaign based in the NEPA process, as well as a conceptual proto-environmental justice
framework for engaging their struggle as one for the Kānaka Maoli right to protect the land and
renew its use as a place for cultural and spiritual healing, rather than one for war and destruction.
Just as the Mākua campaign would engage the Army through the EIA process, the PKO campaign
secured several legal victories based around the EIA process and the National Historical
Preservation Act (NHPA) that eventually led to the return of the island to the State of Hawaiʻi and
federal funds for the cleanup of environmental toxins and unexploded ordinance across the island
(see Kajihiro 2009).
Though the US military had employed the Mākua Valley for training purposes since the
early 1940s, they never established formal training grounds until 1985. Per the requirements of
the NEPA, the Army prepared an environmental assessment (EA) to construct a company
combined-arms assault course on the Mākua Military Reserve (MMR). The newly constructed
training facility opened in 1988, and training exercises occurred regularly over the next decade
1

Summarized from Kelly and Quintal (1977).
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(US Army Environmental Command and US Army Corps of Engineers 2008, §ES.1). As part of
their activities on the MMR, the Army operated an Open Burn/Open Detonation (OB/OD) facility
within the Valley where they disposed of munitions and unexploded ordinance, as well,
apparently, as various other forms of hazardous waste such as used medical supplies (Aila and
Dodge 2012; Dodge 2014a).2 In 1992, the US EPA published a notice asking for community
input on an Army permit application for the OB/OD area.
In response to the EPA request for input, community members of the Waiʻanae coast
began organizing themselves to figure out what they could do about the OB/OD proposal, and
formed a nonprofit organization called Mālama Mākua (Ruelas 2013; Dodge 2014b). The newly
formed organization initially asked the EPA to extend the public comment period since they only
began organizing community members toward the end of the originally scheduled period. They
then pressed the EPA to require the Army to prepare a full EIS to assess the impact of OB/OD and
training activities on the local environment. The Army initiated, but never completed, an
environmental study in 1994, which Dodge (2014b) attributes to Army’s discovery of “dirty stuff:
chemical toxins, heavy metals” within the MMR. Following the Army’s abandonment of their
initial environmental study, Mālama Mākua continued to organize community members in honor
and service of Mākua Valley, with its next big push coming several years later in 1998.

Live-Fire and Brush Fires

Between 1988 and 1998, the Army conducted numerous live-fire training exercises at MMR.
Throughout this time, brush fires triggered by artillery fire landing outside of designated areas, as
well as controlled burns that escalated out of control, became a relatively common occurrence at
MMR, with at least 270 documented fires occurring through mid-1998 (Ruelas 2013; Dodge
2014b). Though the fires rarely posed any imminent safety risk to civilian populations because of
2

See also Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (2001).
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the limited access to MMR, many area residents felt disconcerted by the fires and other training
activities at MMR (Earthjustice 2000). So when a series of training-related brush fires burned
throughout the Mākua Valley in 1998, culminating with a massive four-day fire that burned around
800 acres, area residents, with the support of the community-based organization Mālama Mākua,
took action to stop the fires from continuing to desecrate the Valley and its numerous sacred sites.
Immediately following the large 1998 fire, Mālama Mākua sent a letter to the Army
indicating its intent to sue, prompting the Army to halt further training exercises and initiate
consultations with the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to determine the effect of training on
endangered species, in accordance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA).3 As part of their
consultation with the FWS, the Army prepared a “Wildfire Management Plan” and the “Mākua
Endangered Species Mitigation Plan”. At the same time, the FWS prepared their own study, the
“Biological Opinion for Routine Military Training at MMR”. These three documents provide an
assessment of the specific impacts of live-fire training and wildfires started by training activities
on endangered species, and outline measures and procedures for potentially minimizing risks and
impacts, though some of the recommendations were “experimental in nature” without a guarantee
of success.4 Though intended as a show of good faith of the Army’s commitment to following
through with their obligations under the ESA, and to provide substantive evidence that their
training activities would not cause unmitigated risks to endangered species within the MMR,
these documents would ultimately serve as evidence to the contrary in the hands of Mālama
Mākua over the ensuing years.
A month after the fire, in October 1998, Mālama Mākua, represented by the
environmental law organization Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, filed a lawsuit demanding the
Army evaluate the environmental impacts of the live-fire training exercises under the
requirements of the NEPA. Seeing the damage wreaked on the Valley by the brush fire, Mālama
3
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Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (2001).
FWS qtd. in Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 (2001).
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Mākua wanted to ensure that the Army was held accountable for their activities in the Valley to
avoid future incidents and to formally document the impacts that their training exercises were
having on the cultural and ecological resources within the Valley. The legal strategy resulted in a
settlement agreement between Mālama Mākua and the Army in September 1999, in which the
Army agreed not to conduct any training activities at MMR until at least 30 days after completing
a NEPA document that evaluated the impacts of all of the training activities they planned for the
MMR (Earthjustice 1999).5
Nearly a year after entering into the settlement agreement, the Army circulated a Draft
Supplemental Environmental Assessment (SEA) for public comment in September 2000. At the
request of community members, the Army held two public hearings regarding the Draft SEA, and
received over 130 formal comments. One of the important things to note about the Draft SEA is
that it recognized the presence of numerous endangered species whose habitat overlapped the
MMR, including 32 plants, two birds, one mammal, and one snail, plus an additional 16
threatened species or species of concern. It further recognized wildfires from training activities as
the primary threat to the Mākua ecosystem, and that damage to the native foliage from wildfires
would likely allow invasive plants to take over and increase risks to threatened and endangered
species.6 In conjunction with the Wildland Fire Management Plan, it was clear to Mālama Mākua
and its allies that the Army’s training activities at MMR would result in additional fires, and that
these fires posed significant threats to the endangered and protected species inhabiting the Mākua
Valley: “[f]ires are inevitable and will start on Army training lands due to the availability of
vegetative fuels and the mere nature of the Army’s mission — to conduct livefire training
exercises using various types of ammunition, pyrotechnics, and weapon systems.”7
Despite the over 130 public comments submitted to the Army in response to the SEA
5

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (2001).
Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (2001).
7
Wildland Fire Management Plan qtd. in Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1209
(2001).
6
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urging further examination of the impacts and alternatives to live-fire training at MMR, in
December 2000, the Army followed the Draft SEA by issuing a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) that stated, “because no significant impacts would result from implementing the
proposed action an [EIS] is not required and will not be prepared.”8 In conjunction with the
issuance of the FONSI, the Army held a public meeting to announce the results of their
investigation, during which they received many more comments from community members
raising questions about their findings of no significant environmental impacts due to training
activities. As a result of the continued public pressure, they scheduled another community town
hall meeting, to be held just over a month after the publication of the FONSI, at which time they
would receive additional public comments to be considered before making a decision about
resuming training at MMR.9 Importantly, the date the Army proposed for the town hall meeting
fell outside of the 30-day waiting period required before the Army could resume training after
publishing its SEA and FONSI under the settlement agreement entered with Mālama Mākua the
prior year. Therefore, Mālama Mākua immediately filed a new lawsuit against the Army,
charging that the SEA and FONSI were inadequate to fully address the extent of probable
environmental impacts and didn’t fully consider other possible alternatives to training in Mākua
specifically. They argued that the Army needed to prepare a full EIS in order to address the
outstanding concerns of its members as well as the rest of the community members who
responded during the public hearings and open comment periods (Earthjustice 2000).10
Mālama Mākua and their allies rallied over 500 people at the Army’s community town
hall meeting, with 677 written comments and 64 oral testimonies about the Army’s actions. The
Army subsequently withdrew the SEA and FONSI, then petitioned the district court to dismiss the
pending lawsuit. The Army claimed that because they had withdrawn the NEPA documents, the
lawsuit lacked “ripeness,” or the requirement that a case be non-hypothetical and fit for judicial
8

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (2001).
Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (2001).
10
Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (2001).
9
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review—in the same way that ripe fruits are ready to be eaten, ripe cases are ready for legal
consumption. The Army further argued that even if the requirements for ripeness were satisfied,
they had already withdrawn the NEPA documents, rendering the lawsuit “moot”, or without legal
consequences, because the basis for Mālama Mākua’s case was documents that were no longer
active.11 Mootness is an important concept in NEPA litigation that is closely related to both
standing and ripeness. If a case is moot at a particular moment in time, it essentially means that
standing is forfeit because if the outcome of a judgment has no relevant consequences for either
party, then there is no relief from harm or injury-in-fact, and thus, the requirements for standing
are no longer met (Fogleman 1990). Whereas standing is determined at the time the lawsuit is
filed, mootness is dynamic and depends on the party’s actions throughout the lifetime of a case
(Fogleman 1990). In this case, the court ruled against the Army, asserting that the case was ripe at
the time Mālama Mākua filed the lawsuit, and that the case was not moot because the Army had
not met its burden of proof for showing that they wouldn’t simply resume their actions once the
case was dismissed.12 Being that standing, ripeness, and non-mootness are keys to carrying
forward a NEPA lawsuit, and the ease with which seemingly minor technicalities can prevent a
plaintiff from meeting the requirements for each, this ruling was an important victory for Mālama
Mākua (Fogleman 1990). Interestingly, this particular ruling has been cited as precedent on
numerous occasions for its clarification of the need to test for ripeness at the time that litigation is
entered, and to allow the court to control its docket.
Having been denied its request to dismiss the pending litigation, the Army published a
revised SEA and FONSI in May 2001. The major points of revision concerned the scale and
scope of the proposed training exercises the Army would conduct at the MMR, with the general
11
12

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (2001).
Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (2001). See also Pension Trust Fund for
Operating Engineers Local 3 v. Mcmorgan & Company, Dist. Court, ED California (2007);
Molokai Veterans v. County of Maui, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii (2011); Krakauer v. Indymac
Mortgage Services, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii (2013).

144

CHAPTER 4. SACRED ENVIRONMENTS
trend being toward reduction of risk of wildfires, but also with the exclusion of future OB/OD
activities, relating back to the issue that initially triggered the formation of Mālama Mākua in
1992.13 Like the previous NEPA documents, the May 2001 SEA and FONSI concluded that the
environmental impact of their proposed training exercises was not significant, and therefore, that
no additional NEPA investigations such as an EIS were necessary. Unswayed, Mālama Mākua
and Earthjustice responded to the Army by issuing another request to the district court to require
the Army to conduct a full EIS since the changes made to the SEA and FONSI did not address
their underlying concerns that the proposed live-fire trainings still posed a threat to the cultural
and ecological resources in the Valley. The district court issued a preliminary ruling in July 2001,
prior to a full hearing of arguments from both parties, which renewed the ban on live-fire training
until the court had a chance to hear arguments from the parties and weigh on the full merits of the
case and issue a final ruling regarding the need for the Army to conduct a full EIS; the judge
scheduled this hearing for October 29, 2001.14
The preliminary ruling issued by the district court is significant from both legal and
political standpoints. On the one hand, the judge in her ruling provides reasonable explanation for
the preliminary injunction, ore the decision to ban live-fire training until the full trial scheduled
for a few months later. The judge points out on several occasions that doubts raised by Mālama
Mākua’s and Earthjustice’s arguments as to the insufficiency of the Army’s SEA and error in
issuing a FONSI point to “sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make the case a fair
ground for litigation.”15 Furthermore, the decision points out that the preliminary injunction
would only remain in place until the full hearing a few months later, and that live-fire training had
“not occurred at MMR for almost three years; another few months [would] not cause irreparable
13

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (2001).
Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (2001); Mālama Mākua v. Hagel, Case
Docket, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket 1-00-cv-00813-SOM-LEK (2002).
http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/1ox9n8cp/hawaii-district-court/malama-makua-v-gates-et-al/.
15
Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1204, 1215-1217, 1219-1220 (2001).
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harm,” particularly given the Army’s actions to that point:
The Army voluntarily suspended livefire training exercises at MMR in 1998 and
[had] not trained there for almost three years. In December 2000, the Army issued
a ‘final’ EA and FONSI, but subsequently withdrew it to address community
concerns. This voluntary withdrawal caused a five-month delay in this case. The
Army cannot now come into this court and say that national security will be
jeopardized by a delay of a few months to determine this case on the merits.16
On both points, the judge relied on the legal standards for “preliminary injunctive relief” in
weighing and deciding in favor of Mālama Mākua.17 Though the standards for preliminary
injunctive relief, and NEPA-related injunctions in general vary slightly by jurisdiction, they are
relatively clearly defined, and the evidence viewed by the courts provided strong justification that
the criteria for an injunction were clearly met (Fogleman 1990). In this regard, the judge was
clear in her application of law to the issuance of an injunction despite its preliminary nature and
without having heard the full evidence of a trial on the merits of Mālama Mākua’s claims, and
thus providing Mālama Mākua a somewhat minor, yet important and decisive victory nonetheless
(cf. Gartland 2012). On the other hand, in partially weighing the merits of issuing a preliminary
injunction based on the evidence of the public interest in avoiding the potential environmental
harms caused by live-fire training against the public interest of national security, the judge entered
the murky waters of addressing political questions through the application of law.18
In a law review article arguing the case for a national security exemption to NEPA, and
with direct reference to the decision in Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, Major Charles J. Gartland
(2012) argues: “To enjoin a national defense operation or activity because of a NEPA violation
16

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-1222 (2001).
Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (2001). See also Fogleman (1990).
18
In legal studies, this is what is known as the “political question doctrine,” or the question of
whether or not a court is the appropriate jurisdiction for ruling on an issue that is decidedly
political, or if instead those decisions should be reserved per Constitutional and statutory law,
for the legislative or executive branches of government. See Tushnet (2002); Mourtada-Sabbah
and Cain (2007); Gartland (2012).
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not only elevates a procedural statute above national defense priorities, but also opens a path to
elevating the judicial branch over the executive and legislative” (30). Although Gartland’s
argument in many ways hinges on the potentially problematic notion of military exceptionalism,
and to a lesser degree, the executive prerogative power in issues of national security, the question
of NEPA’s relationship to other national priorities and statutes, and whether the judiciary is within
its discretionary bounds to weigh those priorities is indeed interesting. The court plays a contested
role in balancing its power between the political and judicious in assessing the merits of
arguments that lie between opposing national priorities and statutes. This is a similar but distinct
issue from the one at play in the previously discussed case of Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood
Council v. Karlen (“Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council V. Karlen” 1980), where the court
weighed NEPA against various aspects of Civil Rights and Fair Housing legislation (see Chapter
2).19 In Strycker’s Bay, the legal conflict arising in the lower courts was that the court overrode
and assigned priority in agency decision making that held different priorities in tension, whereas
in Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, the court evaluated priorities between different public interests as
they factored into their consideration of the merits going toward issuing a preliminary injunction,
not as they factored into the actual agency decision making process under NEPA. The judge’s
ruling in favor of Mālama Mākua was grounded in the argument that the public interest in
protecting Kānaka Maoli cultural and historical artifacts and endangered species outweighed the
particular national security interests represented by live-fire training exercises conducted
specifically at the MMR. On this point, the judge evaluated the Army’s arguments for overriding
consideration and determined that they had not met the steep burden of demonstrating that the
preliminary injunction against live-fire training would cause them significant or irreparable harm.
19

Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 US 223 (1980).
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Reaching a Settlement to Sustain the Fight

During the court hearing in which the judge granted Mālama Mākua a preliminary injunction, the
judge scheduled a follow-up hearing to evaluate the full merits of the lawsuit for October 29,
2001. The events of September 11, 2001 created a state of military emergency that Mālama
Mākua found difficult to ignore. Prior to the final district court hearing, Mālama Mākua and the
Army reached a “Settlement Agreement and Settlement Agreement” (henceforth “Settlement
Agreement”), which was approved by the Hawaiʻi District Court, allowing the Army to conduct
limited live-fire training exercises while it prepared a full EIS (Earthjustice 2001). Mālama
Mākua’s concession was a strategic way of ensuring that the Army still committed to an EIS in
the face of a court hearing in which the Army’s evocation of a state of emergency due to national
security concerns could be construed by the court as an overriding factor weighing in the Army’s
favor (Kajihiro 2009; see Fogleman 1990). Rather than risk a court ruling overriding the NEPA
considerations altogether due to the onslaught of national security exceptions passed in the wake
of September 11, Mālama Mākua agreed to allow the Army to conduct live-fire training exercises
while preserving their ability to return to a legal challenge to the Army’s NEPA requirements at a
later date and later stage in the NEPA process.
Owing to the iterative, multi-step NEPA process, public intervention and litigation is not
necessarily constrained to a single point within the EIA process, though it should be pointed out
that the standards for legal ripeness require an agency action to be finalized before judicial review
(Fogleman 1990). In this case, the initial lawsuit filed by Mālama Mākua in 1998 challenged the
Army’s attempt to skirt the NEPA requirements altogether—a situation that was ripe prior to
initiating the EIA process because of the Army’s statutory obligations under the NEPA. As
previously discussed, the second lawsuit challenging the Army’s “final” FONSI was ripe at the
time the lawsuit was filed due to the initial FONSI being a final decision not to produce an EIS
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despite the Army withdrawing it before the trial.20 By entering into the Settlement Agreement,
the Army agreed to produce a full EIS, which could then be challenged again once it was finalized
and ripe for judicial review. Entering into the Settlement Agreement also meant that there was a
legally binding agreement between the Army and Mālama Mākua that could be used to hold the
Army accountable under contract law prior to ripeness under NEPA, in addition to the provisions
under the NEPA and APA. Had the Settlement Agreement not been agreed upon and the case
went to trial and if the Army prevailed on the merits or on the overriding consideration for
national security prevailing at the time, the Army’s FONSI would be allowed to stand as the final
decision in the NEPA process, and excepting the judicial appeals process, would effectively close
the door to future challenges to live-fire training under the NEPA.
The Settlement Agreement between the Army and Mālama Mākua contained several
provisions to which the Army was required to adhere: 1) prepare an EIS addressing, in the least,
impacts to cultural and biological resources at MMR, as well as air, soil, and water contamination
due to live-fire training; 2) establish a $50,000 technical assistance fund for hiring independent
experts to evaluate and interpret the EIS studies for community members; 3) clear unexploded
ordinance (UXO) from MMR to protect the public and improve access to important cultural sites;
4) as much as feasible, transport munitions throughout the Waiʻanae Coast communities via
helicopter, and when infeasible, over land during non-peak traffic times and times when children
would be traveling to and from school; 5) allow public access to cultural sites on MMR at least
twice per month, and overnight camping on MMR at least twice per year; 6) conduct a maximum
of 37 company maneuver combined arms live-fire exercises over the subsequent three years (16
in the first year, 9 in the second year, and 12 in the third year); 7) halt live-fire training at MMR
after the third year if the EIS was still not completed. Over the course of the initial three-year
duration of the Settlement Agreement, the Army would conduct 26 training exercises, foregoing
11 of their agreed upon opportunities for additional training events (Earthjustice 2005).
20

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (2001).
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Though in many ways the Settlement Agreement represented a significant ideological
concession to the Army on the part of Mālama Mākua, the terms agreed upon ensured that the
dispute over Mākua Valley would not end and that the efforts aimed at ultimately returning the
Valley to Kānaka Maoli would endure. Obviously, the terms requiring the Army to complete a full
EIS documenting the impacts of their proposed activities meant that the NEPA process would
continue despite the temporary allowance for live-fire training activities. Additionally, the
technical assistance fund provision meant that the dense technoscientific language and analyses of
the EIS could be independently verified and held to expert scrutiny on behalf of the community.
But central to the broader objectives of Mālama Mākua’s struggle were the points within the
Settlement Agreement that guaranteed access to the Valley and provided greater assurances of the
safety of visitors to the Valley, local residents, and the cultural artifacts, sacred sites, and
endangered species within the Valley, all in spite of the Army’s resumption of live-fire training
and high wildfire-risk activities. In particular, allowing public access to and overnight stays
within Mākua Valley meant that Mālama Mākua, their “sister organization” Hui Mālama ʻO
Mākua, and the rest of their allies could begin engaging in activities aimed at restoring and
returning the Valley to non-military, culturally and spiritually appropriate uses for Kānaka Maoli
including, but not exclusive to, the families and descendants of those displaced by the military
occupation of the land, and those whose ancestors lived on or are buried within the Valley (Aila
and Dodge 2012; Dodge 2014a).
The majority of Mālama Mākua members identify as Kānaka Maoli, and according to
board member and spokesperson Fred Dodge (2014a), the organization’s primary objective is to
bring an end to the US military destruction and desecration of Mākua Valley and to have it
returned to the families of those Kānaka Maoli dispossessed and displaced by the military’s use of
the Valley since World War II. In addition to their legal strategy against the Army, Mālama Mākua
has focused much of its energies in restorative practices and efforts to reconnect Kānaka Maoli
with the Valley. For example, they organize regular visits to sacred sites and overnight stays
within Mākua Valley, and they contribute to film, print, and web productions to spread
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information about their work and struggles (Cole 2002; Aila and Dodge 2012; Ruelas 2013;
Dodge 2014a). The importance of this organizing work in supporting the legal efforts aimed at
the EIA process are analyzed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter.
Though their organizing efforts find Mālama Mākua at odds with the Army, Dodge
consistently insists that the organization is “not anti-military,” but rather, “pro-peace and
pro-Mākua” (qtd. in Ruelas 2013).21 However, perhaps because of the litigious relationship
between Mālama Mākua and the Army, a number of community members chose not to join
Mālama Mākua, and instead formed a “sister organization” called Hui Mālama ʻO Mākua (Dodge
2014a). Hui Mālama ʻO Mākua has been involved in community organizing activities,
particularly things related to documenting and reviving Kānaka Maoli cultural practices at Mākua,
but also things such as protests, publicity campaigns, and providing feedback on environmental
reports generated by the Army (Ruelas 2013). In addition to Mālama Mākua and Hui Mālama ʻO
Mākua, the movement to reclaim Mākua from the military and return it to Kānaka Maoli is
supported by the organizations Koa Mana and the American Friends Service Committee Hawaiʻi
Area Program, now reincarnated as Hawaiʻi Peace and Justice – Na Pua Hoʻāla i ka Pono (Ruelas
2013; Hawaiʻi Peace and Justice 2016). Koa Mana is an organization that represents the Waiʻanae
residents who were evicted from Mākua Valley in and after 1929 when the US government seized
control of Mākua and Kaʻena (Kakesako 1998). Its members hold that their ancestral lineage
bestows upon them the duty to act as stewards of the land, and as cultural practitioners, to make
decisions and provide guidance on behalf of the land once it is returned to the people by the
military (Ruelas 2013). Hawaiʻi Peace and Justice is the most explicitly anti-military organization
within the coalition, with the demilitarization of Hawaiʻi and “addressing both the local impacts
and global consequences of the military presence in Hawaiʻi” being two of the organization’s
primary objectives (Hawaiʻi Peace and Justice 2016). Along with other unaffiliated residents of
Waiʻanae and allies throughout Hawaiʻi, this coalition was able to build a movement around their
21

See also Dodge (2014b).
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shared visions for what Mākua Valley could become through Kānaka Maoli stewardship in the
absence of military occupation, or at least a long-term ban of live-fire military training exercises
and constant environmental destruction.
In July 2003, two years into the Settlement Agreement, another large brush fire consumed
at least 2,500 acres of MMR after a “prescribed burn” started by the Army crossed firebreaks and
went out of control (25th ID (L) Public Affairs Office 2003; Earthjustice 2003; Gordon 2003).
The fire, which was initiated to clear brush to aid in clearing UXO, caused the detonation of UXO,
destroyed endangered species habitat, and likely killed a number of endangered or protected
species. But it ironically also revealed previously undiscovered historically significant
archaeological sites as well as the discovery of additional endangered species (Schaefers 2003;
Kayal 2003). In response to the fire, Mālama Mākua pressed the Army to resume its consultations
with the FWS, then followed up with another lawsuit in March 2004, which resulted in a
temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the use of the MMR from further training exercises
(Earthjustice 2004).22
Interestingly, the 2004 court decision granting a TRO against the Army recognizes the
priority given to the Endangered Species Act in weighing the merits for allowing training
exercises to occur given the risks they posed to endangered species habitat, however the decision
also states that an argument evoking “national emergencies” would trump the priority given to the
ESA.23 Yet the Army chose not to rely on the national security trump card and the court sided
with Mālama Mākua in granting the TRO. There is no clear reason why the Army did not evoke
national security, but it may have had something to do with the desire to maintain an amicable
22

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order”, Document 121, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No. cv-04-00176-SOM-LEK, March
19, 2004.
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relationship with the local community and preserve the trust it seems it was trying to build as an
environmental steward in the Mākua Valley and elsewhere throughout the Hawaiian Islands (see
US Army Environmental Command and US Army Corps of Engineers 2008, secs. 3.9–3.10;
Ruelas 2013). Had the Army evoked national security, it’s likely that people within the
community, and certainly those backing Mālama Mākua, would have been extremely upset that
the Army skirted environmental policy to get their way. Such actions would also have potential
negative ramifications for another simultaneous NEPA lawsuit against the Army on the Big Island
of Hawaiʻi that was being fought by the same environmental law organization, Earthjustice, and
sponsored by some of the same environmental justice and anti-militarization activists as in the
Mākua case.24

The Draft EIS

Finally, in July 2005, the Army circulated a Draft EIS (DEIS) for its training activities at MMR,
nearly a year later than agreed upon in the October 2001 Settlement Agreement. The Army held
public hearings and received public comments immediately thereafter, during which they received
71 oral, and 38 written comments (US Army Environmental Command and US Army Corps of
Engineers 2008, sec. 1.6). At the start of the comment period, Earthjustice submitted a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Army regarding the Army’s claim that only training at
Mākua would accomplish the proposed objectives.25 In their written comments to the DEIS,
Earthjustice noted that they had not received a response to their request within the comment
period, and therefore the comment period was too short their comments were incomplete. As a
result, the Army held a second round of public hearings and open comment period between
24
25

ʻIlioʻUlaokalani Coalition, et. al v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. 3d 1083 (2006).
Henkin, David. Comments submitted to US Army Re: Mākua Military Reservation Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (October 6, 2005). Copied in the “Supplemental Draft
Environmental Impact Statement: Military Training Activities at Makua Military Reservation,
Hawaiʻi” (August 2008).
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February and April 2007, a year and a half after the DEIS was initially circulated.
Though Earthjustice’s FOIA request and the subsequent extension of the public comment
period are relatively mundane points of procedure, they highlight the strategic planning on the
part of Earthjustice, both for utilizing the FOIA process to obtain additional information not
included in the Army’s NEPA documents, as well as to maintain legal pressure on the Army for
complying with the NEPA. By submitting a FOIA request, Earthjustice intended to scrutinize the
Army’s claim that training at Mākua was unique in being able to meet the Army’s training and
troop preparedness needs, versus the possible alternatives of reduced scale and scope training
exercises at Mākua, training at other facilities, or taking no further action. In particular,
Earthjustice wanted to substantiate their argument that the no further action alternative was likely
sufficient for troop readiness given that the Army had already functioned without full use of the
MMR training facility for long periods of time while still deploying troops to combat zones
abroad. Furthermore, by noting that their comments were necessarily incomplete due to the lack
of response from the Army to the FOIA request, Earthjustice essentially forced the Army’s hand,
requiring them to either extend or reopen the comment period, or risk another lawsuit for
noncompliance with NEPA and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). While it is not entirely
uncommon for an agency to extend the public comment period during the EIA process, in this
case it is clear that Earthjustice was able to force the Army to do so through their strategic FOIA
maneuver. The additional public comment period further delayed the Army’s ability to act on the
DEIS and gave community members additional time to review and submit comments on the
DEIS, and ultimately, prolonged the duration of the TRO pending finalization of the EIA process.
Late in 2005, after circulating the DEIS and concluding the first public comment period,
the Army petitioned the court to modify the Settlement Agreement to allow additional training
exercises despite still not having completed the full EIA process a year after the date agreed upon
in the Settlement Agreement. The Army argued that changed circumstances, namely that the US
was engaged in protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, warranted revisiting the terms of the
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Settlement Agreement. The court decision points out, however, “The Settlement Agreement was
entered into after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and in contemplation of war, the main
circumstances the Army identifie[d] as a change.”26 In addition to the contractual factors of
modifying the Settlement Agreement, the court revealed its underlying interpretation of the
material arguments against the Army:
Adequate training is undeniably critical. Without it, soldiers surely face increased
risk of injury and death. But the Army does not establish for this court that training
will only be adequate if live fire training occurs at Mākua. Mākua is the habitat of
numerous endangered species. Associated with Native Hawaiian deities, Mākua
Valley is sacred land to Native Hawaiians. The record shows that there are other
training venues, that many of the soldiers are scheduled to be trained elsewhere,
and that the need for further training at Mākua can only be determined after that
other training has occurred. If training at Mākua is essential, it is the Army’s
burden on this motion to show that. The Army does not do that.27
It is clear from the court decision that the judge in the case took very seriously her charge
to consider the importance of the ESA and NHPA without blindly yielding to the idea of national
security. Indeed, throughout the court decision, the judge makes clear that the state of emergency
following the September 11, 2001 attacks was the overriding consideration that led both parties to
enter into the Settlement Agreement in anticipation of the deployment of troops abroad, and
therefore, the Army’s argument that unforeseen conditions warranting a change in the Settlement
Agreement was completely unfounded since it knowingly entered the agreement for the sole
purpose of utilizing MMR to prepare troops for combat over the three year period in which they
agreed to conduct a full EIS. But the judge didn’t stop there. In reiterating the arguments laid out
by Mālama Mākua and Earthjustice regarding the sacredness of Mākua Valley and the lack of
26
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clear evidence pointing to the Army’s dependence on live-fire training at MMR for troop
readiness, the judge demonstrated the potential flexibility of judicial discretion in interpreting the
applicability of the NEPA and related statutes to Kānaka Maoli cultural, and to a limited extent,
sovereign claims over the protection of the environment (cf. Gartland 2012). The obvious
limitation to this is that the sovereign claims to environmental stewardship depend upon the
inviolability of the US state and jurisprudence, and on the framing of culturally significant sites as
legible within the purview of the NHPA. But it is nonetheless impressive that the judge so clearly
staked out a position that endorsed the cultural significance of Mākua Valley to Kānaka Maoli.
In response to the Army’s request to modify the 2001 Settlement Agreement, Mālama
Mākua countered with their own request that the court act to enforce the Settlement Agreement in
early 2006. They charged that the DEIS circulated by the Army did not sufficiently cover all of
the environmental studies that they had agreed to in the Settlement Agreement and it requested
that the Army reinstate access to all of the cultural sites to which the Army had banned access in
2005 (discussed below). After a series of exchanges, the parties were able to resolve the issue
outside of the courtroom; Mālama Mākua partially withdrew their complaint in anticipation of a
new Joint Stipulation and Partial Settlement (“Joint Stipulation”), which was subsequently
certified by the same district court in January 2007. The Joint Stipulation expanded on and
reiterated the requirements of the previous Settlement Agreement by requiring the Army to
conduct additional surface and subsurface archaeological surveys and to conduct a marine
resources study to determine past or probable future contamination of marine resources that
Waiʻanae residents depend upon for subsistence. Both the archaeological survey and marine
resources survey were to be incorporated into the full EIS for training activities, and both required
public comment periods to allow feedback from members of the community.28
28

Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Joint Stipulation RE: Partial Settlement of Plaintiff’s Motion to
Enforce the October 4, 2001 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order”, Document 149, Dist.
Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No. 1:00-cv-00813-som-lek, January 5, 2007.
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The 2007 Joint Stipulation and Partial Settlement

On its face, the new Joint Stipulation was not a significant departure from earlier settlements
between the two parties. Essentially, Mālama Mākua and Earthjustice were simply making sure
that the Army followed through with additional portions of the EIS agreed upon in the 2001
Settlement Agreement but which were not adequately addressed in the 2005 DEIS. Rather, what
makes this development in the case interesting is the matter of cultural access to sites within the
MMR left. One of the provisions of Mālama Mākua’s request for enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement was that cultural access to sacred sites within the MMR be restored after having been
unilaterally declared off-limits by the Army in January 2005. The original 2001 Settlement
Agreement granted residents of the Waiʻanae area, including Mālama Mākua and Hui Mālama ʻO
Mākua, access to cultural sites located within the MMR. In the immediate aftermath of the
Settlement Agreement, the Army granted access to over a dozen such cultural sites. The only
condition under which the Army was allowed to modify access to the MMR was in direct
consultation with Mālama Mākua and other Kānaka Maoli cultural practitioners. It further
required that the Army prioritize the clearing of UXO within the MMR to increase access to these
and other cultural sites. The Army’s unilateral decision to rescind access to cultural sites
previously open to community members due to safety concerns from UXO was in direct violation
of the terms of the Settlement Agreement (Hoover 2007).29 Thus, the request made by Mālama
Mākua for enforcement of the Settlement Agreement was intended both as a way of maintaining
pressure on the Army to complete the EIA process through the archaeological survey and marine
resources study, and as a way of working toward the broader objectives of Hawaiian placemaking
in Mākua by forcing the Army to improve and restore access to cultural sites within the MMR that
29

Mālama Mākua v. Rumsfeld, “Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Modify Settlement
Agreement and Stipulated Order”, Document 141, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No.
1:00-cv-00-00813-SOM-LEK, February 2, 2006. Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Amended Order
Enforcing 2001 Settlement Agreement”, Document 188, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No.
1:00-cv-00813-SOM-LEK, April 9, 2008.
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had unjustly been banned the previous year. However, the directives within the Joint Stipulation
were confined solely to those parts of the Settlement Agreement dealing with the EIA process,
and explicitly excluded any provisions for, and thus leaving unresolved and legally still in effect,
Mālama Mākua’s complaint about the Army’s ban on access to cultural sites within the MMR.30
It wasn’t until 2008, when the Army had still not completely restored access to all of the
cultural sites, that Mālama Mākua exercised their option left open by the Joint Stipulation to
renew their legal complaint that the Army was in violation of the Settlement Agreement by not
restoring access to all of the cultural sites. The court sided with Mālama Mākua, not because the
Army’s revocation of access to cultural sites due to safety concerns violated the Settlement
Agreement, per se, but because their decision to modify public access to cultural sites was made
unilaterally and without prior consultation with Kānaka Maoli practitioners. The immediate
outcome from this decision was a court order for the Army to prepare quarterly reports updating
both the court and Mālama Mākua of their progress toward identifying “high priority” sites for
UXO clearance, as well as their plans for and progress toward the clearance activities.31 Over the
next year, the two parties returned to the court on several further occasions to debate the scope,
timing, and content of the Army’s quarterly progress reports and identification of sites for UXO
clearance, all without much actual progress toward the clearance of UXO or restoration of access
to cultural sites.32 Resolving these conflicts over UXO clearance, the court issued an order in
30

Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Joint Stipulation RE: Partial Settlement of Plaintiff’s Motion to
Enforce the October 4, 2001 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order”, Document 149, Dist.
Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No. 1:00-cv-00813-SOM-LEK, January 5, 2007.
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Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Amended Order Enforcing 2001 Settlement Agreement”, Document
188, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No. 1:00-cv-00813-SOM-LEK, April 9, 2008.
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Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Order enforcing 2001 settlement agreement”, Document 179, Dist.
Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No. 1:00-cv-00813-SOM-LEK, March 11, 2008. Mālama Mākua v.
Gates, “Order granting in part and denying in part Mālama Mākua’s motion to amend order
enforcing 2001 settlement agreement”, Document 187, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No.
1:00-cv-00813-SOM-LEK, April 9, 2008. Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Order denying defendants’
motion to dismiss complaint”, Document 20, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No.
1:00-cv-00327-SOM-LEK, October 24, 2008.
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January 2009 requiring the Army to identify high priority sites for UXO clearance; the Army
acquiesced, and after two rounds of public review and comments, published its final list of 22
sites that would be given first priority for UXO clearance (US Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2009b).33
Surveying the cultural sites and clearing UXO proved to be an extremely slow process,
and though access to a limited number of cultural sites was temporarily reinstated, the accidental
detonation of UXO resulted in complete closure of the MMR to cultural site visits as well as
maintenance workers until April 2016 (US Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2016). Once the Army
finalized its list of high priority sites for UXO clearance in 2009, they began contracting people to
conduct ground surveys of those sites in search of UXO and other potential safety hazards (US
Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2009b). The UXO clearance process involves numerous steps, including
the initial ground and/or subsurface survey, identifying potential safety hazards associated with a
particular site, conducting safety reviews, getting requisite permits for clearing UXO, and then
actually disposing of the UXO in an appropriate manner. Each time an “anomaly” is discovered
through the site surveys, the Army potentially needs to consult the NHPA and ESA and request
approvals from various agencies before acting to further identify, dispose of, or detonate the
uncovered munitions. These intermediate bureaucratic steps are necessary to ensure the safety of
both personnel and archaeological and ecological resources in the presence of potentially deadly
explosives and other munitions (US Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2010a). Additionally, the process
was repeatedly hampered by the environment itself; roads and trails washed out by heavy rains
encumbered access for both contractors and cultural practitioners, and thick vegetation required
pruning to maintain access (e.g., US Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2009a; US Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi
2014).
All of the steps involved in clearing UXO that slowed progress ultimately proved to be
33

Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss”, Document 23, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No. 1:09-cv-00369-SOM-RIP,
November 18, 2009.
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wholly warranted as the risks of inadvertently detonating UXO became clear when, in April 2015,
two civilian workers employed to prune vegetation near one of the cultural sites were hospitalized
with injuries suffered after previously undiscovered UXO accidentally detonated (US Army
Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2015c; Cole 2015). As a result of the explosion, the Army halted further
activities throughout the MMR, including UXO clearance and cultural site visits (US Army
Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2015b). The MMR remained closed for one year while the Army conducted an
investigation into the explosion and consulted with the US Army Technical Center for Explosives
Safety on their plans for future UXO clearance throughout the MMR. Limited access to cultural
sites by the public resumed in April 2016, as did vegetation management activities related to
further UXO clearance (US Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2016).
The conflict between Mālama Mākua and the Army regarding the clearance of UXO from
the MMR and reopening all of the high-priority cultural sites to public access is significant to this
case for two reasons. First, maintaining access to cultural sites is central to the Kānaka Maoli
placemaking process and the broader objective of reclaiming Mākua Valley as a Hawaiian place
of peace, healing, and engaging in cultural practices. Second, because access to the MMR is for
cultural site visits is included as a provision of the 2001 Settlement Agreement and subsequent
court enforcement orders, the Army is legally obligated to complete UXO clearance and
eventually reinstate access to all of the cultural sites identified as being a high priority by the
Army in consultation with members of Mālama Mākua, Hui Mālama ’O Mākua, and the greater
Waiʻanae and Kānaka Maoli communities. The legal obligation means that, even when a final EIS
is published and a Record of Decision recorded per the NEPA, 2001 Settlement Agreement, and
2007 Joint Stipulation, they will still not be allowed to commence any of the proposed live-fire
training activities until the district court determines that all of the conditions of the Settlement
Agreement are met, including clearance of UXO and allowing access to cultural sites within the
MMR. Essentially, this means that the case brought by Mālama Mākua against the Army under
the NEPA to compel the preparation of a full EIS was parlayed into a much broader case requiring
the Army to take affirmative steps toward making Mākua Valley a Hawaiian place, and holding
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them legally accountable beyond the scope of the official EIA process.

The Archaeological Survey and Marine Resources Study

Mālama Mākua and Earthjustice continued pressing the Army through legal avenues and
community input during public feedback periods to complete the archaeological survey such that
it addressed the entire site and not just in places convenient to the Army, and that the marine
resources study be conducted in such a way that it tested for toxins introduced to the environment
from training exercises in a range of aquatic species that was consistent with the subsistence diets
of Waiʻanae residents.34 Following the Joint Stipulation in 2007, the Army circulated their
Archaeological Subsurface Survey and Marine Resources Study required under the 2001
Settlement Agreement. Mālama Mākua and Earthjustice objected to the sufficiency of these
studies, and over the course of the next two years, pursued a legal remedy by requesting that the
court enforce the Settlement Agreement by requiring the Army to redo parts of each study.
Meanwhile, the Army published a Final EIS and Record of Decision (ROD) for training at the
MMR in June and July, 2009, respectively (see US Army Environmental Command and US Army
Corps of Engineers 2009; US Army Environmental Command and US Army Corps of Engineers
2009). In November 2009, the district court issued a decision favoring Mālama Mākua that
required the Army to conduct additional archaeological surveys and marine resource studies, but
which also denied Mālama Mākua’s request that the additional studies’ inclusion within the Final
EIS should cause another iteration of the EIA process with regard to the circulation and public
comment on the Final EIS and reissuance of the ROD.35 This decision meant that while the Army
34

Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part February 28, 2012,
Findings and Recommendation Regarding Remedy for Defendants’ Settlement Violations;
Order Regarding Remedies”, Document 234, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No.
1:09-cv-00369-SOM-RLP, June 20, 2012.
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Mālama Mākua v. Gates, “Order Clarifying Remedy for Defendants’ Previously Determined
Breach of Paragraph 8(B) of the Settlement Agreement; Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement; Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment”,
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was still responsible for completing the studies and conducting public review as part of the EIA
process and Joint Stipulation, their obligation to do so was covered under the provisions of the
Settlement Agreement and Joint Stipulation as a matter of contract law, not as part of their
statutory obligations under the NEPA. The court further clarified this point, stating that once the
studies were completed and incorporated into the Final EIS, Mālama Mākua could still seek legal
recourse under the NEPA based on the Army’s decision to revise, amend, or reissue the Final EIS
and ROD.
In 2014 and 2015, the Army published the “Archaeological Subsurface Survey in Areas B
through F at Mākua Military Reservation, Mākua Ahupuaʻa, Waiʻanae District, Oʻahu Island,
Hawaii” (2015) and “Mākua Marine Resources Supplemental Study Report” (2015a),
respectively. These two documents, which have each been subjected to the public feedback and
subsequent revision processes, are intended to fulfill the Army’s court-ordered obligation to
revise the impacts to archaeological and marine resources. As of this writing, it is unclear how or
whether the Army plans to proceed regarding the incorporation of these two documents into the
EIS, and whether or not they will issue a new ROD. However, one thing that is clear is that the
court ordered restriction on live-fire training remains in effect, meaning that no live-fire training
exercises were conducted at MMR from late 2004 through the first half of 2016.

“A Mosquito Biting a Rogue Elephant as it Crashes through the Forest”

In an interview with the Honolulu Weekly, Sparky Rodrigues, president of Mālama Mākua,
described his organization in relation to the Army as “a mosquito biting a rogue elephant as it
crashes through the forest. We’re tiny, but we’ve been able to make it stop to itch” (Black 2010).
Like a rogue elephant on the loose, the Army seemed to blindly bulldoze its way toward regaining
use of Mākua Valley for live-fire training despite the time, money, and political costs of trying to
Document 52, Dist. Court, D. Hawaii, Docket No. 1:08-cv-00327-SOM-LEK, January 23, 2009.
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justify its proposal and lack of clear evidence of the need to risk the ecologically, historically, and
culturally significant resources specific to the particular site, instead of selecting an alternative
site. Meanwhile, the persistence of Mālama Mākua, its allies, and the legal team from
Earthjustice were successful in not only making the Army “stop to itch,” but in so doing, make
inroads toward the broader goal of returning control of Mākua either to the State of Hawaiʻi, as
happened with Kahoʻolawe, or to the Kānaka Maoli families displaced by the US military.
The archaeological survey and marine resources study required by the 2007 Joint
Stipulation are prime examples of the types of concessions won from the Army through the
persistence of those fighting to save Mākua. Originally negotiated as specific requirements for the
EIS in the 2001 Settlement Agreement, the need for these two studies persisted as points of
contention over the fifteen-year period following the 2001 settlement agreement due to the
Army’s repeated delays and the subsequent push back from community members whenever the
Army published inadequate versions of the studies. The marine resources study is particularly
notable because of its explicit environmental justice implications. The primary community
concern expressed throughout the public feedback forums related to the uptake of
munitions-related toxins in marine creatures gathered and consumed as part of a subsistence diet
amongst Waiʻanae residents. More than just a strategic tactic deployed by the coalition to cause
further delays to the EIA process, the point of contention in the marine resources study asserted
the importance of marine species to local Kānaka Maoli ways of life in the context of their
marginality within the political economy of Oʻahu. The testing of marine life for toxins is an
environmental health justice issue linked to the ongoing forms of dispossession, displacement,
and environmental violence faced by Waiʻanae residents due to uneven development related to the
continued military occupation of the region, state policies criminalizing informal beach
settlements used by many Kānaka Maoli, and the prevalence of other toxins within the area in
addition to the runoff from decades of munitions use in the Valley (Niheu, Turbin, and Yamada
2007). Ensuring that the Army documented and addressed concerns regarding the infiltration of
toxics in marine life consumed by local residents meant another level of accountability for the
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impacts of past and potential future training at the MMR, even if the EIA process doesn’t require
the Army to take any specific actions to correct this impact.36
The environmental justice implications of holding the Army accountable for polluting
marine resources also reflect important maneuvering on the part of the Mākua coalition in relation
to the racial environmental state. By raising the issue of marine resources in terms of their
importance within the subsistence diet of local Kānaka Maoli residents, the coalition was able to
transfer the discourses and logics governing the Valley’s militarized land uses to alternate
conceptions of Mākua as embedded within a larger human ecosystem that emphasize Kānaka
Maoli survival. The campaign succeeded in shifting the geographies and scales of their struggle
by directly linking physical impacts to the Mākua Valley environment to the human-marine
ecosystems beyond the site boundaries and to communities whose stakes in this conflict extend
beyond the uses of the Valley itself for cultural and religious purposes. This geographical
maneuver on the part of the coalition fighting for Mākua takes advantage of the ways that the
physical environment often exceeds and is unconstrained by political geographies of control and
territoriality to tap into the environmental regulations that mediate the state’s actions.
In addition to their pressure on the Army regarding marine resources, the coalition also
made significant progress toward the broader social movement objective of resuscitating Mākua
as a sacred Hawaiian place for peace and healing that is accessible to Kānaka Maoli cultural
practitioners. Along with their allies, the members of Mālama Mākua have used their legal and
legislative campaign as a way of asserting Kānaka Maoli claims to the Mākua Valley through
their placemaking practices. The coalition has steadily accrued a number of legal footholds that
gradually paved the way to various forms of cultural, historical, ecological, and subsistence uses
of the land. Together, these represent a different ontological relationship to the land than that
36

Even if the EIA process does not directly address the health risks associated with the toxic
runoff from munitions, residents might have other avenues of recourse available under, for
example, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System under the US Clean Water Act.
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exercised by the military—as opposed to the view of the land as simply a space to be transformed
into additional training grounds and scarred by explosions and wildfires, Mālama Mākua, Hui
Mālama ʻO Mākua, and their allies have fostered a nurturing and caring relationship to the land
that views people as mutually dependent stewards of the land and its resources—the literal
translation of the Hawaiian word mālama is “to care for,” and that is precisely what this coalition
continues to do in Mākua.
One of the important activities that community organizers have engaged in is an annual
overnight celebration marking the Makahiki season celebrating the Hawaiian god Lono.
Makahiki traditionally begins after the fall harvest around October or November, lasts for
approximately four months, and celebrates the year’s harvest with a period of peace during which
war is taboo (Lasky 2010). Since 2002, following the Stipulation Order granting public cultural
access to MMR, members of the various organizations in coalition with Mālama Mākua have held
the celebration in Mākua Valley as an important aspect of their broader work in caring for Mākua
(Cole 2002; Adamski 2003). According to Hui Mālama ʻO Mākua member William Aila, Jr., “The
idea of having people connect back to the land is very important for the future generations. Young
people, especially living in a city, don’t have a sense of place, a sense of being…We disrespect the
land, we disrespect our gods, our elders, ourselves. We are here because of that connection to the
land” (qtd. in Adamski 2003). The Makahiki ceremony brings Kānaka Maoli back to Mākua, and
in so doing, helps them develop their own sense of place and belonging while also establishing
Mākua as an enduring place for Kānaka Maoli and their cultural practices. Momi Kamahele
describes this process through her own experience: “We practice this because of what Lono
symbolizes in our culture, in terms of peace, in the wealth of the land. It feels good when you do
something to preserve and to heal. When I chant it is a powerful expression of that feeling.” In
another interview, Aila expands on the significance of celebrating Makahiki at Mākua:
This is part of everyday life, the changing of the season, and also the changing of
the mindset of Hawaiian people to one of peace — wars were stopped at this time
of year. It [the celebration] is very important because it brings back into focus the
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role of sharing, and that it’s important to treat the land well. And more importantly,
we get to live the culture. (qtd. in Cole 2002)
The last part of Aila’s quote is particularly striking because it hints at the heart of the
community’s struggle to reclaim Mākua. For many community members, the struggle isn’t just
about stopping the military’s destructive environmental practices or preserving endangered
species, sacred spaces, and archaeological sites. It’s about the broader movement to maintain
Kānaka Maoli cultural practices and relationships with the land that were disrupted by colonial
settlement, military occupation, and commercial exploitation across the Islands. Aila captures this
sentiment when he explains: “The worst thing I hear is when modern people say ‘Hawaiians used
to do’ in the past tense as if Hawaiians have mystically gone away. Hawaiians are here and are
learning about their culture. They exist today and will continue to exist tomorrow” (qtd. in
Adamski 2003). In the context of the ongoing Hawaiian cultural renaissance that has grown into a
multifaceted social movement amongst Kānaka Maoli and their allies since the 1970s, the
struggle to reclaim Mākua condenses many of the goals of the broader movement within a
geographical struggle over the process of placemaking within Mākua through the reproduction of
Kānaka Maoli cultural practices and worldviews (see Kajihiro 2009; Lasky 2010; Oliveira 2014).
This sentiment is captured in Marie Alohalani Brown’s analysis of Anne Keala Kelly’s filmic
narrative Noho Hewa: The Wrongful Occupation of Hawaiʻi. Brown explains the importance of a
kanikau (mourning chant) performed at Mākua as “both a testimony and a protest against the US
military occupation of Hawaiʻi and its use of the land it appropriated”:
The kanikau is…an eloquent reminder of the Native Hawaiian presence…because
of our relationship with the ʻāina, praying for its recovery also works to ease our
own pain. Furthermore, this kanikau underscores the Native Hawaiian perspective
of the ’ʻāina as a living entity. These chanters are acting as witnesses for Mākua
Valley. Not only are they speaking to her; they are speaking for her. Because the
ʻāina cannot speak for itself, it cannot offer its own testimony, at least not in ways
that have import juridically or politically, as this group is doing for her. Their
kanikau recognizes that she has been ravaged. And while there were few actual
witnesses to the events that inspired the kanikau and its actual performance, the
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number of witnesses grows as more and more people see the documentary. (Brown
2014, pg. 381)
So where does the revival of cultural practices at Mākua and movement to reclaim Mākua
from military occupation stand given the Army’s record of dragging its feet on the EIA process
and repeated attempts to limit or ban public access to the Mākua Valley? In 2011, an outgoing
Army commander of the US Army in the Pacific announced, and his replacement confirmed, that
a plan was in place to shift live-fire training that had been proposed for Mākua over to nearby
Schofield Barracks and the Pōhakuloa Training Area, another (highly contested) training facility
located on the Island of Hawaiʻi (Cole 2011; McAvoy 2011). Both commanders made clear that
the transition would occur over a number of years pending successful construction of new training
courses large enough to facilitate the types and sizes of training activities originally slated for the
MMR, and that until that transition occurred, the Army would continue to pursue implementing
live-fire training at the MMR (McAvoy 2011).37 This announcement reinforces the position
maintained by Earthjustice since the 2001 Settlement Agreement that Mākua Valley was not the
only feasible alternative that would meet the Army’s training objectives. At the same time, the
statement issued by the incoming commander, Lt. Gen. Francis J. Wiercinski, made clear the
Army’s attempts to walk the line between maintaining its public image as a responsible
environmental steward and cultural mediator, without conceding its position as staunchly
committed to its militaristic raison d’être:
We’re going to be very respectful of culture. We’re going to be very respectful of
37

Over the more than two decades that Mālama Mākua has been interacting with the Army,
leadership within the Army has changed hands every few years, from the Secretary of Defense
all the way down to the local Army Garrison Commander—indeed, the court decisions
document these changes as the Secretary of Defense has passed from William Cohen, to Donald
Rumsfeld, Robert Gates, Chuck Hagel, and most recently, Ashton Carter. Every time new
leadership or Army representatives take over, particularly the Army Garrison Command, the
relationship between the military and community groups has to be reestablished and the Army
command has to develop an understanding of the complex environmental, cultural, and political
issues at play (Dodge 2014a).
167

CHAPTER 4. SACRED ENVIRONMENTS
the environment. In fact, I don’t think anybody does it better than us when it
comes to protecting the environment and being cognizant and protective of culture
sites. But in the end I also have to be protective of our greatest resource — our
sons and daughters. And you know what? We’re good enough. We can do all three
of those things. (qtd. in McAvoy 2011)
Looking back to the earlier court ruling that granted Mālama Mākua a TRO in 2004, it becomes
more readily apparent why the Army may have chosen not to evoke national security and a state
of national emergency to bully its way through or around the NEPA process or to seek an
executive or legislative exemption to the same effect. Claiming a national security exemption with
blatant disregard for Kānaka Maoli historical sites and cultural practices, as well as endangered
native species, would squander whatever political cachet the Army had developed in establishing
its numerous environmental management programs across the islands, including its work at
Kahoʻolawe (see US Army Garrison, Hawaiʻi 2010b; Ruelas 2013). By instead complying with
the NEPA and acting in relatively good faith to meet at least the minimum requirements of the
NHPA, ESA, and the demands of local residents and Kānaka Maoli community members, the
Army could maintain its public appearances as a good resident of the islands and maintain its
political support from people such as the late US Senator Daniel Inouye, who was a longtime
vocal proponent of the military presence across the State of Hawaiʻi and at Mākua in particular.
The year 2016 marked the 40th anniversary of the campaign to reclaim Mākua Valley as a
Kānaka Maoli place. Though it seems that the Army has finally decided that further pursuing
live-fire training at the MMR is neither necessary nor in its best political and public relations
interests, it remains to be seen whether or not they would consider further conceding rights to or
control over the land to Kānaka Maoli or the State of Hawaiʻi. Regardless of whatever may
happen when the Army finally meets all of its legal obligations under the various court orders,
settlement agreements, and the NEPA process, Mākua Valley is unlikely to return to a state of
constant bombardment and environmental destruction as it was prior to the interventions and
organizing efforts of Mālama Mākua and its allies. The NEPA process provided an important
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procedural scaffolding upon which Earthjustice was able to build a robust legal defense of Mākua
involving the ESA, NHPA, and judicial rulings enforcing settlement agreements. In turn, this
legal platform, combined with the tireless organizing efforts of community members, have
established new traditions over a fifteen-year period supporting cultural practices within, and
Kānaka Maoli relationships to the Mākua Valley that are unlikely to be unmade in the near future.
Interestingly, the battle over Mākua has been taken up within the Hawaiʻi House of
Representatives, with legislation being introduced—and subsequently left to die or tabled for
subsequent sessions—to establish a Mākua Valley reserve (Jordan 2011; Jordan et al. 2014;
Jordan et al. 2015) and to compel the Army to finalize its EIS, discontinue its use of Mākua, and
clean it up in preparation for returning it to the families displaced by the military (Jordan et al.
2016). In theory, the bill version introduced in the Hawaiʻi House of Representatives (HB1430 in
the 2015-2016 legislature) would establish a Mākua Valley Commission to oversee management
of a Mākua Valley Reserve upon expiration of the existing lease held by the Army, and
subsequently transfer control over the land back to the State of Hawaii, and presumably, the
State’s Department of Land and Natural Resources. Significantly, this bill calls for the
Commission to be composed of seven members, most of whom represent Kānaka Maoli
organizations, both within and outside of Hawaiian government positions. The other piece of
legislation, a House Concurrent Resolution, is more of a non-binding request to the Army
reinforcing all of the same demands made by Mālama Mākua and its allies.
While these bills are still purely speculative, and full control over the Valley wouldn’t
occur until at least 2028 when the US Army’s lease expires, they provide an interesting
proposition since the bill as proposed would establish formal oversight and management
guidelines for the Valley outside of military control, and explicitly for non-commercial activities
in furtherance of Kānaka Maoli cultural practices. It should be noted as well that the legal footing
for such legislation is as-yet uncertain since much of the land in question is likely held in
fee-simple title or sovereign control by the US federal government. The legislation as proposed is
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vague and fails to address the property in question or the property regime governing this transfer
of control. Despite these legal ambiguities, the bills, which are essentially offered up each session
of the state legislature, typically passes through committees until ultimately being tabled.
In any case, these proposals are significant because they acknowledge the efforts of
Mākua organizers and former Valley residents in their fights to reclaim Mākua as an important
site for Kānaka Maoli cultural practices by codifying their role in land stewardship and
governance. Additionally, they have been proposed in a climate of uncertainty regarding the
future of the Army’s presence in Hawaiʻi since, in 2013, the Army announced its plans—and
published a programmatic environmental assessment—to significantly reduce the number of
troops stationed on O’ahu (US Army Environmental Command 2013; Pignataro 2015). Backlash
against the Army seems fairly prevalent within the State’s legislature, and even a number of the
house representatives who signed on to previous versions of the aforementioned bills seem to
have withdrawn support for latter incarnations, and some even signed on to a joint resolution
(HCR3/SCR3) “Strongly Opposing the United States Army’s Proposed Reduction of Schofield
Barracks and Fort Shafter Bases.” Amidst the proposed reduction in troops over the next several
years, it seems unlikely that legislative action will lead to any significant gains for those
supporting the return of Mākua to Kānaka Maoli, but at the same time, the announcement could
be indicative that the Army’s future role at Mākua will be conducive to meeting the objectives of
the Mākua community organizers.
As a case study in community organizing around the NEPA and EIA process, Mālama
Mākua and its allies were able to turn a relatively simple demand for the Army to fulfill its
statutorily mandated procedural requirements under the NEPA, into a powerful movement to
reclaim Mākua valley from military occupation that extends far beyond the limitations of NEPA
review or judicial intervention within the NEPA process. Aspects of the movement incorporate
anti-military and pro-peace sentiment, Kānaka Maoli claims for sovereignty, Kānaka Maoli
cultural renaissance, environmental justice and health concerns, and ecological and biodiversity
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conservation efforts that the coalition argues are inseparable from the worldviews prompting their
actions. It is impressive that the Mākua community organizers have compelled the Army to
commit funds, limited as they might be, to cleanup, conservation, and environmental restoration
at the MMR on top of halting further activities that contribute to the destruction of environmental
resources.
The Mākua campaign has contributed to ongoing efforts within Hawaiʻi to revive Kānaka
Maoli cultural practices as a source of pride and cultural identity against a history of settler
colonial institutions and practices reinforcing white racial and cultural domination. Whereas
Kānaka Maoli traditions and cultural practices were once the targets of the racialized violence of
colonialism, capitalism, and a US military-backed coup d’état, they now provide both an impetus
and legal basis for the assertion of Kānaka Maoli claims to Mākua stewardship. This campaign
initially depended on the legal and institutional framework of the NEPA legislation to gain
traction, but has since been able to sustain itself through a combination of legal maneuvering on
the part of Earthjustice, community input during public forums and comment periods, and the
organizing efforts of community organizations that have instantiated the revival of cultural
practices within Mākua Valley and around the Waiʻanae Coast. That is, while NEPA provided an
entry point for this struggle, the campaign has only endured because the community has
maintained its pressure on the Army and has continued to innovate their strategies to tap into
other aspects of the racial environmental state. For example, the NHPA, which dovetails with
NEPA in establishing an armature for racially and culturally sensitive modes of governance over
the built environment, provided the legal basis for substantiating claims about historically
significant archaeological sites and culturally significant sacred sites. These sites, in turn, are
cognizable by the racial environmental state as a result of the longer history of Kānaka Maoli
struggles for recognition of Hawaiian sovereignty by the US government.38
38

Many people within the movement for Kānaka Maoli sovereignty and Hawaiian independence
reject the idea of recognition by the US government as an indigenous tribe or dependent nation,
and instead assert their status as an internationally recognized sovereign state under US
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In recognizing the significant gains of the Mākua coalition, it is worth considering that
perhaps the state’s recognition of Kānaka Maoli cultural practices and sacred sites vis-à-vis the
NHPA and the NEPA signal a sort of “neoliberal multiculturalism” that serves to maintain the
military presence throughout Hawaiʻi by conceding cultural site access and token
environmentalism in place of the ability to conduct live-fire training, while still maintaining
control of Mākua Valley, and also reinforcing their position of control over other sites throughout
the State, in particular Schofield Barracks and Pōhakuloa (see Melamed 2011). The state in this
case, deploys its ability to be culturally sensitive to Kānaka Maoli concerns exactly because such
concessions allow the maintenance of the settler state under the thumb of military power, even
though that power isn’t being wielded as a direct threat of violence against Kānaka Maoli—even
though their training activities do enact various forms of racialized “slow violence” in the form of
toxins and cultural destruction—but rather, in the form of military political power and federal
funding that help drive the formal Hawaiian economy (Nixon 2011).
Rather than in the sense of domination or absolute sovereign control over space that the
Army claimed in its militarized exploitation of the land, Mālama Mākua, Hui Mālama ʻO Mākua,
and their allies have taken legal actions, mobilized community members in protests, submitted
comments to the Army expressing their concerns about the military use of Mākua Valley, and
engaged in cultural activities to strengthen and rebuild ties with the land. By directly engaging the
modes of environmental governance employed by the racial environmental state in the forms of
the NEPA, ESA, and NHPA policies and the legal recourses for enforcing them under the APA,
the coalition has won victories affecting what activities and land uses can and cannot take place in
the Valley, asserting new relationships of control over the land that finally supplant the regime of
de facto martial law that seemingly governed the Valley since its initial military occupation in the
1920s. In its place is a more liberal regime of environmental governance that accedes partial
control and access to the Valley for non-militaristic uses in order to sustain the legitimacy of
occupation (Sai 2008).
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broader military claims to land throughout Hawaiʻi.
Despite this, and to avoid ending on a cynical note, the significant victories won by
Mālama Mākua and its allies have resulted in tangible changes to Mākua Valley and give
continuing hope for securing future victories for Kānaka Maoli struggles across Hawaiʻi. And the
fact that the state recognizes the importance of Kānaka Maoli culture as a matter of public interest
and overriding environmental concern (see above) is a direct result of the combined efforts at
Mākua, Kahoʻolawe, Pōhakuloa, and countless other placemaking struggles to reestablish
Hawaiʻi as a Kānaka Maoli space. Reiterating Rodrigues’ analogy, the community’s persistence
in holding the Army to their legal obligations wasn’t necessarily going to prevent the Army from
crashing through the forest, but at least they have slowed it down, opened new “wounds” in terms
of opportunities for resistance, and forced the elephant to consider whether it really needs to get to
the other side of the forest by leveraging public scrutiny of and dissent to the Army’s use of
Mākua Valley.
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Conclusion

My intention for this project was to address the question of why the EIA process has endured as a
relatively durable mechanism for public intervention into governmental functions, and how it
functions within racialized conflicts over the production of space. To this end, I set out to tell two
aspects of the NEPA story. The first part of the story is about the ways that the NEPA framework,
and the EIA process in particular, gets taken up as a platform for political action and integrated as
part of a legal strategy within social movement and community organizing. In addition to
legislative action, direct action, and non-state alternatives, legal action is one of the avenues for
working toward social change and redirecting state capacities. By examining case studies in
which community organizers engaged the EIA process, I showed how the process fits within the
racial environmental state apparatus, and in turn some of the possibilities and limitations for
engaging the process as a means for achieving social change. Understanding the EIA process in
this way also helped reveal the underlying logics that make it an important, and thus enduring,
mechanism for maintaining the legitimacy and hegemonic power of the state despite the potential
avenues it provides for public intervention into and disruption of state functions. One of the
important revelations for someone previously unfamiliar with the operation of environmental law,
was that the modes of intervention available within the EIA process are circumscribed by the web
of state regulations and policies that provide supplemental legal footing on which to base claims
or arguments.
The other part of this story looks at the ways in which the NEPA legislation has shaped the
contours of the racial environmental state. This includes the manner through which state
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institutions operate under NEPA, the judiciary enforces aspects of NEPA, and conflicts between
agencies or between different state priorities are mediated within the EIA process. Though the
NEPA legislation does not on its face deal explicitly with race, and not all NEPA conflicts entail
racialized conflict, racial conflicts are often wrapped up within the EIA process, and
environmental justice considerations—as an institutional framework for considering the
entanglement of race, class, and environment—had been added as a requisite component of the
EIA process after President Clinton passed Executive Order 12898 (see below). Out of the
statutory obligations of state agencies, through public pressure, and by the very fact that the
production of nature under capitalism is quite often racialized, the EIA process results in the state
producing scientific knowledge detailing and weighing impacts to racialized environments.
Each of the case studies examined in this dissertation deals with racialized conflicts over
the production of the environment and differing visions of place. In each case, the conflicts were
resolved through a combination of administrative procedure, court intervention, and community
organizing to gain popular and political support. Because the EIA process is primarily procedural
and enforced through the judiciary, I relied heavily on court proceedings and agency reports for
my data, and developed an analysis of each case that traced the policy and court rulings back to
their implications for social and environmental justice struggles over the production of space and
reshaping the racial environmental state.
In the first case study that looked at New York’s West Side Urban Renewal Area, conflict
erupted out of competing visions for state-sponsored community development in terms of the
racial and class composition of an urban neighborhood. In this case, the EIA process was
transformed into an institutional mechanism for mediating conflicting racial and social welfare
priorities, but also diminished as a means for judicial intervention into the decision making
process. Largely as a result of the case law that derived from this case, the NEPA legislation was
stripped of its substantive imperatives regarding the incorporation of environmental values into
agency decision making, but in its place came the procedural requirement for agencies to consider
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how impacts caused by physical changes to the environment affect environmental justice
communities, though the official language of environmental justice wouldn’t be incorporated until
President Clinton enacted Executive Order 12898 in 1994.
The second case study explored a campaign that made use of the EIA process as an
organizing strategy and to prevent the construction of a prison in California’s Central Valley. The
campaign combined legislative and legal tactics, including the use of the EIA process as a way of
intervening in the state’s further transformation of the Central California landscape into a carceral
space. By building a movement around an environmental justice framework that appealed to a
broad constituency through the range of environmental issues that mattered most to each
constituent group—from ecological conservation, to traffic congestion, to groundwater use, to the
local and statewide economy—the campaign organizers were able to use the racial environmental
state’s institutional and administrative mechanisms to delay and almost avert the expansion of
California prison system. The stakes of the campaign were more than just the individual prison;
the fight in Delano was part of the campaign organizers’ broader strategy of prison abolition,
aimed at dismantling the carceral state’s investments in policies, practices, and physical
infrastructure to control and punish racialized populations marked as surplus to the reproduction
of capital, and instead promote alternative investments in those populations through education,
health care, and economic development. This case highlights the ways in which the racial
environmental state on the one hand operates through the production of carceral spaces to
facilitate particular flows of people and capital, while on the other hand, it provides a mechanism
in the EIA process for challenging the expansion of the carceral state.
The final case study in this dissertation followed the history of a campaign-turned-social
movement to reclaim Mākua Valley from the US military as a Kānaka Maoli place. In this case,
the Army’s resistance to fully engaging the EIA process in a timely fashion led to the indefinite
postponement of their proposal for live-fire training in Mākua Valley after local activists teamed
up with an environmental law organization to use the NEPA legislation as the basis for a lawsuit
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against the Army. The NEPA legislation, along with the Endangered Species Act and the National
Historical Preservation Act, operate in concert to regulate permissible land uses in light of the
Kānaka Maoli claims regarding historical, cultural, and religious uses of the Valley. The racial
environmental state mediates these placemaking claims against the frequently irrefutable claims
of national security under the entrenched War on Terror. The legal case brought under the NEPA
legislation opened the door to broader forms of organizing after a cleverly crafted settlement
agreement early in the campaign conceded to a temporary and partial resumption of live-fire
training in exchange for key concessions from the Army in terms of their commitments under
NEPA and opening the site to the public. The former of these concessions has allowed the legal
campaign to endure well beyond the duration of the settlement agreement, while the latter has
allowed Kānaka Maoli to begin the process of reclaiming the Valley through their cultural and
religious practices. This case study serves as a prime example of the capaciousness of the racial
environmental state as a malleable framework for social change through environmental justice
principles.

The Institutionalization of Environmental Justice

The legislative intent behind NEPA was never for it to be a public policy that deals explicitly with
race or racial issues. Other legislation passed throughout the middle of the 20th century, such as
the Fair Housing and anti-Jim Crow portions of the Civil Rights Acts of the mid-1960s are far
more explicit about their intentions for reshaping spatial dimensions of the racial state. The
expansive character of NEPA, however, situates it as an extremely important factor in the actual
implementation of certain aspects of Fair Housing legislation, for example, as shown in Chapter 2.
It also provides an entirely different framework for considering how racialized geographies are
produced through the political and juridical category of environment. Certainly the category of
environment as a political analytic precedes NEPA, but NEPA instantiates entirely new
institutional arrangements that span the breadth of state institutions. And given the political
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opening left in the wake of Civil Rights legislation, both state and non-state actors turned to
NEPA for a framework for engaging struggles over racialized space because of the flexibility of
environment as an analytical category. From the start, NEPA operated in an environmental justice
capacity, providing a mechanism, via the EIA process, for racially differentiated populations to
engage the state to shape the ways in which their environments were made safe, healthy, and
otherwise supportive of life.
By the time Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12898 in 1994, shifts in state logics
around environmental justice had already begun to sediment, as the EPA and other federal and
state agencies were already implementing, if unevenly and inconsistently, internal policies for
assessing impacts to racially and culturally differentiated communities, as part of NEPA, Civil
Rights legislation, and otherwise. And because of the public disclosure function of EIA and the
legal protections from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the goal of preventing overt forms of
distributive discrimination was already coded into the policies of the EPA and other federal
agencies. So then the question remains as to why Clinton felt it necessary to pass an executive
order whose function in many was already outmoded by existing juridical and procedural
precedent. Clinton’s executive order brought into public focus the need for official
representational antiracism within state institutions. That is, to maintain the legitimacy of liberal
democracy in the face of growing resistance from organizing around issues such as environmental
racism, state institutions needed to adopt mechanisms for including and considering culturally,
racially, and economically differentiated populations. It acknowledges the various forms of
critique environmental justice advocates raised against the state and capitalism by acknowledging
the spatial inequalities of environmental racism. However, through its institutionalization of a
previously radical framework for engaging spatialized social justice, it diffuses the more radical
critiques of structural racism by insisting on a particular vision of environmental justice premised
on neoliberal multiculturalism and liberal democratic principles of recognition, inclusion,
participation, and disclosure as sufficiently aspirational for continued capitalist growth.
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Executive Order 12898 attaches environmental justice, as a form of official state
antiracism, to the broader project of modeling racial liberalism as a universalized component of
contemporary racial capitalism, at the same post-1992 Rio Conference moment that EIA was
becoming a universal model for environmental policy across the world. By establishing sets of
guidelines, procedures, and a juridical framework through which racialized environmental
knowledge is produced, disseminated, and brought to public scrutiny, the EIA process, amended
by Executive Order 12898, was institutionalized as one of the many state mechanisms implicated
in the government of racialized space. State-sanctioned forms of environmental antiracism further
entrench the ways in which racial liberalism is entwined in the universalizing discourse of US
capitalist modernity by foregrounding the representational aspects of racial justice while brushing
aside the forms of environmental racism most inextricably tethered to global capitalism and
contemporary forms of racial domination (cf. Melamed 2011). Environmental justice thus
became politically viable at the local scale and within the national context while simultaneously
naturalizing the “off-shoring” of environmentally racist pollution and resource extraction regimes,
and the masking of other forms of environmental racism such as policing practices and access to
adequate housing, health care, and clean water. Under the Executive Order 12898 and the NEPA
legislation, race serves as one of the ways of understanding and empirically “knowing”
environmental geographies, who is impacted, how, and whether or not those impacts are
acceptable under the liberal racial regime of official forms of environmental justice. Within this
system, the environment is the nexus of geographical expression of power, production, resources,
and waste. The NEPA legislation links environment to the production of space.
Environmental impact assessment thus forms a basis for the ascent of a sort of US
environmental imperialism through its universalizing lens of environmental techno-science and
liberal antiracism as rationalizing principles for managing space and racialized populations. It
allows for the abstraction of racialized material difference and to a certain degree, the masking of
imperialist relations through its formalized environmental knowledge systems and liberal public
participation mechanisms. The effect is that uneven capitalist development projects and property
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relations are legitimized through racial and environmental knowledge produced through the EIA
process, and the pluralistic-democratic mechanisms—public feedback and disclosure—contained
therein. Despite this, the implementation of EIA is always grounded in, and dependent on, locally
situated knowledges and institutional capacities arising from both state and non-state actors. Thus,
just because the mechanisms facilitating the spread and implementation of EIA are linked to the
structures of global capitalism and US empire, its institutional apparatuses are not necessarily
fixed in service of those forces. Indeed, the universalizing tendencies of EIA as global knowledge
and governance system might help to reveal some of the ruptures within the imperialist logics of
global capitalism exactly because it makes legible the similar forms of oppression and domination
that derive from the EIA apparatus.

NEPA at 50: An Agenda for Future Research

As the National Environmental Policy Act approaches its 50th anniversary, retrospective analyses
of its legacy and speculative visions of its future are bound to begin appearing across a range of
academic, popular, and political, and legal spheres. The two questions that many of these
reflections will likely look to address are whether the NEPA legislation has been successful in
achieving its intended purposes—however that is described, and what the Act’s broader impact
has been on environmental policy more generally, both within the US and internationally. In
terms of the former of these questions, there is likely to be renewed debate as to the intention of
the legislation: was it really intended to create substantive “improvements” to environmental
conditions within the US, or was it intended to merely cause bureaucrats to think differently about
their responsibilities to people and the environment. Scholars including one of the first
environmental politics scholars and a co-author of the NEPA legislation, Lynton Caldwell, stood
firmly by the position that the Act was intended primarily as a prescriptive mechanism for
“redirecting national policy through procedural reform,” based on a particular moralistic and
values-driven approach to the environment (1998, ix; Bartlett and Kurian 1999). Caldwell also
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viewed the Act as having an unrealized potential for significant substantive impacts on both the
environment and on environmental considerations within government functions, however this is
more of a minority viewpoint, particularly given the impact court decisions such as Strycker’s Bay
had in gutting the EIA process of its substantive requirements, and of the realities of the
institutional, political, and organizational structures have in shaping both the content and
outcomes of the EIA process (Bartlett and Kurian 1999). This latter viewpoint hints at the broader
implications of the NEPA legislation on public administration, the planning and development
processes, and political action beyond the substantive objectives of the Act, and theorizes, among
other things, the impact assessment model as a general mechanism of government (e.g., Taylor
1984).
This research contributes to the scholarship about the broader implications of the NEPA
legislation that is less concerned with the intentionality behind the Act or its successes or failures
as an Act rooted in a particular vision for the environment or the state’s role in managing the
environment. My primary focus is on the implications of the Act for the ways that racialized
environments are produced through conflicts within and in relation to the state. The three case
studies I examined provide a lens into some of the issues that arise out of public engagement with
the EIA process. They are not intended to be representative nor exhaustive of the ways in which
this engagement has played out in practice over the nearly half-century since the NEPA legislation
was passed. Rather, they are a middle distance reading of the legal, political, cultural, and social
processes that shape the ways that people use, and the state responds to, organized efforts making
use of the EIA process to shape their racialized environments through different ideas of place,
belonging, domination, and belonging.
This research reveals several prospective areas for further examination. First is a deeper
theoretical interrogation and explication of the racial environmental state. This dissertation
utilized the concept of the racial environmental state as a way of understanding how the NEPA
legislation changed existing forms of state control over racialized space. The racialization of the
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environment its counterpart, the management of racialized populations via environmental
geography, through practices and processes of statecraft, in addition to being central to my
understandings of the EIA process, are (much) more broadly, foundational to the flows of capital
and workings of empire and coloniality. Developing better geographical understandings of the
state’s investments in race and environment is crucial in looking to the possible futures of global
resistance to capitalist domination of environmental and climate change discourses.
One of the current limitations of this project is that the data are primarily from legal and
limited archival sources. Developing the case studies further through the incorporation of oral
histories, ethnography, or additional archival materials would add different dimensions to the
narratives and would likely reveal insights into the organizational back stories that can only be
glimpsed in the current study. Such investigation would likely reveal the ways that each campaign
operated in relation to the racial environmental state by engaging state apparatuses on the one
hand, and trying to change the state’s operation on the other. For instance, in the case of Mālama
Mākua, it is clear from interviews with lead organizers that complex interpersonal relationships
were developed and nurtured between the various organizations opposed to the Army’s use of
Mākua Valley and some of the people within the Army command and other military divisions
responsible for carrying out archaeological and environmental studies and conducting
conservation work within the training grounds (e.g., Aila and Dodge 2012). Learning more about
the nuances of these interpersonal relationships could provide rich detail about the difficulties or
opportunities made possible through the workings of state institutions on an individual scale. My
own experience as an environmental engineer situated between environmental regulators and
“polluters,” for example, informs me that a tremendous amount of work and negotiation occurs off
the official records and outside of courtrooms or public hearings, and that the outcomes of such
negotiations can have dramatic impacts on the things that happen on the record.
But further examination of the specific case studies highlighted in this dissertation is only
one possibility for further developing this project. While such work would give a richer
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accounting of the nature of individual campaigns, another avenue of investigation might be to
expand the scope of the types of cases I examine in detail, or alternatively, using some sort of
empirical analysis to generalize across a much broader range of cases. What types of conclusions
might be inferred through a longitudinal analysis of all NEPA or other EIA-type cases submitted
for public review or challenged in court? Relatively early in the life of the NEPA legislation,
Serge Taylor (1984) looked briefly at the types and quantities of NEPA cases that were challenged
in courts or which encountered delays due to public intervention. Given the impacts of case law
precedents on the possible scope of legal challenges under the NEPA legislation, repeating a
similar analysis today would likely reveal significantly different results. On the other hand,
expanding the scope of cases examined in detail would provide additional insights into the use of
the EIA process as a site for political intervention, and as the three existing case studies have
shown, additional ways that the EIA process provides a mechanism for shifting state discourses
around race and environment. Interesting areas for additional case studies might include cases in
which a US agency was involved in a proposal for explicitly transborder or international projects
(e.g., the Keystone XL oil pipeline between Canada and the US), cases directly resulting in new
legislation, and cases in which environmental justice concerns came in direct conflict with
ecological concerns.
Expanding on both of the above possibilities for further research, one of the projects I have
already begun planning for is an ethnographic project involving environmental justice community
organizations. The project aims to develop understanding of the ways that the shifting contours of
the racial environmental state under already-institutionalized environmental justice policies and
rapidly developing climate change and adaptation policies are affecting the abilities or capacities
for community organizations to engage in social and environmental justice activism, advocacy,
and community development work. While not directly about the EIA process, this next project
aims to build on the racial environmental state framework developed through my research on the
NEPA legislation in order to uncover other ways that community organizers utilize the state’s
capacities for racial and environmental regulation in their efforts toward social justice that go
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beyond EIA litigation. As this dissertation reveals, legal strategies are often one in an arsenal of
approaches to reaching social and environmental justice goals, so this project seeks to fill in those
other gaps to see what other strategies look like that engage the state as a means of changing it.
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Appendix A:

California State Prisons, 2016

Date Opened

Design
Capacity

San Quentin
Folsom
Chino
Soledad
Chino
Tracy
Tehachepi
San Luis Obispo
Vacaville
Norco
Susanville
Jamestown
Vacaville
Represa

1852
1880
1941
1946
1952
1953
1954
1954
1955
1962
1963
1965
1984
1986

3,283
2,072
3,078
3,281
1,026
1,026
2,781
3,884
2,315
2,314
3,682
3,926
2,610
1,728

Avenal
Ione
Stockton

1987
1987
1987

2,320
1,700
400

San Diego

1987

2,200

Corcoran
Blythe
Crescent City
Chowchilla

1988
1988
1989
1990

3,016
1,738
2,280
2,004

Wasco
Calipatria
Imperial
Lancaster

1991
1992
1993
1993

2,984
2,208
2,208
2,200

Delano

1993

2,692

Name

Location

San Quentin State Prison
Folsom State Prison
California Institution for Men
Correctional Training Facility
California Institution for Women
Deuel Vocational Institution
California Correctional Institution
California Men’s Colony
California Medical Facility
California Rehabilitation Center
California Correctional Center
Sierra Conservation Center
California State Prison, Solano
California State Prison,
Sacramento
Avenal State Prison
Mule Creek State Prison
Northern California Women’s
Facility1
Richard J. Donovan Correctional
Facility
California State Prison, Corcoran
Chuckawalla Valley State Prison
Pelican Bay State Prison
Central California Women’s
Facility
Wasco State Prison
Calipatria State Prison
California State Prison, Centinela
California State Prison, Los
Angeles County
North Kern State Prison

185

APPENDIX A. CALIFORNIA STATE PRISONS, 2016

Date Opened

Design
Capacity

Blythe
Coalinga
Susanville
Chowchilla
Soledad
Corcoran

1994
1994
1995
1995
1996
1997

2,200
2,208
2,224
1,980
2,224
3,324

Delano
Stockton
California City

2005
2013
2013

5,120
1,722
2,304

Name

Location

Ironwood State Prison
Pleasant Valley State Prison
High Desert State Prison
Valley State Prison
Salinas Valley State Prison
California Substance Abuse
Treatment Facility and State
Prison, Corcoran
Kern Valley State Prison
California Health Care Facility
California City Correctional
Facility

Data Sources:
California Department of Corrections. “California’s Correctional Facilities.” Brochure.
Sacramento, CA: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, October 15,
2007. Archive.org. http://web.archive.org/web/20071214123130/http:
//www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/docs/20071015-WEBmapbooklet.pdf.
California Department of Corrections. “CDCR Prisons.” California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, 2016.
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=z9Q7-pexmUvk.kbu0FmAYn1Xs.
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, State of California. “Monthly Report of Population
as of Midnight December 31, 2010,” January 4, 2011. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_
Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad1012.pdf.
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, State of California. “Monthly Report of Population
as of Midnight December 31, 2015,” January 1, 2016. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_
Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad1512.pdf.
“California City Correctional Facility.” CCA, 2013.
http://cca.com/facilities/california-city-correctional-center.

1

The Northern California Women’s Facility closed in 2003.
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